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Resumo 
 
A busca por um sentido de unidade nacional desempenhou sempre um papel central nos vários 
governos do Canadá. Com o final da Segunda Guerra Mundial foram inaugurados os Anos 
Dourados da Política Externa Canadiana, um amplo slogan que os canadianos assumem como 
parte de sua existência enquanto comunidade política, estabelecendo um paralelo entre Unidade 
Nacional e Politica Externa. Tal abordagem demarca o Canadá como uma potência média 
moderadora, conhecida por um envolvimento permanente e um comportamento cooperativo na 
defesa de valores universais na promoção de uma ordem mundial internacional mais 
institucionalizada e justa: uma visão com presença permanente nos seus processos de definição 
e execução da agenda politica.  
Enquadrados na ampla agenda do internacionalismo, diferentes governos liberais rotularam o seu 
programa político para resgatar a Idade de Ouro e alcançar os seus interesses políticos, sejam 
estes internos, externos ou ambos. Esta tese começa por analisar de que forma a Agenda de 
Segurança Humana emerge através do governo de Jean Chrétien durante os anos 90 enquanto 
resposta a uma crise interna de unidade nacional na véspera do referendo do Québec que exigiu 
um novo sentido de unidade nacional entre os canadianos, aumentando o seu sentimento de 
orgulho e pertença, sendo também considerado como o último período internacionalista na política 
canadiana. Na véspera da eleição federal de 2015, Justin Trudeau discursou acerca dos chamados 
valores liberais canadianos após uma década de governo conservador, oferecendo uma visão 
positiva e até nostálgica do Canadá, aumentando a necessidade de retornar o internacionalismo 
liberal à política canadiana. Uma vez no poder, Trudeau anunciou que “o Canadá está de volta”, 
abrindo as portas para uma agenda de política externa, inovadora, idealista e muito pessoal, com 
a qual os canadianos se identificaram e até mesmo uma possibilidade de reconstruir uma nova 
agenda de segurança humana. No entanto, grande parte da retórica de Trudeau perdeu 
credibilidade uma vez que as suas ações e experiências como Primeiro-Ministro não 
acompanharam a prometida marca idealista para um mundo demasiado turbulento. 
 
Palavras chave: Canadá, Definição da agenda, execução da política, política externa, Segurança 
Humana, Partido Liberal, Unidade Nacional, State Branding, Jean Chrétien, Justin Trudeau. 
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Abstract 
 
A search for national purpose has always played a central role throughout the several governments 
of Canada. Particularly after the end of World War II, the Golden Years of Canadian Foreign Policy 
were inaugurated, a broad slogan which Canadians assume as part of their existence as a political 
community, thus establishing a parallel between National Unity and Foreign Policy. Such approach 
brands Canada as a mediatory middle power, remarked by a permanent engagement and 
cooperative behavior, endorsing universal values through the promotion of a more institutionalized 
and just international world order: a vision with permanent presence in its processes of agenda 
setting and execution.  
Framed within the broad agenda of internationalism, different liberal governments have branded 
their political program in order to rescue the Golden Age and achieve their political interests may 
these be internal, external, or both. This thesis starts by analyzing how the Human Security Agenda 
emerged through the Government of Jean Chrétien during the 1990’s as a response to an internal 
crisis of national unity in the eve of the Quebec Referendum, calling for a sense of national unity 
among Canadians by increasing their sense of national pride and belonging, also being remarked 
as the last internationalist period in Canadian politics. In the eve of the 2015 federal election, Justin 
Trudeau has brought to discourse the so called Canadian liberal values after a decade of 
Conservative rule, offering a positive and even nostalgic vision of Canada by enhancing the need 
to return liberal internationalism to Canadian politics.  
Once in power, Trudeau announced that “Canada is back”, opening the door for an innovative, 
idealistic and very personal styled Foreign Policy agenda that Canadians identified with and even 
a likely possibility of rebuilding a new Human Security Agenda. However, much of Trudeau’s 
rhetoric has lost credibility as its actions and experiences as prime minister did not keep up with 
the promised idealistic brand for a too turbulent world.  
 
Keywords: Canada, Agenda Setting, Policy Implementation, Policy Making, Foreign Policy, Human 
Security, Liberal Party, National Unity, State Branding, Jean Chrétien, Justin Trudeau. 
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The present dissertation was born out of the ambition of reconciling the study of Political Science 
with International dynamics thus, finding a common ground between both disciplines in order to 
provide a unique approach to what the behavior and conduct of states is concerned.  
States are constrained by both domestic and external actions, with the first triggering the second 
and the latter also replying to the former or vice-versa, many times through the form of norms, 
values and discourses in the pursue of well-defined self-interested goals, regardless of its nature. 
In a context of middle-power hood, Canada underscores an appealing internationalist discourse 
that remains a powerful tool both inside and outside its borders, whereas the consistency of such 
discourse and the positive reception by the external environment becomes a major source of 
internal legitimacy, credibility and unity.  
For the above mentioned reason, and further more to be ahead clarified, this research will analys 
the Canadian internationalist Foreign Policy discourse in relation to domestic but also external 
determinants, shading light upon the ongoing synergy between both levels of interaction. 
 
Presentation and Theme Purpose 
 
The peaceful conclusion of the World War pushed the world into a new reality that demanded a 
new normative framework in order to explain a wide set of rising phenomena. As the old terminology 
on interstate warfare no longer seemed capable of offering the needed insights into these same 
dynamics, new discourses established the needed ground for the inauguration of a period where 
progressive values became an integral part of Foreign Policy identity of states, particularly middle 
powers through an interest-based approach. The specific content of such discourse has evolved 
over time and normative context, giving origin to the concept of Human Security in the 1990’s, 
immediately after the end of the Cold War whereas the individual replaces the State as the main 
security referent object. 
Under the wide internationalist umbrella that had been inaugurated by Lester B. Pearson in 1969 
during the Golden Age, the Canadian government of Jean Chrétien eagerly endorsed the Human 
Security discourse under an embedded humanitarian agenda that rapidly became major slogan 
not only of its mandate but of Canadian Foreign Policy itself (Chapter 1). In fact, however, such 
option was not randomly chosen as it is mainly justified by the power of ideas, springing from the 
progressive values of the early 20s in the sense that norms shape the interests of states not only 
by shaping the definition of interests but also by determining its order of priority but masking, 
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sustaining and advancing power-oriented ambitions whatever these may be (Shurke 1999, 268). 
During a period where the government faced difficult context due to the increasing pressures of 
Quebec’s separatist forces by the time of the 1995 independence referendum, Jean Chrétien 
sought to promote the unity of its state by providing Canadians with shared motivating values and 
a cultural ideal, therefore legitimatizing the established order, highlighting the argument that the 
lack of a rooted nationalism, typical of federative states, leaves a dangerous political void at the 
center of the state system (Thomsen and Hynek 2006, 851). 
After ten years of Conservative rule and a clear abandonment of the liberal internationalist policies, 
mainly remarked by a move away from a multilateral approach and the United Nations itself, the 
2015 elected Prime-Minister Justin Trudeau noticed Canadians and the international community 
that “Canada is back” (Chapter 2) by promising the return of the liberal internationalist approach 
and restoring Canada’s place in the world as a peacekeeper par excellence, “helpful fixer” and 
“honest broker”. Although an open space for a Human Security discourse, or an updated one 
according to the normative context, was left open, the kept promises remain unfulfilled apart from 
a relabeling. While there have been changes in tone (towards the United Nations), approach and 
content (climate change and feminist FP), the needed lifting was not sufficient to encounter a too 
turbulent external environment that highly conditioned the state action and an effective 
accomplishment of internal commitments: reestablishing Canada’s positive role outside its borders 
and therefore, internalizing such condition into the national mythology.  
In what Human Security is concerned, it served as a starting point for this analysis as the last 
discourse on Canadian liberal internationalism but mainly because it reveals itself as an important 
topic for the field of Political Science given that it is little explored through such lens of research. 
From the perspective of Political Science, Human Security also presents itself as a powerful political 
tool that enables a reevaluation of the changing norms of sovereignty, security, and power politics. 
Additionally, despite the fact that such a concept is applied to policies of external incidence, the 
truth is that the responsibility for providing security lies essentially with the state and its dynamics, 
a central actor in the studies of political analysis. 
Opting for Canada as a case study would be a clear choice given its peculiarities in terms of national 
unity make Canada a pertinent research. Additionally, it has a leading role in the international 
community as a promoter of the internationalist approach to foreign affairs. The Canadian Human 
Security agenda was remarkably attractive in that it differs from other existing approaches, 
including that of the neighboring state (USA). Regarding the instrumentalization of discourses and 
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external practices that serve the purposes of internal aggregation of the state makes it an 
interesting case study. Because it is an eminently multicultural society and multinational state in 
which ethnic diversity reigns, state unity becomes many times threatened by Quebec’s 
independentist movements given its historical past. In this regard, the country's Foreign Policies 
easily become political means to achieve domestic ends, not only to gain an electoral base but also 
with the intention of taking advantage of them in favor of unity.  
Moreover, the relevance of the study is still related to the selected temporal delimitation, since it 
refers to the 90's, when the debate about Human Security reached its peak due to a redefinition 
of the traditional conceptualization of security but also when Canada assumed unmistakable 
leadership on the Human Security objectives. The second time frame, on the other hand, refers to 
a possible return to the strategy of the golden years, but whose success can be questioned from 
several variables, such as the relevance of the concept as an instrument and if it proves to be 
appropriate for the current international context, calling into question some basic premises of the 
liberal progressive values in the world.  
Following the presented framework on the conceptual and theoretical options but also the case 
study, this research will be guided by a puzzle definition through the concepts of National Unity, 
Foreign Policy and Human Security applied to Canada’s strategy: states may build specific 
discourses through its Foreign Policy options with the ambition of targeting domestic audiences; 
Human Security became itself a powerful instrument of national interests through which  
humanitarian values were incorporated into the internal discourse on ‘beliefs’ cohesion and 
inherent state legitimacy under the need to further develop national unity. 
In this regard, the main purpose of this research is to offer a more comprehensive approach on 
why Canada has used Foreign Policy behavior to achieve domestic political goals, driven by an 
internal constraint and scrutinize the encountered limitations (external) by accounting the analysis 
of two different governments in the pursue of these same goals, under equally different 
circumstances at both external and internal environments.  
 
State of the Art 
 
While there is no prompt definition on liberal internationalism, it usually denotes liberal foreign 
policies “sometimes to indicate more broadly the application of liberal principles and practices to 
international politics” (Jahn 2013, 13). Noting that such application is not always successful, being 
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remarked by ups and downs, times of high expectations and success (1990’s) but also shameful 
failures (2001) the current order continues to be guided by liberal principles and norms as 
reference objects for international politics (Jahn 2013, 14).  
It was precisely during the 1990s that the Human Security discourse emerged as an impressive 
political tool, reinforcing a powerful period of liberal internationalism by taking advantage of the 
ongoing international dynamics through new security agendas, security manifestations, new rules 
and new security policies which states sough to adopt, not only to promote short term policy gains 
but also to justify self-interested actions and, consequently, promote an image of credibility, status 
and influence (Christie 2010, 174-175) which assume a particularly important role for middle 
powers like Canada. In fact, Chandler considers that such agendas configure an adaptation of a 
realistic understanding to an increasingly globalized and interdependent world on a purely selfish 
basis (Chandler 2007, 431), an argument with which Suhrke agrees by assuming that, through 
this promotion, its serves as a useful slogan but, above all, a truly powerful Foreign Policy 
instrument as a source of legitimacy (Suhrke 1999, 272). Canada’s example seems to fit the 
mentioned argumentation in the sense that its appeal to Human Security focused on the freedom 
from fear approach, which was a random choice. Unlike freedom from want, the conceptualization 
of freedom from fear fits into Canada's security reality. The promotion of a narrow position in the 
political arena is largely dictated by pragmatic reasons: budgetary constraints do not allow for a 
more ambitious Human Security policy in terms of earmarking funds for international aid with 
developmental impact (Tzifakis 2011, 361). Stressed by Grayson (2004, 47), the realpolitik of 
national interest is not at all absent from the Canadian Human Security discourse; indeed, the 
principles of Human Security have been mapped on a realistic understanding of the world and the 
place that Canada occupies in it. The main distinguishing feature of the agenda is that its brand 
image was able to camouflage self-interest under the guise of moral superiority and 
humanitarianism, making even more sense when denoting that, from a domestic policy 
perspective, Canada's position on Human Security can be analyzed as a state branding strategy in 
the form of nationalism (Nimijean 2018, 128). 
Thomsen and Hynek make clear that Canada aims to establish itself as a role model by having 
something to offer the world: an example as a multicultural ethnic society with a successful track 
in accommodating differences and proven ability to generate unity within diversity by practicing 
peace at home (Thomsen and Hynek 2006, 846). Taking the symmetry between internal and 
external affairs, Thomsen and Hynek, question what are the self-benefits and rewards for Canada 
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when endorsing such efforts. Apart from an ambition to “do good”, keep peace and avoid the 
escalation of conflicts, they come to the conclusion that Canadian efforts emerge the standing 
struggle on achieving a shared national purpose to which these discourses positively contribute by 
providing Canadians with a sense of national unity and distinctiveness (Thomsen and Hynek 2006, 
847). Canada has become highly conditioned by its early events in what state formation is 
concerned. It is composed of French speaking population which were converted into British by the 
time of its conquest in the late eighteenth century but who’s historical events made them 
Canadians later in nineteenth century, not disregarding the aboriginal population who were 
overwhelmed and diminished throughout the years (Gagnon 2000, 13-23). In this regard much 
are the reasons that seem to divide Canadians.  
Authors such as Will Kymlicka, Richard Gwyn or John Rawls have sought to explain the difficulty of 
finding common purpose, particularly in Canada, arguing that “social unity depends on 'shared 
values'” (Kymlicka 1995, 187) in the sense that focusing on these same values will provide grounds 
for unity. Kymlicka actually provides an example on how a Canadian government established a list 
of seven shared values among Canadians, including (1) belief in equality and fairness, (2) belief in 
consultation and dialogue, (3) accommodation and tolerance, (4) diversity (5) compassion and 
generosity (6) attachment to natural environment (7) commitment to freedom, peace, and non-
violent change, yet recognizing that providing grounds for common values might not be enough to 
provide the sufficient raison d’être to bind together different national groups under the same state 
(Kymlicka 1995, 187-188).  
Thomsen and Hynek actually go further and assert that Canada’s collective sense is built through 
a two-way process with external and internal identities being mutually constructed (Thomsen and 
Hynek 2006, 848), also providing an interesting scheme that captures the nexus between national 
unity and the essence of Canadian Foreign Policy. According to its framework of role conception1, 
(1) a role is assumed in the internal environment as part of the agenda setting process endorsed 
by policy makers whose intentions of self-perception come to define the state’s international role, 
followed by (2) the role performance in the external environment which includes the FP behavior 
itself such as decisions actions and outcomes as part of the policy implementation process which 
then, are (3) perceived and judged by other international actors that react and generate 
 
 
1 The role conception denotes the intent and purpose of an actor, a normative perception of expected external behavior (Thomsen and Hyken 2006, 
855). 
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expectations based on this same behavior and assumed role; finally, (4) the evaluation from the 
outside sphere may, or not, cause a role identification and internationalization, noting that this last 
stage is not certain but an expected result, which a constant recurrence is likely to result in 
increasing credibility, thus taken for granted by turning pervasive (Thomsen and Hyken 2006, 857).  
 
 
Figure 1. The Process of Rolemanship Model 
 
Source: Adapted by the author from Thomsen and Hyken 2006, 257. 
 
To this discussion, Nimijean adds that there is a clear connection between the external promotion 
of national values, domestic politics and branding, highlighting that “constructions of Canada for 
external audiences increasingly informed domestic politics” (Nimijean 2018 129), initiatives that 
can target domestic or external audiences but even both (Brown 2018, 146). Noting, however, that 
earning a reputation demands effective proofs and measures in the sense that only once concrete 
action is taken will values be reflected and perceived by audiences (Nimijean 2018, 129). In this 
last regard, falls the “Canada is back” slogan pronounced by the time Justin Trudeau took office, 
denoting the return of Canada’s traditional role into the external context, thus being redirected 
towards the international community , possibly related with the Canadian desire to attain the UNSC 
non-permanent seat in 2021, but also towards domestic public, announcing that the liberal 
internationalism was back and devoted to accomplishment important contributions at the 
international stage (Brown 2018, 146).  
Although little research on Justin Trudeau’s mandate has been complete at this point, some 
consistency is noted through the argument that the rhetoric has reconfigured the external 
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perception on Canada, “rhetoric– reality gaps” are also perceived, revealing an inconsistent state 
role (Nimijean 2018, 130). Copeland completes this assertation by observing that “for Canada to 
come back meaningfully on the world stage, our diplomacy and international policy will under any 
circumstances need a radical, comprehensive and intensive revamp” as “evidence of that 
commitment remains to be convincingly registered” (Copeland 2018, 251).  
Within this mapping, the present research work is framed within Christie’s argument that Foreign 
Policy discourses may endorse a self-interested purpose (Christie 2019, 174), where the broad 
Canadian brand assumes a nationalist label under the form of a moral and legitimacy superiority 
(Nimijean 2018, 128). Additionally, analyzing the Human Security agenda under the government 
of Jean Chrétien and a possible return with Justin Trudeau, assumes Thomsen and Hyken’s 
rolemanship process model by considering the role assumed by Canada at the internal 
environment as well as its performance and perception by other actors in the external sphere 
(Thomsen and Hyken 2006, 857). The added value of this research highlights the reason for such 
selfish intention to be adopted by Canada considering a domestic politics perspective, but also by 
shading light upon the process through which national unity aimed to be promoted through Foreign 
Policy.  
 
Research Question and Hypothesis 
 
The central question of the present investigation is: Why has Human Security, been 
instrumentalized to foster national unity in Canada during the governments of Jean Chrétien (1995-
2000) and Justin Trudeau (2015- October 2019)? 
It is said that states, particularly middle powers, have endorsed the Human Security discourse 
throughout the 1990’s on the basis of national interests (Grayson 2004, 47), with Nimijean 
highlighting that Canada’s approach was covering a nationalist purpose (Nimijean 2018, 128) of 
fomenting national unity (Thomsen and Hyken 2006, 846). This research aims to explore why such 
discourse was built, performed, and externally perceived, therefore opening space for a possible 
domestic internalization and legitimation by the internal audience. Taking this logic as a starting 
point, the hypothesis of this research work supposes that: 
 
H. Jean Chrétien’s government has adopted the Human Security approach in Foreign Policy by 
endorsing a solid agenda-setting and policy implementation process, complemented by a favorable 
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normative and international context as the means to foster internal sense of national unity. Justin 
Trudeau’s government, on the other hand, lacked a coherent agenda-setting and policy 
implementation process, facing an hostile and unstable external environment in the pursue of a 
Foreign Policy discourse and agenda to foster national unity. 
 
Given the internal context, Chrétien’s government had the assignment of fomenting national unity, 
choosing the Human Security discourse at a time when the concept was under the international 
spotlight not only in the academy but also in the real world context where new answers were 
demanded to tackle new political and security dynamics (Kaldor 2013, 2-3). Such is seen to have 
favored Canada to actively contribute towards this new international allied to its known reputation 
as peacekeeper. In 2015, after ten years of conservative government, Justin Trudeau promised to 
bring Canada back to the international stage, many times assuming a similar discourse as the one 
of the 1990’s, providing Canadians with a FP based on its traditional values (Nimijean 2018, 128). 
In order to demonstrate this hypothesis, the agenda-setting and policy implementation processes 
shall be considered as an analytical tool to provide an explanation on how Chrétien managed to 
achieve valuable results in its HS FP approach thus increasing the chances of promoting national 
unity, also considering the internal and external environment at the time. The same will be applied 
to Trudeau’s government in order to verify if such approach was also pursued to foment national 
unity.  
 
Methodology 
 
This research work will be guided by two central arguments based on its nature: the position here 
expressed assumes that the world is socially constructed, asserting that phenomena are dependent 
on the meaning which the different actors provide to their action (Marsh and Furlong 2002, 19) 
therefore, it is not accurate to assess political behavior without grasping relevant meanings (Bevir 
and Rhodes 2016, 4); also, it is based on the premise that meanings can only be determined 
through interpretation focusing upon understanding rather than causally explaining, being justified 
by an hermeneutic system (Marsh and Furlong 2002, 19). In this regard, this research work falls 
upon the interpretivist paradigm.   
This approach is simply justified by the ambition of this dissertation to analyze Canada’s intentional 
meanings by understanding its discourses, actions and practices (Bevir and Rhodes 2016, 12) 
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through the terms of Jean Chrétien and Justin Trudeau, essentially based on the double 
hermeneutic conception where “the world is interpreted by actors (one hermeneutic level) and their 
interpretation is interpreted by the observers (a second hermeneutic level) (Marsh and Furlong 
2002, 19), whereas Canada’s self-perception represents the first level while the second is occupied 
by other international actors and the external environment itself. Additionally, the involved facts 
and terms to be here appraised -national unity, Human Security, state branding – must be 
understood within the framework of a social construction as they do not exist apart from the human 
subjective interpretation of the world. As for the mentioned reasons, Canada’s international 
practices and the meaning of its subjective internationalist discourse under nationalist motivations, 
would be poorly assessed by being reduced to intervening variables. 
The methodology option fell upon qualitative methods which best fits a case-study orientation 
aiming to insight a social and political reality through a “thick description” (Vromen 2010, 261). 
An in-depth understanding with no intention of making generalizations over many cases but seeking 
an interpretation of meanings and provide understandings instead of explanations (Vromen 2010, 
255). Opting for a comparative method was the second methodological choice as a necessary 
approach to assess the validity our interpretations, highlighting the method of difference as the 
suitable arrangement to analyze two similar cases which differ only in respect to some specificities 
(Hopkin 2010, 291).  
In order to proceed with such analysis, information gathering was carried out through both primary 
and secondary sources. In what the first is concerned, the choices fell upon official government 
websites namely DFAIT, Global Affairs Canada, Justin Trudeau Prime Minister of Canada, Liberal 
Party of Canada, Elections Canada and CIDA in order to collect official policy papers, statements 
and discourses2. Discourse analysis came to play a central role and, in this regard, the chosen 
discourses for both governments were at domestic (parliament) and international stages (United 
Nations) mainly ones that evidenced each of its foreign policy guiding lines in order to figure its 
strategy and ambitions. Also, United Nations websites such as UNGA, UNSC, UNHCR, essentially 
as sources of resolutions and reports as well as discourses; additionally, an interview to Roland 
Paris was also carried out, an academic from University of Ottawa and former Senior Advisor to 
the Justin Trudeau on Global Affairs and Defense (2015-2016) in order to assess some research 
 
 
2 The availability of official statements to compare, particularly policy papers and statements, is different from one government to another as there 
was a discrepancy of quantity regarding the production of such official documents.  
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gaps on Trudeau’s government. Secondary sources were privileged as well throughout this work, 
namely the consultation of journal articles, chapters of books and, in a fewer volume, edited books.  
In sum, this dissertation will analyze the background context on the interaction between domestic 
and external dynamics, throughout the government of Jean Chrétien between 1995 and 2000 but 
also Justin Trudeau during the years of 2015 and 2019, carrying out an approach through 
qualitative options, namely a comparative method grounded on the assessment of variables.  
 
Dissertation Structure 
 
Following the topics to be analyzed in this research, the dissertation structure will be divided in 
four different parts, corresponding to three chapters, combining a broader contextualization on the 
major subjects –National Unity, Foreign Policy, Human Security- to be considered, followed by an 
analysis of each government’s action and discourse performance, finalizing with the concluding 
remarks. 
Chapter I, “National Unity, Foreign Policy and Human Security”, seeks to expose the theoretical-
conceptual background upon which the case-study will be guided thus, establishing a parallel 
between the three different but interconnected dimensions in what the context of this research is 
concerned (domestic and external environment connected by process of agenda setting and policy 
implementation). The three subchapters will be assessing each one of these concepts by outlining 
its major arguments, debates and controversies, regarded of interest for this research. 
Chapter II named as “Jean Chrétien’s Government” and Chapter II, “Justin Trudeau’s 
Government”, will be dedicated to the analysis of each government’s context (external and 
internal), discourses and particular focus on the action plan endorsed by each term. This last one 
will be following the same criteria and how were these reflected in the agenda-setting and policy 
implementation process: international legal norms, institutions, crisis and advocacy. 
The “Conclusion” presents the closing remarks by summarizing the main points of evidence that 
sustain the central statement of this dissertation. Such will be grounded on the comparison of 
governments regarding the differences and similarities in its discourse and action plan which are 
reflected in its agenda setting and policy implementation processes. Additionally, the contrasting 
context in which they have operated shall also be considered as a conditioning factor on the means 
to achieve the defined policy goals. Lastly, future research venues will be exposed as well as. 
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Chapter 1. National Unity, Foreign Policy and 
Human Security 
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1.1. National Unity, Values and Soft Power 
 
The consistency between national unity and the external promotion of values through soft power 
tools is one worth to explore given that the national and international spheres are interconnected 
as never before. Such poses the challenge of understand the relation between both levels of 
integration and the ways in which culture and identity connect them (Shulman 1998, 110).  
According to Henderson and McEwen (2006, 174), the inclusion of shared values in the political 
agenda intends three distinctive ambitions: (1) the quest for ideological goals; (2) mobilization of 
populations; and (3) encouragement of inter-regional solidarity and identity. In their view, such 
objectives aims to promote a specific policy by aligning it with the presumed values, gain civil 
support in times of sacrifice and stress by bringing together the public upon the notion of shared 
beliefs and values or, at last, reinforce the mutual sense of belonging with a nation-building purpose 
in contexts where territorial challenges threats a state’s integrity deriving from sub-state nationalist 
activities3. Taking the last approach, Edney (2015, 9) adds that these values strength cohesion 
between political, social and cultural core of statehood with those on its margins, meaning that the 
relation between national unity and values is best described as the “development of shared 
meaning of nationhood where the promotion of shared values may play a role in shaping 
conceptions of national identity”, being translated into collective meanings, underlying what defines 
individuals (Henderson and McEwen 2006, 176). 
 
1.1.1. National (State) Unity within (Social) Diversity 
 
Most of modern societies face different types of diversity, from national minorities, immigrant or 
indigenous peoples deriving from a variety of sources, either the process of globalization, history, 
or the liberal highlight on individual choices, turning unity into a major state priority as means to 
reconcile diversity without losing cohesiveness and take society as a whole. It may be said that 
multiculturalism has been present in almost every society throughout history with nothing 
distinctive when compared to today’s context however, Parekh does not agree with such statement 
by arguing that if in premodern societies religion united beliefs and practices, today, the absence 
 
 
3 From the sub national movements point of view, the perception of their nation sharing a different set of values may intensify its sense of cohesion 
and distinctiveness, compared to the population with whom they divide statehood (Henderson and McEwen 2006, 174) 
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of moral consensus and the importance given to the freedom of personal choice, create a deep 
division concerning the best way to lead collective lives but also about the meaning of human 
activities and relations (Parekh 2005, 4). Additionally, given today’s diffusion of democratic sense 
allied to the ideas of status and rights equality, minority communities put greater pressure 
regarding equal treatment, equal opportunities, participation and the right to shape collective life, 
noting that the state should be neutral and therefore not privilege a particular group within society 
(Parekh 2005, 4). Today’s western societies are dominated by liberal ideas of individual choice 
that legitimize the concept of diversity where individuals take part in a common political life that 
cuts across communal boundaries, making it difficult for modern states to deal with a wide set of 
different demands without losing its cohesion and unity. In this context, it is relevant to expose the 
different concepts that affect modern states who face diversity within its social sphere, which is the 
case of national integration, national identity and how these are distinct but related with the purpose 
of national unity. 
National integration is the means by which the various groups of society, may these be regional, 
ethnic, social or subgroups, become unified as a common political community through a shared 
sense of collective identity, also known as national identity (Shulman 2007, 111); National identity, 
on its end, translates into a solidarity awareness among the members of this same political 
community which can be defined as a nation4 and can be delimited by a state’s geographical 
boundaries but who’s endurance majorly relies upon its strength and content: the intensity of the 
belonging sense as well as the reasons that brings individuals together thus, promoting the ‘we’ 
feeling among them, including a common territory, myths, memories and a common culture 
(Shulman 2007, 112). In this regard, national integration is conceived as unity based upon a 
shared and grounded identity where individuals share common understandings, aspirations and 
ideas that bind them together (Guibernau 2004, 133). Societies described as multiethnic, 
multiracial, multilingual, multicultural or multinational, face, however, deep concerns on how to 
maintain order and political stability, thus ensuring an effective exercise of state power5 (Shulman 
2007, 110) failing to retain stable democratic politics” by revealing a fragile nature of democratic 
practice (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972, 21). 
 
 
4 According to Guibernau, a nation concerns a “human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly 
demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future” (Guibernau 2004, 132). 
5 In Max Weber’s words, a state is defined by a “human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory (Weber 1991, 78), taking note that not all states have effectively accomplished this, and some of them are not even aspired 
to accomplish it (Guibernau 2004, 131). 
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 In 1939, Furnivall identified such contexts as plural societies which can be described as “the 
presence of two or more separate communities living side by side yet, without mingling in one 
political unit”, noting that this pattern was visible in Thailand and South Africa but also in Canada, 
a non-tropical society and sought to be an advanced country (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972, 11). 
According to Furnivall, plural societies are “qualitatively distinct from homogenous ones”, 
highlighting that an outside force is needed to maintain order within the state (Rabushka and 
Shepsle 1972, 11). Although there is no academic consensus on providing a systematic 
explanation for the conflicts that may occur within a plural society, it is a common conclusion that 
the recognition of core common values may be a sign of a more unified society and a low chance 
of conflict occurrence (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972, 17). In such cases, national unity comes to 
play a central role and an essential tool in multicultural societies, a state without a nation or with 
various nation within it, by uniting various groups that have different social and cultural 
backgrounds, into one physical state entity in an heterogeneous society by establishing common 
bounds through norms and values. Unity, in these cases, might be achieved without uniformity 
given the context of diversity but with no fragmentation (Lalonde 1994) thus, sustaining national 
(state) unity. 
Although the thesis “diversity within unity” dates back to the indigenous peoples in North America 
and Taoist societies, it was embodied in the ancient Greeks and Romans and is still visible in 
today’s Western culture through a variety of disciplines may these be religion, philosophy, politics 
or ecology. In fact, it was through the ecological sphere that the concept has evolved over the last 
years, highlighting that “biological diversity is necessary to sustain the healthy existence of 
ecosystems and that the healthy progress of the planet is dependent on a diversity of such 
ecosystems”, which, applied to social sciences, means that “each human being possesses talents 
and capacity (…) that contribute to the richness of the human community as each individual 
expresses herself (…) harmoniously with others” (Lalond 1994). However, Berman et al. makes 
clear that developing a common sense of citizenship and state loyalty among individuals who are 
distinct in their identity, culture or religion is a difficult task but not an impossible one (Berman et 
al. 2004, 13).  
According to Berman’s conception, states can reconcile national unity with diversity by 
incorporating different strategies or policy approaches, may they choose a specific one or a 
combination of them all: the ‘neutral’ or difference-blind’ state; the Jacobin republicanism (nation-
building from above); civil society (nation-building from below) or federalism. The ‘neutral’ or 
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difference-blind state implies that the state will avoid implicitly or explicitly to support a specific 
culture over other while allowing individuals to express their cultural practices and identity in private 
as they respect the right of others to do the same; States should be ‘diversity neutral’, meaning 
that no public decision is based upon a specific ethnic, religious, racial or other ascriptive element 
however, the author notes that such approach is not a feasible one as the states is obliged to take 
positions regarding the language of public administration, education, public media and so on 
(2004, 16). The Jacobin approach or Nation Building from above, also known as ‘assimilative’ 
considers that the states are active actors in promoting a specific language, culture and identity 
which will be defined as the official national language, culture and identity to which all individual 
shall assimilate; this approach is also recognized to be the French model of citizenship however, it 
also has limitations given that results may only be achieved through a massive coercion against 
the minority groups therefore, not a viable option nowadays given a clear condemnation from the 
international community (Berman et al. 2004, 17); The civil society approach or nation-building 
from below, on the other hand, intends to avoid the flaws from its opposite by considering that a 
common language, culture and identity should emerge as a result of the mixing of individuals on 
civil society organizations through a gradual consensus-building, not as an imposition of the central 
authoritarian state; Although this one may seem to be a reliable model, Berman et al. argues that 
it is an unrealistic conception as he considers that civil society associations are already themselves 
dived and defined, therefore unable to generate a common integrated society; additionally, such 
approach demands an active and planned involvement of the democratic state (Berman et al. 
2004, 18-19). Lastly, given the exposed limitations of the previous approaches, Berman et al. 
suggests the idea of leaving behind the goal of achieving a unified nation-state when there is no 
reliable route to develop a cohesive and unique national identity, thus accepting the differences 
within the state through the federalist approach and accepting the coexistence of more than one 
identity. Also, Burgess considers that a set of elements may be regarded as essential to the political 
strategy of maintaining and strengthen the unity of the state, namely “trade, a common law and a 
common system of courts, a system of education that would spread common ideas and aspirations 
to the citizens”, noting that in cases where centrifugal forces were significant by a minority section 
of the populations, constitutional arrangements take a useful role by softening resentment feelings 
towards the rest of society, through legal disposals or the establishment of local autonomy; In such 
cases federalism can be assumed as an essential solution to achieve harmony among the different 
communities within a state (Burgess 2006, 19). Considering the importance of the federalist 
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approach for the purpose of this thesis, particular attention will be given to the analysis of 
federalism as an alternative strategy to achieve unity within diversity in multinational states. 
 
Federalism as a solution 
The idea of federalism is an interesting one as it embodies both the goal of unity and diversity, 
becoming a particularly attractive state system for plural societies that eager to combine these two 
assets. It is well translated into to a model unites two or more self-governing communities in a 
shared political space (Norman 2006, 77) and where the different groups are more or less 
territorially concentrated (Berman et al. 2004, 19). Federalism is commonly known for its 
mutability and flexibility, making it a feasible option for plural societies, where the state is composed 
by different groups with distinctive national self-conceptions (multinationalism), all with more or 
less sense of nationhood, contrasting with the ideal nation-state (uninationalism) (Norman 2006, 
7). 
The study of federalism is a controversial one given its inherent adaptability and irregularity as it 
has evolved through different conceptions, in different periods and applied to a variety of contexts 
(Burgess 2006, 4). However, citing Greave, Burgess recognizes that there is the common 
knowledge that “federalism, with its combination of separate unities, may be said to correspond to 
the nature of modern man. He is a member not of one but of many social unities” (Burgess 2006, 
4). Federalism, in this regard, is a difficult case study as it reflects the complexity of human 
existence. There is a wide variety of federal systems combining different specificities according to 
the societal conditions in which the federal constitutional and institutional models are to be applied 
to, making it difficult to establish generalizations. In a simply matter, however, multinational 
federalism, is conceived as a system that manages and accommodates at least two nationalities 
and other societal minority groups (Burgess 2006, 131).  
According to Norman, the purest form of the federalist arrangement is composed by provinces, 
which are commanded by provincial governments, and the federal government, corresponding to 
two orders, not necessarily implying a hierarchical organization through different levels, where 
individuals are both members of its province as well as the federal state (Noman 2006, 77). 
Important noting that, neither provinces or the federal power are subordinate to each other, as 
each has sovereign powers derived from the constitution rather than a higher level of government; 
each has the necessary legislative and executive power to deal with its citizens, being directly 
elected by them (Norman 2006, 78). Seymour and Gagnon, however, make an important 
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distinction between territorial federalism and multinational federalism. Within its framework, 
territorial federalism recognizes the existence of diversity and may recognize the equal status of 
some regions through the concession of autonomy, power separation and non-subordination but it 
can fail to put forward different policies according to the different groups; multinational federalism, 
on the other hand, intends to reflect “the diversity of the people in the diversity of its federated 
states” (2006, 4). In this regard, a multinational state does not necessarily imply that its political 
system corresponds to multinational federalism: federal states can be composed of different people 
but this might not be reflected. Canada, for instance, is not pointed to be a complete multinational 
federal state in what its constitution and institutions are concerned but more like a territorial 
federalism (Symour and Gagnon 2006, 12). Instead, Canada can be considered a multinational 
state, a “multinational society in a bilingual and multicultural federation”; or Switzerland, for 
example, with a wide cultural, linguistic, religious and historical diversity with political minority 
groups but no consistent majority therefore, being only classified as a “multicultural and 
multilingual federation” (Burgess 2006, 118- 130) 
Apart from the different classification, this is far from being a perfect system and problems may 
rise in federal states which eager to combine unity and diversity, even when there is an effective 
representation of a minority group within the federal system and when the group exercises effective 
self-government. This is particularly likely to happen in cases where the minority group is the only 
one among other subunits or provinces through which the majority is represented; Such context 
not only gives the majority legislative advantage, but it also isolates the minority group as the other 
parts tends to go along with the central government (Seymour and Gagnon 2012, 9). 
 
1.1.2. Values as a Shaping Element 
 
The concept of values remains one of difficult assessment from the perspectives of many 
disciplines due to a number of reasons: values are unobservable and therefore difficult to measure; 
the process of values generation is unknown and behavioral explanations are not conclusive; 
existing explanations are insufficient to understand how values shape behavior (Hitlin and Piliavin 
2004, 360).  
Although there are several approaches regarding the conceptualizations and measurement of 
values, when employed, the term ‘values’ usually denotes a reference to “interests, pleasures, 
likes, preferences, duties, moral obligations, desires, wants, goals, needs, aversions and 
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attractions, and may other kinds of selective orientations” (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004, 359). Hitlin 
and Piliavin suggest that values outline the means and end for social action, grant motivation for 
such action, but are also vital for self-definition (2004, 383), governing political behavior in the 
political system (Osaghae 1999, 264). Whereas Schwartz and Bilsky summarize the five key 
features which are common to the several definitions on values: “(a) concepts or beliefs, (b) about 
desirable end states or behaviors, (c) that transcend specific situations, (d) guide selection or 
evaluation of behavior and events, and (e) are ordered by relative importance.” (Schwartz and 
Bilsky 1987, 551). 
Taking Schwartz and Bilsky’s summary of what values are about, Rustow notices that government 
policies fall upon the need for a majority consensus, denoting the “need for certain beliefs or 
psychological attitudes among the citizens (…) a procedural consensus on the rules of the game” 
(Rustow 2015, 337). Additionally, as Gilbert describes, “sharing values unifies people, it binds 
them together”, meaning that national unity is strengthen by a set of “shared beliefs or opinions” 
that inspire the different groups within a plural society and brings them together within a state of 
several identities (Gilbert 2005, 45). Asserted by the thesis of “diversity within unity”, individuals 
may embrace more than one identity within the state system, therefore reinforcing the identification 
of individuals with a set of values become a central strategy to foster the sense of belonging to the 
national community (Henderson and McEwen 2005, 174). 
 
Soft Power: The mean to Achieve the End 
Intended to describe the means by which national unity is stimulated, "soft power is the ability to 
affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment” 
(Nye 2008, 94) which resources “arise in large part from the values an organization or country 
expresses in its culture” (Nye 2004, 8). Worth noting that, such ability to attract “is associated with 
intangible assets such an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and 
policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority” (Nye 2004, 6). 
To this idea, Gunek adds that “When a country’s culture includes universal values and its policies 
promote values and interests that others share, it increases the probability of obtaining its desired 
outcomes because of the relationships of attraction and duty” (Gunek 2018, 2549. Such means 
that practices and values produced by a society are a powerful soft power tool at the international 
stage which can be induced by a sense of morality and, therefore, legitimacy (Gunek 2018, 254). 
The notion of moral legitimacy arises out of two of three soft power sources according to Nye, being 
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Culture, Political Values, Foreign Policy (Nye 2004, 95): When particular political values, 
institutions and policies are lived up to at home and abroad, expressed at the international stage 
through an effective Foreign Policy that lives in accordance, such states are seen as legitimate and 
covered of moral authority before the other international players, aligning their national interest 
with appealing causes such as economic aid or peacekeeping (Gunek 2018, 254). 
As Nye asserts that “resources that produce soft power arise in large part from the values an 
organization or country expresses in its culture” (Nye 2004, 95), Gunek denotes that such 
approach generates a branding process based on cross-cultural communication through an 
advertising strategy of awareness –attraction– preference thus, opening “a new game in 
international politics” about image and reputation (Gunek 2018, 257-258) where a positive 
character at the international environment enhances one’s soft power. This approach is well 
described as a state branding strategy: A “unique, multidimensional blend of elements that provide 
the nation with culturally grounded differentiation and relevance for all its target audiences both at 
home and abroad” (Dinnie 2008, 15) thus, increasing international political influence, stimulating 
stronger international partnerships and enhance nation building by nourishing confidence, pride, 
harmony ambition and national resolve” (Gunek 2018, 257). 
 
1.2. Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: What Relation? 
 
There is urgency of refocusing our efforts on (…) domestic 
affairs as the centerpiece for understanding the world of 
international relations (Mesquita 2002, 1). 
 
Following the end of the first and second World Wars, the international system witnessed a constant 
interaction among states which was also induced by the rise of International Organizations, namely 
the United Nations. Such resulted into the intensification of foreign policies, the interaction of one 
state with another, which originally remotes Foreign Policy formulation and execution during the 
emergence of the modern State in the 17th and 18th century (Bojang 2018, 1). 
According to Charles Hermann, Foreign Policy remains a neglected concept which constitutes a 
serious obstacle to a comprehensive and adequate explanation of what he conceived as the 
behavior of states (Neack 2008, 9). Neack (2008, 9), for instance, takes Foreign Policy further by 
asserting that analyzing a state’s orientation on this regard, should consider both goals and 
behavior, thus understanding its purpose but also how and why these arise. Bojang (2018, 1) 
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considers that a state without Foreign Policy is a “ship in the sea without any knowledge of 
directions” in the sense that Foreign Policy is one of the greatest instruments at a state’s disposal 
to pursue its national interests. For instance, what motivates states to interact between each other 
in the international system is both their concern with change and status quo as long as they serve 
the domestic interest (Bojang 2018, 1). Also, Brighi and Hill note that domestic goals are many 
times achieved through the pursue of specific foreign policies in the same way that Foreign Policy 
objectives may also be accomplished by domestic politics (2012, 156).  
In the past, distinguishing domestic and Foreign Policy spheres would be regarded as an easier 
task, however, contemporary entanglement of politics has blurred such border between what is the 
domestic and foreign as it turns to be of great importance the connection of international relations 
(the way states relate with each other) with domestic dynamics (the activity of governments and its 
interaction with individuals, groups, among others) (Kaarbo et al. 2013, 1-2). In 1969 James 
Rosenau conceived a linkage relation between the domestic and international context composed 
of inputs and outputs that link both systems (Rosenau 1969, 45) recognizing that Foreign Policy 
behavior is a reaction to both external and internal triggers (Rosenau 1966, 31). Also acknowledged 
by Putnam in 1988, “domestic and politics and international relations are somehow entangled” 
(Putnam 1988, 427) in the sense that domestic politics are an important explanation for the state’s 
Foreign Policy that take great influence on its options (Fearon 1998, 289). Taking such approach 
does not necessarily mean that there is no detachment between these two policy spheres, this 
difference is still perceptible by observing the policy target: if the primary target is outside the 
state’s border it is understood as Foreign Policy or, if the primary target is inside these same 
borders, it is perceived as domestic policy; nonetheless, some cases might be considered both 
(Kaarbo et al. 2013, 3). Even though there is literature devoted to such bridge studying, just like 
the conception of Foreign Policy itself, this thesis is not yet sufficiently clear and elaborated neither 
untangled (Fearon 1998, 289; Putnam 427; Hill 2007, 259; Hagan 1995, 117) as Rosenau 
recognizes that Foreign Policy analysis lacks a general theory of testable generalizations to explain 
the determinants of foreign behavior neither a scheme to link the two components of external 
behavior (domestic and international spheres) (Rosenau 1966, 32). 
Taking Putnam’s “two-level game”, foreign affairs choices are motivated by simultaneous 
pressures and constrains emanating from their own domestic political context and international 
sphere (Putnam 1988, 460) meaning that there is an inherent linkage between domestic and 
international environments (Obikaeze 2018, 228) where decision makers face two sets of concerns 
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that continually interact (Hill 2003, 221). For instance, Miller has argued that Foreign Policy defeats 
or victories may well reinforce or forge national unity, already strained by sectional, regional, class 
and racial conflicts (1994, 634). 
According to these “nested games”, a wide range of actors, institutions and concerns influence 
leaders governing preferences, thus turning the Foreign Policy process not an isolated one, limited 
to systemic structures (Hagan 1995, 117). National interests broadly motivate their involvement 
in international affairs but, in return, international affairs also configure political behavior patterns 
(Hagan 1995, 118). For instance, the causal linkage between domestic and external politics 
reflects a political strategy of internal legitimization (Hagan 1995, 128) towards political opposition 
or civil society itself, for example. This particular strategy aims mobilization as means of asserting 
their own internal legitimacy, often related with the “game of retaining power in which the 
leadership manipulates Foreign Policy issues (Hagan 1995, 129). In fact, the classical theorist 
Morgenthau has asserted that the state’s international behavior is not limited to national material 
interests but it is highly influenced by its internal political and cultural context (Massie 2009, 627). 
According to Massie, material interests along with identity and culture, constitute an important 
framework to understand the underlying explanation and priority setting related with a state’s 
Foreign Policy ambitions such as national unity, political autonomy or simply reputation and status 
(2009, 628).  
Even though there is a general consensus among scholars that Foreign Policy “serves as an 
intersection point of domestic and international politics (Bojang 2018, 2), Hagen (1995, 135), 
recognizes that the essence of the theoretical logic that links domestic and Foreign Policy is a very 
complex one and underdeveloped. In this regard, Putnam (1998, 459) also notes that, there are 
several empirical examples of reciprocal influence and relation between domestic and foreign 
affairs however, there is need of concepts and theories in order to organize and extend the 
empirical observations. 
 
1.2.1. Determinants of Foreign Policy 
 
Acknowledged by Rosenau, “the dynamics of the processes which culminate in the external 
behavior of societies remain obscure” (Rosenau 1966, 31). As exposed so far, “foreign policy is 
the hinge of domestic and international politics”, meaning that the Foreign Policy of every state is 
a responsive strategy to both internal and external factors (Bojang 2018, 2). According to this 
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argument, state’s actions are influenced by two broad explanations, namely factors outside the 
state, and factors inside the state: the first pointing towards the international environment such as 
the international system organization and the second facing internal dynamics such as the political 
system, individuals and groups within this internal organization (Kaarbo et al, 2013, 7). This type 
of approach bridges international and domestic politics by considering how both internal and 
external determinants are sources of impulse on the state’s behavior (Kaarbo, et al. 2013, 7), 
where the implementation of strategies demand effective management align both fronts (Brighi 
and Hill 2012, 156). However, the level of influence between internal and external determinants 
varies according to the specificities of the environment where each state exists (Bojang 2018, 2).  
 
1.2.1.1. Domestic Determinants of Foreign Policy 
 
As Bojang (2018, 59) asserts, the domestic dimension of a state “determines the amount of social 
effect which can be devoted to foreign policy”. In divergence with the external dimension of 
explanation where the international circumstances may be quite similar for all players taking action 
within it, internal determinants of Foreign Policy have a wide spectrum of diversity between different 
states in the sense that the heterogeneity of geopolitics, political systems, leaders or cultures guide 
states in very different directions, yet facing the same external environment (Kaarbo et al. 2013, 
13). Taking a domestically based explanation induces that a state is not a ‘unitary’ player in the 
external scene as it has to deal with different judgements and conflicts internally, thus performing 
‘irrational’ behaviors from an external perspective, given the leader’s needs of accounting both 
domestic and foreign goals (Putnam 1988, 427; Kaarbo et al.2013, 13). These many ideas and 
clashes are settled among the different institutional levels and players within a state: Geography 
and Population, Culture and History, Economic Development, Military Capabilities, Political System, 
Leadership Style and Public Opinion (Kaarbo et al. 2013, 13). 
 
Resources: Geography and Population 
The resources of state correspond to what the French school conceives as ‘basic forces’ of Foreign 
Policy or one’s total sum of both advantages and disadvantages including its geography, population 
size, education, tradition but also development levels (Brighi and Hill 2012, 162).  
The territorial space occupied by a state, its dimensions and the population living within it, largely 
affects Foreign Policy strategy. Starting by the geographic location, it is a crucial factor to take into 
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account in the sense that it naturally defines permanent neighbors and natural frontiers may these 
be oceans, high mountains or the desert, thus remarking a changeless position in geography 
(Bojang 2018, 6). Turkey, for instance, is located at a transit point between Europe and Asia, which 
effectively affects its Foreign Policy behavior and strategy implementation. Citing Eayers, Bojang 
(2018, 6) asserts that “Pacts may be broken, treaties unilaterally denounced, but geography holds 
its victims fasts”. The geographical location necessarily includes the idea of size and form of a 
country. The size of a territory and its populations, is believed to have great impact as well, meaning 
that states in territory and population are expected to carry out an irrelevant role in international 
affairs in contrast with large ones whose international performance is predicted to be highly ranked. 
However, this preposition should not be taken in absolute terms, but rather as influenced by 
alternative elements, mainly the resources at a state’s disposal. Such statement is legitimate by 
taking into account the fact of Russia, China or the United States are large countries assuming 
important positions in international affairs and willing to take advantage of their enormous size 
both in terms of territory and populations nonetheless, small states such as Israel, Switzerland or 
North Korea whose rich resources in terms of military, economy or power provided them an active 
role; in the meantime, massive states like Canada, Australia or Brazil have not achieved such a 
leading performance among the dominant international players. (Bojang 2018, 5). 
Although nowadays the conception of geography cannot be overstated mainly due to the 
increasingly important technological and scientific evolution, this factor continues to be a dominant 
one when tracing one country’s Foreign Policy path. Although there is no apparent relation between 
the possession of certain characteristics and the capacity to play international influence, Brighi and 
Hill assert that resources are an important factor when a state defines its Foreign Policy choices 
(2012, 162).  
 
Society: Public Opinion and Cultural Values 
The public, its culture and inherent identity are essential factors to consider when analyzing a 
state’s Foreign Policy strategy. Starting by public opinion, in this context may be defined as the 
attitudes of citizens towards a Foreign Policy approach or specific policy. According to Bojan (2018, 
7), public opinion influences Foreign Policy in democracies, both by shaping who is elected and by 
influencing leaders once they take office as the opinion of individuals within a democratic state 
should be reflected through government policy (Robinson 2012, 170). 
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According to Robinson, the public opinion of democratic states concerning foreign affairs may be 
generally divided between either isolationists or internationalists, meaning that isolationists oppose 
the idea of their government taking an active approach in the international scene, while 
internationalists consider that their government should take an active Foreign Policy approach by 
getting involved in organizations like the United Nations (2012, 170). However, such statement is 
not coherent among scholars in the sense that as Kaarbo et al. (2013, 14) argue, the average 
people tend to take little consider on its country’s external policy, adding that many times evidence 
suggests that leaders who disregarded public opinion on Foreign Policy are not held accountable 
at the polls due to fact that topics revolve essentially around domestic matters. In 1950 Almod 
suggested that a distinction should be made between a small ‘attentive public’ and a larger ‘mass 
public’ as the former holds enough acknowledge to formulate a consistent view on foreign affairs 
while the latter is conceived as an inconsistent and irrational interpretation (Robinson 2012, 170).  
Instead, Kaarbo et al. (2013, 14) propose that Foreign Policy paths are usually chosen in 
accordance with enduring “core values” which refer to underlying values within society that the 
public uses as benchmark when judging a Foreign Policy approach namely, isolationism, neutrality, 
internationalism or anti-imperialism, for instance. Core values are particularly reflected in one’s 
cultural identity, meaning that these are connected to political culture – values, norms and 
traditions – broadly shared by individuals inside a state with a relatively persistency over long time 
periods of history. In this regard, culture provides individuals with ways of perceiving phenomena 
around them, thus providing ways of seeing and thinking by shaping ideas (Bojan 2018, 5). Kaarbo 
et al. (2018, 14) support such thesis by asserting that such enduring factors are a corresponding 
guideline for national Foreign Policy strategies.  
All in all, the role of public opinion and its influence over foreign affairs is an open question mainly 
due to the difficulty in assessing and actually measure its real influence (Robinson 2012, 172).  
 
Capabilities and Instruments: Economic Development and Military Strength 
As asserted earlier in regard to geography, resources at a state’s disposal and its ability to manage 
these same resources are a central factor that define its position in the international community, 
thus having a great impact in the conduct of Foreign Policy. In this sense, a state’s capabilities 
refer its capacity of making its resources operational, specific elements which a state seeks to 
improve in a long term project but whose improvement provides a better conditions to put forward 
an effective Foreign Policy (Brighi and Hill 2012, 162); Instruments, on the other hand, correspond 
 
 
 29 
to the forms of pressure and influence at the disposal of policy-makers, which may be translated 
into and ascending scale, from soft to hard power representing a spectrum of seriousness 
depending on the commitment of resources (Brighi an Hill 2012, 163).  
Advanced by many scholars, highly industrialized countries come to play a significant role in the 
world of international politics and formulate their foreign policies in accordance with a strategy that 
will sustain such superiority within the system by having at their disposal a wide set of developed 
resources. In this regard, states who have considerable resources at their disposal are able to build 
considerable capabilities such as military on one side while, on the other, may diffuse monetary 
benefits on other states through aid and loans and put forward a more effective diplomacy (Bojang 
2018, 6). The United States is a clear example of such thesis, meaning that it has been able to 
pursue a robust Foreign Policy and grant its national interest mainly due to its degree of high 
economic and technological development but also military strength; on the other hand, small 
countries like Gambia are condemned to follow a limited Foreign Policy strategy given its poor 
economic power and military capacity thus being regarded as a developing country and dependent 
on advanced industrialized states. Military capability specifically is a great determinant also, 
considering that high military capacity provides greater independence from external forces when 
configuring a Foreign Policy path. In this regard, an increase of military capacity might well outcome 
a policy reversal or significant change, from a peace to an aggressive approach, for instance 
(Bojang 2018, 6). This conceives that states with considerable military power such as the United 
States, China or Russia are usually more robust and intense when chasing their Foreign Policy 
goals in the international system hence, not relying on its allies or International Organizations to 
grant protection like states with low military capabilities. However, worth noting is that in recent 
years, particularly after the end of the Cold War, Germany has been taking a leading role in the 
European context although having small military capacity essentially due to its economic 
development. Such cases may be, explained by other type of state instruments based upon an 
effective application of its capabilities such as GDP, industrial and technological skills, strength of 
currency, civil society, among others. 
Although state capabilities are, above all, essential to the internal well-being and stability of a society 
and the state itself, these end up playing an important role in the construction of a Foreign Policy 
approach by influencing what instruments should be used at the international stage (Brighi and 
Hill 2012, 162). The implementation of a Foreign Policy approach, however, becomes largely 
dependent on factors of long-term development, also meaning that policymakers must choose their 
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instrument on a rational basis, one that best fits their immediate purpose raging from a soft to a 
hard power approach (Brighi and Hill 2012, 163).  
 
Institutional Organization: Political System and Decision-Making Processes 
How a state is institutional and politically organized is a particular determinant that largely affect 
the process of Foreign Policy elaboration and implementation. In this regard, a first important 
distinction must be made between democracies and authoritarian regimes, meaning that FP 
processes on this subject is considerably different: decision making authority is usually more 
disperse among the different institutions and actors involved in democracies in contrast with 
authoritarian leaders who often take these level of decisions on their own or among a very narrow 
group around them. Additionally, democratic leaders are generally accountable towards other 
political parties and the public itself thus the need of building a considerable consensus on what 
Foreign Policy strategy should be followed; in opposition, authoritarian leaders do not take such 
constraints hence enjoying considerable autonomy (Kaarbo et al. 2013, 16). Also, what the Bojang 
(2018, 6) asserts that in more democratic systems citizens or societal groups can freely express 
their voice in both domestic and external affairs of their country, making an impact on the policy 
outcomes while also playing a role in the process.  
In what bureaucracy in democratic systems are concerned, Kaarbo et al. (2013, 18) argues that 
the complexity involved in dealing with the large number of issues in international politics, 
governments organized themselves bureaucratically, handing out different responsibilities to 
separate agencies and departments: diplomatic relations, trade, foreign aid or particular military 
issues such as peacekeeping. Although this is a necessary bureaucracy due to the complexity of 
international affairs, many times these departments may come into conflict over what approach 
should be followed, somewhat caused by the own sense of identity developed by each of the 
departments and their organizational mission.  
Lastly, particularly regarding the political structure Bojang (2018, 7) affirms that parliamentary 
systems of governments dependent on cooperation between the Legislature and the executive 
branches, are a factor that definitely shapes the policy outcomes on foreign affairs; in the 
meanwhile, presidential systems based on separation of powers the relationship between these 
two sides are non-cordial and likely to be tense. Similarly, Bojang (2018, 7) asserts that distinction 
should be made between bi-party and multi-party systems, where the first is far more likely to have 
a majority and conduct foreign its Foreign Policy strategy in a significant more decisive way, while 
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multi-party systems are usually confronted by conflicting perceptions and interests which may lead 
to the avoidance or the postpone of a specific policy.  
 
Leaders: Leadership Style and Beliefs 
Conducting a Foreign Policy, we will find a leader, or leaders, who own personal characteristics 
and beliefs may shape policies under complex and uncertain conditions, in fact, it is individuals 
who make decisions, not the ‘state’ (Mesquita 2002, 4). According to Kaarbo et al. (2013, 19) all 
individuals prefer to be consistent with their beliefs, an important determinant that has been input 
during childhood or earlier political experiences which have instill certain values and personal views 
on how to handle ambiguous situations to which.  
Bojang (2018, 7), categorizes leaders into two different types: “Hawks” and “doves”, namely those 
who advocate an aggressive approach to Foreign Policy based on military power and the ones who 
take a conciliatory conception that are determined to sort international divergencies with no military 
appeal. Kaarbo et al. (2013, 19) complete such statement by adding that some leaders may have 
more nationalistic convictions, a distrustful conception of the world where conflict is a constant 
that can only be solved through the use of force; on the other hand, others may perceive their state 
as part of an international community that should be trust and whose problems are better solved 
multilaterally.  
Paraphrasing Rosenau, Bojang (2018, 7) affirmed that “a leader’s belief about the nature of 
international arena and the goals that ought to be pursued (…) his or hers emotional needs and 
most of other personality traits these are but a few of the in idiosyncratic factors that can influence 
the planning and execution of Foreign Policy”.  
 
1.2.1.2. External Determinants of Foreign Policy 
 
Regardless of geography, history, culture or political system, every state is broadly framed within 
the international system, which shapes its behavior. As argued by Bojang (201, 2) since Foreign 
Policy concerns the interaction of a state with another, this interaction only happens at the 
international level, and, as such, may not be disregarded. Acknowledged by Brighi and Hill, the 
international stage is shaped by different players, may these be states or non-states, all of them 
pursuing distinct interests, goals and priorities which does not necessarily in conflict, but different 
from each other’s (Brighi and Hill 2012, 149).  
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Recognized by scholars, in order to explain and interpret how states relate with each other, it is 
essential to understand the effect of systemic determinants, actors and international conditions 
that come outside the control of policymakers. In fact, during long time it was argued that the 
behavior of states in the external context was merely a product of the international system as a 
reaction to the outside conditions and actors (Kaarbo et al. 2013, 7).  
In this regard, perspectives on the international system are many times used to deduce how states 
are likely to take certain actions in their Foreign Policy strategies (Kaarbo et al. 2013, 7), namely: 
the international system organization, international law and norms, International Organizations and 
alliances.  
 
International Power System and Structure 
Defining the international system as the lack of an overarching government is the most relevant 
factor in what external determinants are concerned (Kaarbo et al. 2013, 7). Conceived in such 
terms, due to the absence of a global system of law and enforcement, the emergence of conflict 
in the international system is significantly more likely and each actor is responsible for looking after 
itself. In this sense, states take their foreign policies as vehicles to safeguard their own security 
and power within the system. 
The modern state system, existing since the Westphalia treaty in 1648, is composed by big, middle 
and small powers, meaning that one’s Foreign Policy is mainly framed by its relative power within 
the system. The system itself is shaped by the prevalent conditions which also play a decisive role 
in the Foreign Policy decision making, however, it is worthy taking into account that these same 
conditions in the international context are in constant mutation, new events and new actors are 
continually shaping new circumstances (Bojang 2018, 3). 
 
International Law, Norms and Legitimacy 
International law corresponds to a set of rules that conduct relations between states, also defined 
as a regulatory system explicitly built by them (Bojang 2018, 3). On the other hand, norms 
resemble “shared expectations” concerning the proper behavior that should be expected from 
states which result from a range of established “beliefs, standards of behavior, international 
conventions, and decision-making procedures” (Kaarbo et al. 2013, 12). Although these were 
deliberately created by states themselves (Bojang 2018, 3), they carry a moral and normative 
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authority that states support, thus classifying behaviors as legitimate or not in accordance with the 
laws and norms (Kaarbo et al. 2013, 12). 
In this regard, international law and norms (through moral enforcement) regulate state’s foreign 
policies and how these interact, denoting that there is a guiding framework for state action that not 
always favors its interests given the set of limitations imposed (Bojang 2018, 3). However, the 
consequences of both limitations constitute an ongoing debate between scholars: Are states really 
compliant with the international laws and norms? To what extend do governments obey the rules 
in the sense that some are respected while others are not? Realism suggests that states are 
motivated by self-interest in order to achieve supremacy (Kaarbo et al. 2013, 13), meaning that 
consenting laws and norms are seen as a strategy to maintain the international order so that they 
are capable of achieving national interests (Bojang 2018, 3). According to this approach, such laws 
and norms are forceless given that states are willing to disregard them when essential interests 
are at stake (Bojang 2018, 3). Liberalism, on the other hand, emphasizes that an interdependent 
system promotes cooperation and support among states and other actors such as International 
Organizations (Kaarbo et al. 2013, 13), while international laws and norms make contradictory 
actions excessively costly while, complying with the established agreements is considerably less 
demaging (Bojang 2018, 3). Lastly, constructivists point towards “socially created meanings that 
develop into international norms” and serve as a guide to the actor’s behavior (Kaarbo et al. 2013, 
13). Apart from its deep differences, all perspectives consent that international laws and norms 
determine the status, rights, responsibilities and obligations of one state’s Foreign Policy strategy 
and may be, or not, a source of legitimacy in the international arena (Bojang 2018, 3).  
 
International Organizations and Alliances 
International Organizations and alliances among states play a significant and interesting role in the 
international system structure while enduring a cornerstone of state’s Foreign Policy strategy. Both 
determinants have direct affect in the policy formulation and implementation, both provide 
opportunity of maintenance and change, and they are both a powerful instrument of Foreign Policy 
making (Bojang 2018, 4). 
Beginning with International Organizations, around the world there are more than 68,000 among 
them, the United Nations and its agencies, the European Union and many others. Such institutions 
take a primordial role in foreign policies of states as they facilitate the interaction between the 
different actors at the global, regional and local level (Bojang 2018, 3). However, it is worth taking 
 
 
 34 
into account that as states partially surrender sovereignty on to these organizations, their actions 
will be guided and judged in accordance with the nature of the specific institution (Bojang 2018, 
4).  
Nevertheless, the disagreement among scholars persists regarding the actual role played by 
International Organizations in the state’s foreign policies. The realist approach, while denying the 
actual efficiency, considers that these institutions reflect the real distribution of power within the 
international system, essentially based on the self-interested actions taken by the great powers 
(Bojang 2018, 4). On the other hand, others take a top-down approach by considering that 
International Organisations are an important shaper of state’s behavior, thus highly impacting 
Foreign Policy choices (Bojang 2018, 4). 
Regarding alliances, Bojang (2018, 4) conceives these as “the results of agreements that entail 
come degree of commitment, allowing increased Foreign Policy activity in the pursue of similar 
goals. These definitely frame the Foreign Policy of one state in the sense that members of the 
alliance are obliged to feedback upon requests and demands from their allies and rearrange their 
Foreign Policy actions in accordance (Bojang 2018, 4). 
 
1.2.2. Public Policy Cycle and Foreign Policies 
 
Formulated and implemented by state actors, Foreign Policy choices are a direct result of public 
policy analysis whose approach reveals to be important when considering its agenda-setting, 
formulation and implementation. Although Foreign Policy should be regarded in accordance to all 
of its specificities such as the fact of being highly dependent on external factors, erratic events and 
actors, thus being more reactive than the usual domestic policies, it is still linked to important 
public policy pillars such as public opinion or the nature of elites. On the other hand, however, its 
implementation becomes many times conditioned by ongoing processes at the international realm. 
As the lines between domestic external dimensions fade along with the rise of non-state actors as 
central agents, sub-state entities as well as suprastate institutions, it turns to be of considerable 
importance to consider the interconnection between Foreign Policy and public policy analysis. As 
a public policy, foreign policies correspond to conscious choices resulting from government 
decisions aimed to reshape a certain aspect of the ongoing circumstances and composed by two 
connected elements: policy goals and policy means who operate at different stages of the policy 
cycle: the goals and expectations that state actors have when choosing a particular path and the 
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chosen strategy to pursue and achieve these goals (Howlett 2019, 44-45). In this regard, when 
analyzing foreign strategies as a public policy, different determinants may be considered at the 
different stages of the policy cycle given the influence of extraterritorial factors, opposed to domestic 
public policies. 
According to the policy cycle model presented by Michael Howlett and Sarah Giest, the policy 
process is generally composed by five interrelated stages: agenda setting, policy formulation, 
decision making, policy implementation and policy evaluation (2013, 17). Agenda-setting 
corresponds to the first stage of the process, the point where a particular problem is perceived by 
the policy actors and a set of solutions are considered; at a second stage, the policy formulation is 
put forward, policy options are developed within a wide range of options, thus being narrowed by 
the different policy actors who eager to favor a specific solution among the remaining ones; during 
the decision-making, the government takes the opted solution and takes a course of action; 
throughout the fourth stage, policy implementation, decision are put into action by endorsing a set 
of tools that will enable the achievement of the established goals; Lastly, during the policy 
evaluation, the adopted policy is monitored by the state but also societal players, resulting in the 
development of new policy problems and possible solutions to encounter the policy issue (Howlett 
and Giest 2012, 17).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted by the author from Howlett 2019, 47. 
 
Particularly regarding the formulation of Foreign policies and the intent of this thesis, especial 
attention should be given to the process of Agenda setting, Policy formulation and Policy 
implementation.  
During the agenda-setting, problems are perceived as they come to the attention of policy makers 
and, calling attention for possible policies to arise with specific goals and targets. This process may 
Agenda 
setting
Policy 
formulation
Decision-
making
Policy 
implementation
Policy 
evaluation
Figure 2. The Policy Cycle Model of the Policy-Making Process 
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rise out of a system or institutionalized agenda, also known as unofficial or formal course, in the 
sense that many issues are perceived by the members of a political community, becoming a point 
of public attention in form of a society’s agenda for public concerns or they are brought up to 
attention by policy elites who choose a limited range of issues (Howlett and Giest 2012, 18). 
Secondly, the government chooses its course of action or non-action, facing the different actors 
and spheres involved and, lastly, the implementation process where the policy tools should be 
chosen carefully and well thought in order to attain the desired goals in a particularly unstable 
context like the international (Howlett 2019, 46). 
Policy Implementation reveals to be a particularly relevant stage given that it is the final point the 
internal process becomes reflected at the external context, a decisive procedure that influences an 
effective outcome or not, depending on the correct choice of policy tools that combine a wide set 
of suitable instruments for the context where they are intended to operate (Howlett and Giest 2012, 
22). It is the point at which the formulation plan gains substance by opting for substantive (provide 
goods and services to members of the public or governments) or procedural instruments (intention 
of modifying the nature of policy processes), being categorized per type of governing resource upon 
which they rely (Table 1): Information, Authority, Treasure, Organization.  
 
Table 1. Substantive and Procedural Implementation Tools 
 
 
Purpose 
Governing Resources 
 Information Authority Treasure Organization 
Substantive 
of tool 
Public Information 
Campaigns 
Independent Regulatory 
Agencies 
Subsidies and grants Public enterprises 
(government reviews, 
ad hoc task forces, 
commissions, public 
hearing, 
Procedural Official Secrets 
Acts 
Administrative Advisory 
Committees  
Interest Group 
funding 
Government 
reorganizations 
(oversight agencies, 
analytical units, 
commissioning) 
Source: Howlett 2019, 150-236. 
 
Policy Design: The Importance of Effective Policy Formulation 
Although the formulation process takes place at the internal environment of one state, it a crucial 
stage at which the successful goal achievement may be defined. At this point policy objectives are 
corresponded with the instruments or tools which will make them real. Such process is designated 
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as policy design, “a specific form of policy formulation based on gathering knowledge about effects 
of policy tools on policy targets” (Howlett 2019, 48).  
Although a policy design process is said to be a logical one based on a means-ends rational through 
which different policy tools are considered to affect policy outputs (see Figure 3) as well as the 
required resources for its operation, instrumental knowledge is contextual. This means that 
understanding how particular instruments may affect the behavior of target groups is needed, 
accounting all limitations and constraints thus, requiring “government analytical and evidentiary 
capacity as well as the intention to exercise it” (Howlett 2019, 49).  
Since policy design outputs may include complex adjustments of policy goals and means which 
are coordinated in decision making and policy-making processes, the result is not always a 
systemic approach to match specific aims through well-defined means grounded on rational 
procedure. Such recognition assumes that policymaking cannot be considered as an exclusively 
technical and logical activity of reconciling needs and ends, but rather a complex arrangement of 
interaction between policy makers, therefore being known as non-design (Howlett 2019, 58). On 
the other side, ideal design factors would include the “presence of high quality information on the 
range of impacts of policy alternatives but also the presence of a high level of technical capacity 
and expertise on the part of policy analysts” in order to obtain the adequate knowledge, allocating 
the right instruments and efficiently match goals and targets (Howlett 2019, 58).  
 
Table 2. Types of Policy Formulation Spaces: Design and Non-design Processes 
 
 
Government 
Formulation Intention 
Level of Government Knowledge and other constraints 
 High Low 
More instrumental Capable policy design space; 
Relatively unconstrained 
formulation is possible. 
Poor policy design space; Only 
partially informed or restricted 
design is possible. 
Less instrumental Capable political non-design 
space; Relatively unconstrained 
non-design processes are 
possible. 
Poor political non-design space; 
Only poorly informed non-design 
is possible.  
Source: Adapted by the author from Howlett 2019, 59. 
As expressed in table 2, there is a discrepancy between the designed intention and the ability to 
actually endorse its action due to the existence of distinct policy formulation spaces originating 
different policy designs. In the presence of a variety of formulations that separate the initial intention 
and the capacity to engage it, as well as being conditioned by contextual bounds.  
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1.2.3. Confronting Environments: Domestic and External spheres 
 
At the stage of implementing their policy goals and internal priorities a state confronts the 
international environment while the environment also confronts him: an interactive process that 
assumes particular relevance when putting into practice the established plans and effectively 
achieve the desired Foreign Policy outcomes. The process of implementation is a process 
developed in a two-level stage which are in permanent interaction with each other: domestic and 
international just like Putnam conceived through the two-level game theory (Brighi and Hill 2012, 
156).  
 
An Interconnected System in Permanent Interaction 
Through his work “Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International 
Systems” in 1969, James Rosenau provides an insightful framework on how both spheres interact 
through a permanent linkage of inputs and outputs. According to its conception, polities (national 
state system) originate policy outputs (foreign policies) aimed to be implemented at the at external 
environment, thus being translated into environmental inputs, behavioral sequences in the external 
environment. In the same way, environmental outputs are produced by the behavior started in the 
external environment by a polity while polity inputs emerge as behavior sequences from 
environmental outputs into the national system again (Rosenau 1969,45)  
Source: Rosenau, 1969, 45. 
The author states that a clear distinction between outputs and inputs should be done in order to 
clarify its purpose within the linkage system. In this regard, outputs are intended to originate 
responses from the system to which it is redirected, being distinguished between direct policy 
outputs or direct environmental outputs depending on who gave rise to the behavior, may these be 
Polities Policy outputs
Environmental 
inputs
Environmental 
outputsPolity inputs
Figure 3. Linkage Politics Framework 
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the polity towards the environment or the contrary. Also, other patterns of behavior are likely to 
arise between the polity and the environment many times not intended to trigger a response but 
end up doing so through a perceptual or emulative process, therefore, a distinction between direct 
or indirect outputs caused by the polity or environment should also be made. Following the same 
reasoning, inputs are divided in four categories: direct polity inputs, indirect polity inputs but also 
direct environmental inputs or indirect environmental inputs (Rosenau 1969, 46). 
Such formulation would not be complete without explaining how the inputs and outputs between 
the polities and the environment get together. Rosenau identifies three different types of linkage 
behavior that may be established: penetrative, reactive and emulative. In the first place, the 
penetrative process takes place when the different actors of a polity participate in the political 
process of each other, thus sharing authority in contexts such as foreign aid missions or 
transnational political parties, for instance. Reactive processes, on the other hand, corresponds to 
the opposite, meaning that actors do not share authority but, instead, the member who experiences 
an input produces a response behavior as a reaction to the output undertaken by another, being 
the most frequent type of occurrence within the overall system since they are caused by both direct 
and indirect outputs; a clear example on such process can be translated into the direct and indirect 
repercussions of an American election many times giving rise to new policy outputs from the 
different polities in order to respond to the new context that was input by the American polity. 
Lastly, the emulative linkage corresponds to a specific type of the reactive process. The input is 
not only a response to output, but it also takes the form of the output therefore being known as 
diffusion: political activities within a state’s internal sphere are perceived and emulated by another 
though an independent choice to do so whereas only indirect outputs and inputs are considered. 
The widespread desire for industrialization an political modernization in the post war period are an 
evident example on how linkages were established through an emulative process (Rosenau 1969, 
47).  
 
Harmonizing Domestic Ambitions with External Constraints 
Worth noting, however, that practical obstacles are likely to arise when Foreign Policy objectives 
confront with the external context where it is intended to engage with different actors. As the 
different actors within the international scene pursue distinct goals and interests, facing a set of 
issues when trying to implement their projects, Brighi and Hill assert that Foreign Policy behavior 
is conceived through an interplay between an actor’s own strategy and the context where its 
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strategy is to be implemented. This conception is designated as the strategic-relational approach: 
Strategic in the sense that players are oriented towards the achievement of their goals and 
relational as their behavior only becomes clear when analyzed in relation with the other actors and 
context (2012, 149).  
The strategic-relational approach asserts that the failure or success of a certain Foreign Policy goal 
cannot be explained by only taking into account the strategy or the context in isolated terms since 
an exclusive focus on the domestic political process is not able to provide a reliable reason on why 
the outcomes many times differentiates from the initial intention; on the other hand, focusing solely 
on the context will provide an explanation that only regards constraints and opportunities which 
shape the action, not considering the intentionality of the player’s actions (Brighi and Hill 2012, 
150). In this scheme, the contexts (the environment where player’s meet) is not traditionally 
conceived as a static structure that pre-exists actors, instead, the context corresponds to the other 
actors, the network of relations they compose but also the behavior patterns they generate; given 
the complexity of such relations based upon a wide aggregation of interests the context is an 
irregular and uncertain ground for Foreign Policy implementation whose success is many times 
dependent on the position the player has at the international terrain but also how it perceives its 
surrounding. Worth noting that there is a permanent interplay between the actors and the context 
which is determined by the role of ideas which filter the actor’s response to context, may these be 
paradigms, narratives or perceptions that become reflected in the political process.   
Such interplay comes to produce the Foreign Policy behavior (Brighi and Hill 2012, 150). Lastly, 
just like there is a continual interaction between actors and context mediated by ideas that produce 
a Foreign Policy behavior, this one also originates feedback into the context by reshaping it or 
leaving it the same but also into the actors who should readjust themselves.  
 
Figure 4. The Strategic- Relational Approach to Foreign Policy 
 
Source: Brighi and Hill 2012, 150. 
 
 
 41 
Just like it is projected through the strategic-relational model, pursuing and actually achieving a 
Foreign Policy goal is essentially about harmonizing domestic issues with the external environment 
where the strategy is to be projected, meaning that the perception states have regarding the 
‘outside’ is of crucial importance.  
According to Brighi and Hill, actors perceive the international space through a double dimension 
in horizontal and vertical terms: the horizontal perspective conceives the ‘outside’ on the base of 
proximity and distance, categorizing it as near or far, from regional to global; and vertically where 
the ‘outside’ is stratified into functional affairs may these be political, economic, military, social or 
normative (2012, 152). Regarding the horizontal perception, implementation of Foreign Policy 
goals emerges from the closest environment, whereas the proximate neighbor states and the region 
itself come to play a central role and assume its major priority while reaching the global standing 
is an aspiration that only few states are able to accomplish, particular for middle and small powers; 
noting, however, that such level is dependent on the position the actor has at the international 
realm but also the strategic value of the resources at its disposal (Brighi and Hill 2012, 153). The 
vertical view, on the other hand, structures the system in different but overlapping layers which are 
not necessarily fixed as the traditional conception of high and low politics based upon the 
supremacy of military means which is now widely challenged by the rise of determinants such as 
culture or soft power; in fact, classifying high or low politics highly varies from one actor to another, 
depending of its position within the international system (Brighi and Hill 2012, 154). The first layer 
corresponds to political affairs, a set of interdependent relations that brings states but also non-
state actors together through diplomacy, for instance, overlapping with other layers such as 
normative and social affairs as diplomacy appeals to the ideal of ‘international society’ essentially 
grounded on common norms and ethical behavior that come to influence Foreign Policy behavior 
just like it happened during the 1990s; Economic affairs, on the other side, appear to be a more 
plural sphere within the vertical system as the distinct nature of economic affairs includes a variety 
of actors however, it is highly likely for economic concerns to be merged in the political layer as 
they are easily politicized; the military level, traditional conceived as the most important one, it 
presumes military alignments which are decisive as they form cooperative or adversarial relations 
whose issues emerge from political, economic or cultural issues, a major Foreign Policy 
determinant assuming the importance of the distribution of military power within the system; at 
last, culture may not be left out when pursuing a Foreign Policy objectives given the proximity of 
different cultures as a globalization product but, on the other hand, an active rejection of such form 
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of marginalizing cultural particularities which become confined to the private sphere (Brighi and 
Hill 2012, 153-154). All in all, acting at the external environment is about managing effectively the 
complexity of such networks through a continual coordination with the established goals.  
Domestic politics also assume a central role when a state considers Foreign Policy, in fact, the 
internal factors are decisive when it chooses to pursue objectives through the international context 
and which precise objectives. In accordance with Brighi and Hill the internal sphere is involved in 
the process in two ways: in first place, pursuing a Foreign Policy objective implies that there’s the 
capacity to chase its ambitions through the effective means and the state’s capacity to gather the 
needed resources from its public, may these be material or not, but also the ability to channel 
these same resource towards the established goal; On the other hand, democratic societies 
presuppose that there is as societal consensus that sustains governments in the chasing of such 
objectives, an essential one that may not only threaten the Foreign Policy but the government 
(2012, 156). The internal consensus itself can be the overall reason to seek a role at the 
international sphere as the authors also note that domestic objectives may be carried out through 
specific foreign policies (Brighi and Hill 2012, 156).  
As exposed, domestic politics and Foreign Policy are interconnected through a wide variety of 
channels where balancing both environments is a daring challenge of statehood. Domestic and 
external spheres are involved in a permanent interplay and synergy, one that is most visible when 
pursuing a certain Foreign Policy is meant to achieve domestic purposes or the opposite as 
reflected through the strategic-relational model.  
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1.3. Human Security 
 
As a new political agenda known as Human Security emerged in the early 1990’s, it attracted 
considerable attention from politicians but also academics, being inaugurated with the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) and publishing its official report in 1994. 
A new security debate was open in the international community. A debate that essentially 
questioned the basis of state sovereignty, under the idea that its major responsibility is to secure 
the safety of its citizens, facing consequences from the international community when such 
premise is not accomplished.  States such as Canada or Japan have adopted Human Security as 
a political leitmotif of their Foreign Policy strategy by endorsing significant efforts in shaping its 
agenda, noting the international campaign on Landmines (ICBL) followed by the Ottawa Treaty but 
also the foundation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) based on a set of people-centered 
principles and a bottom-up approach. 
However, opening a controversial debate in many of its arguments by extending the analytical and 
contextual purpose of security, the Human Security concept and the respective agenda have faced 
significant criticism not only regarding it conceptual vagueness but also its political appropriateness 
(Werther and Debiel 2006, 7).  
 
1.3.1 Conceptualizing Security 
 
Generally speaking, “security is about constituting something that needs to be secured” (Buzan 
and Hansen 2009,10). However, conceptualizing security is not a straightforward exercise as one 
might wish, in fact it is a highly contested concept not only in the academia but also in the real 
world of politics. It is a commonsense word and commonly used in a wide set of realms from 
personal to collective activities and conditions. For instance, it may be used in a broadly day-to-day 
sense as a position of one being safe, secure and protected; as a political term referring to political 
processes, action and structures, a political tool that safeguards the political unit; but also an 
analytical concept that describes and explains social sphere events, circumstances or specific 
realities such as security policies, security policy interaction or security institutions and structures 
(Heurlin and Kristensen 2009, 175). 
Taking an analytical approach, security is about “setting political priorities, and justifying the use 
of force, the intensification of executive powers, the claim to rights of secrecy and other extreme 
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measures” (Buzan 1997, 21). Even though it is widely-used and a core concept when analyzing 
the political international realm, it remains relatively underdeveloped much due to the dispute 
about its real meaning which involved many contradictions and nuances in the 1990’s, all of which 
can induce confusion (Buzan 1983, 6-10). Most of these contradictions “include that between 
defense and security, national security and international security and between violent means and 
violent ends” (Buzan 1983, 10). To this should be added that the difficulty of defining the referent 
subject of security but also the hardship of applying the term to a varied set of spheres, may these 
be military, political, economic or social. Also added by Baldwin, given these normative and 
empirical concerns, little attention was dedicated to the concept itself (1997, 5).  
From Westphalia in 1648 until the end of the Cold War, Security was perceived in terms of threats 
to the state’s sovereignty and territorial boundaries which were considered inviolable (Ogata 2001, 
9; MacFarlane and Khong 2006, 36; Tadjbakhsh 2005, 4). On this traditional realist school of 
thought (realpolitik) one may find classical theoreticians such as Hobbes, Machiavel or Clausewitz 
who emphasized military power as the means of facing military threats (Kaldor 2013, 11; 
McFarlane and Khong 2006, 38). Also, during the Cold War, the political approach to security was 
determined by a military agenda confined to matters of nuclear weapons and the major assumption 
that the Soviet Union was a military ideological threat to the western sphere. However, as the 
nuclear dynamics between superpowers matured, the original security debate re-emerged and 
expanded its scope aside from the military political focus towards several distinct but related flows 
such as environment, humans, food, climate and other (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 2; Werthes and 
Debiel 2006, 9). Yet, special focus must be put into the individual as a security subject in the sense 
that the importance of these new extensions to the concept made clear that when including non-
military factors, individual becomes a significant challenger to the state as the referent subject to 
be secured from threats (MacFarlane and Khong 2006, 133). For many, however, adjusting the 
concept was not only a simple matter of adding subjects or changing the analytical approach but 
to indeed transfer the referent objects of security away from the state towards the individual person 
(Owen 2010, 40). Ultimately, it was the UN’s efforts allied to its leadership on post-conflict events 
of reconstruction that framed new security approaches (Christie 2010, 173). 
Exposed the conceptual debate, it is neutrally acceptable to state that “security is a ‘hyphenated 
concept’ and always tied to a particular referent object, internal and external locations, to one or 
more sectors and to a particular way of thinking about politics” (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 10). 
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1.3.1.2. Security Dynamics Post-Cold War Period 
 
The main threat to peace does not come from major inter-state 
confrontations anymore (…) but from conflicts within the 
borders of states (Yilmaz 2007, 12). 
 
By the end of the Cold War security as a concept, but mainly as an international dynamic, has 
assumed new forms through new security agendas, security manifestations, new rules and new 
security policies. With the end of the bipolar order, dictatorships with rigid internal control gave way 
to new democracies and the fall of the Berlin wall opened a new world order (Donaghy 2011, 40). 
However, this new sense of optimism was betrayed by the eruptions of new waves of violence, this 
time, within states, leaving behind the inter-states tensions and external threats to territorial 
integrity and state sovereignty (Ogata 2001, 9) as the new political dynamics progressively revealed 
the need of individual protection as an urgent and outstanding matter in the state’s security agenda 
(MacFarlane and Khong 2006, 133). These new type of threats with grounds on historical clashes 
between distinct ethnical, religious and social groups, became a central security issue showing the 
state’s ineffective role as the major protector of its people, if not its enemy, an indicative that global 
peace was not yet in the near horizon (Ogata 2001, 9; MacFarlane and Khong 2006, 135-137). 
Many of these intra-state conflicts emerged abruptly in developing countries namely the Haiti in 
1994, Kosovo Crisis in 1998, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Rwanda and so on (Obikaeze and 
Iheke 2016, 226; Koldor 2013, 8; Collins 2010, 2, Tadjbakhsh 2005, 5).  
This context, allied to an extension of actors, threats and risks within the scope of security at the 
global and transnational level, left the old school conceptions of security unfit to deal with the 
growing complexity of international security dynamics thus, indicating the limit of the traditional 
approach linked to the military dimension. These were dominant factors that changed security 
dynamics (Kaldor 2013, 2-3; Yilmaz 2007,20; Werthes and Debiel 2006, 8).  
 
The Changing of Nature and Perception of Conflict and Threats 
At the turn of the new century a profound change was evident in the nature and perception of 
conflicts (Leaning and Aries 2001, 1; Kaldor 2013, 8) as security dynamics expanded its essence 
both horizontally and vertically (McFarlane and Khong 2006, 1; Rothschild 1995, 54). While 
horizontal dynamics rapidly expanded its scope beyond military concerns by accounting other 
issues such as economy, environment, health, gender, and culture, following a context of increased 
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sense of welfare and identity as core values to humanity, this expansion was also a vertical one 
both up and downwards by comprising regional and global bodies at a higher level but also society, 
its groups, and the individual as a human being (McFarlane and Khong 2006, 2).  
As the number of inter-states conflicts were at a significant decline, clashes and emergencies 
started to take hold, thus involved in a whole new context of values (Ogata 2001, 9). The outline 
of the new security dynamics, perceived as “new wars”, easily transcended the logic of the “old 
wars” theorized by Clausewitz’ model on traditional wars (Kaldor 2013, 1-2). Distinguishing 
characteristics relied on the nature of enrolled players, goals, methods and finance resources in 
the sense that non-state actors fight in the name of identity through political means such as 
population control, mainly funded by predatory finance, leaving behind a record of state forces 
moved by geopolitical ambitions and territory conquest, largely financed by the states’ resources 
(Kaldor 2013, 2-3). 
Since these would be categorized as a completely distinct class of conflicts, the international 
community was not prepared to handle them (Leaning and Aries 2001, 1; Yilmaz 2007, 12). For 
instance, these conflicts were mainly within the domestic borders of states, making the other 
international players hesitant specially regarding the international legal gap on this matter (Yilmaz 
2007, 12): international conventions that formerly governed war rules between states did not apply, 
plus the fact that confronting factions within a nation dispute power, considering the national 
government illegitimate, thus blurring the actual residence of national sovereignty (Yilmaz 2007, 
28-29; Werthes and Debiel, 2006, 8). Even though these matters appeared to influence only at a 
local sphere, they could quickly achieve an international proportion given the global 
interdependence but also the case where the enrolment of external parties through political, 
economic, military backing or asylum, the struggle necessarily assumed an international 
proportion. International actors, in fact, were not disengaged from such dynamics as they were 
actually important shapers of intra-state conflicts, many times determining a long or short duration 
for example, a reliable stable international sphere is essential for a peaceful resolution of internal 
confrontations (Yilmaz 2007, 13-25). The essence of the above mentioned intra-state issues 
consisted of inter-group clashes among different ethno-cultural circles with distinct sense of self in 
a multi-ethnic societies who, by considering their position within the community as discriminatory 
and unlawful one, would use the paths of violence and conflict to arrange recognition, autonomy 
or even independence allied to a desire of identity expression (Leaning and Arie 2001, 1; Yilmaz 
2007, 15; McFarlane and Khong 2006, 136). In many cases, the eruption of ethnic tensions 
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resulted from the collapse of a central authority, thus provoking local anarchy and a state of 
complete insecurity but also a power struggle for governance among the various involved groups, 
as happened in the ex-Yugoslavia. To this should be added the fact that, in these contexts the 
absence local and foreign investment or of a clear authority who should rule, people’s basic needs 
become increasingly unfulfilled (Kaldor 2013, 2; Yilmaz 2007, 20-21) hence creating a scenario 
of scarcity, starvation and hardship but mainly human suffering (McFarlane and Khong 2006, 135-
137). 
So far, people were considered to be granted security through state’s protection (Ogata 2001, 9) 
but from this point onwards, threats were directly addressed to individuals most of the times as 
means of controlling the territory thus dissembling the state (Kaldor 2013, 3). As a natural 
repercussion, the treatment of individuals by state structures raised a critical questioning whether 
these had the needed capacity to promote its human’s security within its borders and creating a 
skeptical perception on the traditional security paradigm (McDonald 2002, 277; McFarlane and 
Khong 2006, 138). An important note that should be taken at this point relates the state’s 
incapacity as a security provider (Ogata 2001, 8) and as a legitimate and effective power holder 
(McFarlane and Khong 2006, 37). An ongoing tendency of increasing international norms6 
consequently exposed progressive constraints to state sovereignty, mainly due to its inability to 
protect its citizens from vulnerabilities or even the cases where they were in fact the actual 
perpetrators of such insecurity (McFarlane and Khong 2006, 165). This brought into scene a real 
debate on the meaning of sovereignty and the rights that it entrusts on states7 (Tadjbakhsh 2005, 
4).  
In this sense, the nature of post-cold war security dynamics was highly complex, thus challenging 
the long-established norms of the international status quo and the traditional boundaries of security 
providers and receivers. As Alkir states (2003, 10), a set of empirical, analytical and institutional 
changes took place, namely in the nature of security threats, the interdependence between them 
and the security structures at both national and international level, conceiving a context where both 
policy makers and academics had to perceive an extension of insecurity threats through a different 
approach (Heinbecker 1999,4; Owen 2010, 40).  
 
 
6 This process was, in part, a natural one mainly borrowed from the ad hoc responses to the dreadful crimes by the end of WWII (McFarlane and 
Khong 2006, 165). 
7 Such assessments somewhat urged the legitimate interference on domestic matters once considered untouchable internal affairs of a state, later 
encouraging humanitarian interventions covered by the ‘responsibility to protect’ in order to protect human beings within its borders when states 
were either unwilling or unable to do so (McFarlane and Khong 2006, 199-200). 
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1.3.2. Conceptualizing Human Security 
 
Concepts, just like theories, are born in specific circumstances, in response to certain reality and 
intellectual context (Collin 2010, 105). As a consequence of the transfiguring normative and 
political context at both local and international spheres, the Human Security concept became a 
popular approach within the domain of Security Studies as a response to new threats (Owen, 2010, 
39; Newman 2010, 78), contributing itself to that normative change through the questioning the 
appropriateness of traditional conceptions of international politics (Mcdonald 2002, 295).  
Worth noting that  
The threat to individual security was highlighted by the growing incidence of civil war. The 
human consequences thereof (ethnic cleansing, genocide, mass rape, the systemic abuse of 
children and levels of displacement unmatched since World War II) added a new urgency to 
the issue of individual and group safety from violence. (McFarlane and Khong 2006, 139) 
Mainly due to this, the new decade opened a new dimension regarding human centrality which 
called for a new thinking in security studies (Bajpai 2003, 198). By 1990 the so-called 
“Copenhagen School” (CS) took the first step towards a shift when stating that non-military issues 
could be considered security matters even when these did not create a direct threat to states 
(Werthes and Debiel 2006, 9). Although this first approach remains attached to the rational of 
states as “the only securitizing actor” (Hough 2004, 9), other security approaches emerged during 
this period which followed to widen but mainly deepen a new security framework, among these is 
Human Security (Werthes and Debiel 2006, 10). In a general view, Human Security, in its simplest 
essence, means putting people first and, particularly, “taking people and their communities” thus 
treating their “safety as integral to international peace” by acknowledging that “security of states 
is important but not sufficient” in order to address threats to individuals both from military and 
non-military sources (Heinbecker 2000, 27). 
At the political realm, the human centric approach was at first presented by the UN sphere in 1992 
through the “Agenda for Peace” formulated by Boutros Boutros Ghali but it was not until Kofi 
Annan’s mandate as the UN’s Secretary General that the milestone 1994 United Nations Human 
Development Report (UNDP) was unfold as “New Dimensions of Human Security” (Donaghy 2011, 
40; Tadjbakhsh 2005, 12; Chandler 2008, 427) exposing a model of seven broad groups of 
security insights: economic, environmental, personal, community, health, political and food 
(Thomas and Tow 2002, 178; McDonald 2002, 279; Newman 2010, 79). According to this specific 
document, Human Security was defined in terms of safety from deep-rooted threats, namely 
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hunger, disease and repression but also protection from sudden and destructing breaks in the daily 
life quality arrangements such as homes, jobs or in communities (Bajpai 2003, 203; Tzifakis 2011, 
354), leaving behind an approach concerned with sovereign and territorial threats (Thomas and 
Tow 2002, 180).  
The core objective of this report was to establish the HS concept and capture attention as well as 
resources on development to support vulnerable people. This also triggered a political transition 
regarding financial and human resources distant from the typical security agenda based on the 
win-win basis mainly neglecting the South on behalf of benefiting the North (Collins 2010, 105). 
However, this approach is a particularly wide one by including a broad range of underdevelopment 
issues and conceiving insecurity as a form of structural violence going beyond gross violations of 
human rights, armed conflicts and natural disasters (Tadjbakhsh 2005, 11). In other words, the 
UNDP advanced human development as a precondition for security in a sense that HS meant that 
people would act in a safe and freely way, confident that their opportunities would be granted in 
the next day (Tadjbakhsh 2005, 12). The UN conception is clearly described as a broad one, 
complementing both human rights and human development as an attempt to humanize 
development issues (McFarlane and Khong 2006, 160-161). This brings the debate over security 
as a safeguard against chronic threats and individual well-being (Alkir 2006, 14) or in narrower 
terms, security from violent and non-violent threats such as war phenomena thus protecting people 
from perpetuate violence (Tadjbakhsh 2005, 5), also known as the dichotomy between “Freedom 
from Want and Freedom from Fear (Galsius 2008, 32).  
Aside from the dual approach debate, the HS framework owes its loudness mainly to the ontological 
status, normative and moral position that advocates people instead of states should be the main 
referent objects of security, thus becoming morally irrefutable (Tzifakis 2011, 356) By this, HS is 
easily described as a policy tool that enables a reconsideration on “changing norms of sovereignty, 
collective security and power politics” (Tadjbakhsh 2005, 9).  
 
Centralization of the Individual as a Security Reference Object 
The debate over the referent object of security is not a new one as it remotes to basic principles 
rooted by Montesquieu, Rosseau or Condorcet (Owen 2004b, 15). Human Security assures its vital 
focus on the individuals with special attention on the “values and goals such as dignity, equity and 
solidarity (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007, 13). A shift from the state to the individual as referent of 
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security is the essential trait of the Human Security approach, thus distinguishing it from the broad 
range of other conceptualizations on security (Owen 2010, 40; Floyd 2007, 40).  
If previously the sovereign legitimacy relied on the state’s capacity to control its territory, being 
supported by its citizens, the HS approach asserts that state sovereignty should reverse the 
equation and provide security to the people from which its legitimacy stems (Glasius 2008, 36; 
Newman 2010, 78). Even though there may be no clear agreement on what threats should be 
included within the HS scope this is one central characteristic that gives common ground to all 
definitions on this approach and also a certain basis on literature (McDonald 2002, 279).  
Stressed by Glasius (2008, 36) and Newman (2010, 79), if previously the sovereign legitimacy 
relied on the states capacity to control its territory, the HS approach asserts that state sovereignty 
should reverse the equation and provide security to the people from which its legitimacy stems 
(Glasius 2008, 36). Also backed by Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, 13), this transition means 
more than adjusting the individual as the center of the security agenda, but especially a revision 
on its condition and status “no longer consubstantial to the state- an infinitesimal part of an organic 
whole- but an equal subject” in the international scene, therefore becoming an ultimate actor to 
take into account, one whose security subordinate all other international actors and instruments 
(Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007, 13). Once the reference object of security changed from the state 
to its power source, individuals, the “safety notion is extended beyond a stage of mere existence 
or survival towards a life worth living, hence, well-being and dignity of human beings” (Tadjbakhsh 
and Chenoy 2007, 9) as the vital protection unit (Alkir 2003, 2; Buzan 2007, 49) within a state’s 
borders.  
The term is well known for its universalism and holistic reasoning (Ewan 2007; 184) given its 
concern with the security of each individual without exception of its country or location of residence 
(Tzifakis 2011, 356; Christie 2010, 170), but also for its multi-sectoral approach that takes into 
account the various effects of threats on human lives (Tadjbakhsh 2005, 7). However, as supported 
by Buzan (2007, 49), applying the conception of security to the individual is not an easy task, nor 
easy to perceive, meaning that various issues of individual life are paradoxical (crime protection vs 
individual liberties) and difficult to classify (real threats or imagined?).  
 
A Complementary Approach to State Security 
As posed by McFarlane and Khong (2006, 265), “Human Security is not about transcending or 
marginalizing the state, neither institutions or state sovereignty (Christie 2010, 173; Tadjbakhsh 
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and Chenoy 2007, 167; Newman 2010, 79). It is about ensuring that states protect their people. 
Rather, it consists on framing a state system that praises its people translating itself as means of 
ensuring security to the individuals through effective governance (Axworthy 1999, 3) and 
responsibility sense (McFarlane and Khong 2006, 231), but also entitling the state with the 
‘responsibility to protect’ the human beings within its sovereign sphere (Shani 2007,7; Tzifakis 
2011; 359). Particularly, HS features a link among people, state and the role of sovereignty as the 
center of security understandings (Collins 2010, 178).  
From such point of view, the HS concern may well expand beyond a state’s physical borders taking 
into account the fact that security of states and the consequent preservation of international peace 
are ultimately built upon the base of secure people (Axworthy 1999, 3; Collins 2010, 115; 
Heinbecker 1999, 5). Since a state is judged in terms of the ability to fulfill its responsibility to 
protect and, of course, its eagerness in doing so (MacFarlane and Khong 2006, 261), when citizens 
or internal residents are not protected, one’s sovereignty may be questioned either by a popular 
uprising or by external intervention (Tadjbakhsh 2005, 10; Newman 2010, 79). In other words, 
the legitimacy of a sovereign state relies on not only in the control over its territory but also on its 
capacity to “fulfill certain standards of human rights and welfare of citizens” (Newman 2010, 79). 
Despite a different approach challenging the traditional conception on a state’s sovereignty and 
how this should be employed, the widening and deepening debate in fact places the state at the 
highlight by justifying and expanding its governance scope on security matters (Christie 2010, 178; 
Black 2006, 59).  
Essentially, the core responsibility of ensuring HS falls upon states (Tadjbakhsh 2005, 9) therefore 
confirming the idea of Human Security and state security as being reciprocally supportive 
(Heinbecker 1999, 5; Axworthy 1999, 3; Collins 2010, 105) through a “complementary” approach 
and not a “competitive” one (McFarlane and Khong 2006, 160) as “the state remains the most 
effective grantor of peoples’ Human Security needs” (Christie 2010, 173) in ideal circumstances 
(Newman 2010, 79).  
  
 
 
 52 
Table 3. Paradigm framework: Key Points on Distinction Constituency 
 
Security 
Paradigm 
Normative context Security referent 
object 
Level of 
analysis 
Security 
provider 
Threats 
 
Realism 
 
Pre-Cold War 
 
States 
 
State 
 
States 
Conventional threats, with 
external nature; 
Political Military sectors 
as an important asset 
 
Human 
Security 
 
Post-Cold War 
 
Individual 
 
Individual 
States, 
International 
Organizations 
and other 
non-state 
actors 
Conventional and 
unconventional threats 
with internal roots; 
Multi-sectoral (economic, 
environmental, military, 
political, societal sectors) 
approach rather than 
solely political and 
militarily based 
 
Source: Adapted by the author from Buzan 1997, 6-12. 
 
1.3.2.2. Conceptual Discussion: Freedom from Fear vs Freedom from Want 
 
Defining Human Security remains an open battlefield due to the lack of consensus among its 
advocates (Tadjbakhsh 2005, 5). Moreover, being a highly contested concept in security studies 
itself (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007, 10), both, enthusiasts and critics on HS, diverge when the 
discussion is about what threats should be considered in the Human Security agenda (Owen 2010, 
48; Newman 2010, 79), although all proponents agree that the essential target should be the 
individual human lives and its protection (Sharni 2007,4; Heinbecker 1999, 4). This brings the 
discussion towards the polarity debate over “Freedom from Fear” and “Freedom from Want” 
approaches, (Glasius 2008, 32) also known as the complex broad versus narrow conceptions 
(Owen 2004a, 374) which reflect two different policy approaches (Krause 2009, 150). In sum, 
Human Security followers are deeply engaged in an unsolved discussion around the broad versus 
narrow approach to the concept and securitization repercussions (Newman 2010, 82)8.  
A broad conception on Human Security, well recognized and accepted by the UN and Japan 
(Newman 2010, 79), perceives different threats to the individual’s security, namely natural 
 
 
8 This conceptual debate is a high discussion matter among proponents thus becoming subject of constant confrontation among different authors: 
Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007); Bajpai (2003); Alkire (2003); Owen (2004b); Roberts (2005); McFarlane and Khong (2006), Ewan (2007). 
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disasters, poverty, hunger, infectious diseases or unemployment (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007, 
24; Tzifakis 2011, 363) as drawn in the UNDR. Given its broad approach and considering the vast 
array of issues that may harm the individual’s well-being, it clearly delimits itself from the most 
traditional security approaches (Tzifakis 2011, 361) by integrating both dimensions on physical 
protection and rights development in order to safeguard and expand people’s vital freedoms 
(McFarlane and Khong 2006, 160; Owen 2010, 44), removing “restrictions and constraints “ that 
unable the “enjoyment of human life” (Shani 2010, 5). As Newman (2010, 81) and Ewan (2007; 
183) suggest, by securitizing a wide range of issues, the broad approach intends to encourage 
security providers - particularly states - to channel their consideration and resources into non-
traditional security challenges.  
On the other hand, the narrow conception supported by the Human Security Report - firstly 
published in 2004 by the Centre for Human Security at the University of British Columbia- (Owen 
2004b, 19; McFarlane and Khong 2006, 172) and Canada as its major enthusiast (Roberts 2006, 
249; Bajpai 2003, 207), is perceptively closer to the traditional security reasoning as it relates HS 
as ‘hard security’ (Roberts 2006, 257) in terms of political and criminal violence issues (Tzifakis 
2011, 361; Owen 2004, 45) mainly in form of physical threat (McFarlane and Khong 2006, 165). 
From this point of view, HS is defined as the absence of such threats (Shani 2007, 40), meaning 
“freedom from pervasive threats to peoples safety or lives” (Owen 2004, 43) essentially in modern 
conflictual contexts (Tzifakis 2011, 360; Heinbecker 2000, 27) where high rates of victimization 
persist (Newman 2010, 80). 
Anchored in Western liberal tradition (Shani 2010, 5), the relevance of this last approach relates 
to its analytical, conceptual clarity and policy-applicability (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007, 167) by 
“limiting its horizontal extension of legitimate Human Security threats (Owen 2004, 46; MacFarlane 
and Khong 2006, 133). In this sense, it clearly separates itself from the broad conception whose 
“conceptual overstretch” is said to be “meaningless and analytically useless” in favor of normative 
persuasion (Newman 2010, 82) that does not prioritize any of the components within its agenda 
(Tzifakis 2011, 361) 
Persecutors of a broad approach, on the other hand, argue by including such a broad conception 
on the number of threats in fact represents a refusal to give way to the dominant political agenda 
(Tadjbakhsh 2005, 7) but also that analytical difficulties are an unavoidable consequence from 
shifting the referent object beyond state, thus pointing the exclusion of a wide range of threats as 
a major critic to the narrow conception (Owen 2004a, 374).  
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While many observers from a broad point a view, consider that one of its major leverage points 
relies on its multi-sectoral approach as considering a variety of threats (Tadjbakhsh 2005, 7; 
Christie 2010, 170) this is one of the key-criticisms pointed by those who contend a more 
minimalist impression, namely Buzan (2004, 369-370) or Ewan (2007, 184) who claims that a 
holistic conception “undermines effective causal analysis” and hypothesis (Paris 2004, 371). By 
arguing that this is a too inclusive assessment, one that confuses both sources and consequences 
of insecurity (Newman 2010, 82) scholars from the more narrow focused vision such as Krause 
(2009, 150), stress that freedom from want is “ultimately nothing more than a shopping list” that 
loses any usefulness for policy makers who urge priority setting and policy coherence (Ewan 2007, 
184; MacFarlane and Khong 2006, 240; Floyd 2007, 39). In return, “freedom from want” 
advocates, assert that a broad definition provide an “integrated solution for multifaceted issues” 
due to the interconnected nature of threats and non-territorial aspects of security, protecting 
citizens from external attacks may be a necessary condition for the security of individuals but not 
a sufficient one (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007, 49). Also, Alkire (2003, 24) makes clear that there 
is no lack of coherence and vagueness as long as the “vital core” is identified by institutions that 
undertake Human Security. Additionally, the broad conception is a distinctive one thus “making a 
valuable contribution” that is required by a changed security environment (Alkire 2003, 40).  
One of the central elements within this discussion emerges from its paradoxical character: “Narrow 
proponents have sacrificed non-violent threats for policy utility, and broad proponents have 
sacrificed some analytical and policy clarity for inclusiveness (Owen 2004b, 381). As a strategy to 
overcome such deadlock, Owen (2004a, 20) advocates an alternative HS approach based on the 
“threshold” scheme, one that would encounter both analytical usefulness and political purpose. 
Owen regards HS as “protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive 
threats”. Also known as an hybrid conceptualization of HS (2004a, 20), Owen’s approach, deeply 
rooted in the broad standpoint, particularly in the UNDP, states that all sources of threats are 
considered, thus limited regarding its severity, instead of the causes; only those exceeding the 
severity threshold could be encountered as threats to Human Security (2004b, 381).  
From this mid-term, narrow supporters should recognize that their approach is only one of the HS 
frames, namely personal security, but not exclusively; on the other hand, broad proponents would 
step down upon such a broad labeling of harms (Owen 2004b, 383), therefore limited to certain 
environmental, economic, food, health, personal and political threats (Owen 2004a, 20). Also a 
mid-term, but located at the other side of the spectrum, presenting a broader version of the narrow 
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approach, Roberts (2006, 258) regards HS threats as “avoidable civilian deaths”, caused by 
“changeable human-built social, political, economic, culture or belief structures” resulting in 
“needless mortality around the world”, leaving space for a broader conceptualization within its 
delimitation around massive deaths. Additionally, Roberts (2005, 9) stresses that although Owen’s 
conceptualization is a good starting point for dialogue, it still lacks clarity through its ambiguity in 
defining the “vital core of all human lives”.  
Despite the divergence in these concepts, there are significant elements equally shared and 
convergent by the different approaches (Owen 2004b, 376). The first common ground recognizes 
the need to move from a traditional approach exclusively devoted to armed conflict, accepting the 
shift from the state to the individual as the main security reference but also the definition of security 
in terms of threats to the life of individuals. Also, worth noting is the shared consensus regarding 
the role played by non-state actors as important players for the fulfilment of security. This much 
summarizes that there is a clear consensus in the overall criticism to the realist conception of 
security (McDonald 2002, 279).  
Although both approaches provide considerable arguments and a wide range of data for analysis, 
they all reflect the polarity within the conceptual debate (Roberts 2006, 249), “undermining unity” 
(Newman 2010, 83) and development within the Human Security conceptualization (Tzifakis 2011, 
354; McDonald 2002, 278; Paris 2004, 371) 
 
1.3.2.3. A Critical Insight on Human Security 
 
A clash between two different ‘paradigms’ is at the essence of global policymaking, reflecting two 
different viewpoints of the world: one reproducing power relations and consequent insecurities 
while the other challenges such a view by emphasizing mutual securities threats and the need for 
human-centered responses (Chandler 2008, 427). Although the emergence of discourse and 
practice on Human Security as a new approach to security is perceived (Thomas and Tow 2002, 
177), one capable to challenge the more realistic conceptions, it has been subject to scrutiny and 
critics for a large number of reasons not only regarding its conception but also its substantial 
practice in the real governance dimension (McDonald 2002, 280; Krause 2009, 76).  
Krause (2009, 76), for instance, sums up four major lines of criticism, not only coming from within 
the HS proponents community but also from outside this sphere, namely the traditional security 
approaches: HS as normatively engaging but weak in theoretical terms (Newman 2010,82; Paris 
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2004, 34; Floyd 2007, 42); There is a wide gap between HS discourse and the real practices by 
states and international organizations (Kaldor 2013, 14); The concept has been used by states to 
reinforce their traditional power (McDonald 2002, 282; Christie 2010, 170; Chandler 2008, 428). 
The rhetoric can be used to promote the use of force as legitimate practices (McDonald 2002, 
282). Similarly, Chandler (2008, 428) suggests that even though the discourse on HS has become 
popular within the international policy circles, it has few impact on policy results, being entitled as 
“the dog that did not bark”. Through his perception, the attractiveness of Human Security is due 
to a strategy of amplifying the new Post-Cold War threats, locating these same threats in the 
developing world and, finally the promotion of short term policy making in the absence of a 
straightforward and strategic Foreign Policy vision (Chandler 2008, 428).  
Other critics arise specifically towards the global perception of Human Security as a broad concept. 
Regarding the previous, McFarlane and Kong (2006, 237) are particularly sceptics by 
acknowledging that even though the concept promises to be “analytically coherent and powerful 
(…) able to generate positive policy payoff s”, these specific grounds disable the concept to 
compete with national approaches by: establishing false priorities and hopes; creating causal 
confusion; and excessive securitization. Through this critical vision, the horizontal extension of the 
concept that covers the well-being of individuals creates false hopes and priorities due to the 
impossibility of prioritizing a wide set of dimensions such as economic, ecologic, health and gender-
related threats thus making it empirically useful. Also related, combining too many elements under 
the same the Human Security scope, “confuses rather than clarifies the causes” of insecurity 
(McFarlane and Kong 2006, 241). Lastly, the legitimization of a whole new sphere of matters that 
can be securitized, may lead to military responses to political and socioeconomic issues given the 
state’s tendency to associate issues with the concept of security so that they can bring force to 
bear (McFarlane and Kong 2006, 242). 
Major critics also arise regarding the application of the Human Security agenda, particularly within 
the present dynamics of power and decision-making processes (McDonald 2002, 280). Through 
this lens, HS is an essentially normative and moral project, by clearly lacking effective and useful 
policy (Ewan 2007, 184), rather than a security practice rooted in political reality (McDonald 2002, 
280). This argument is also reinforced by Chandler (2008, 436) who considers that the absence 
of causal relations promotes lack of clear policy strategy, enabling governments to evade 
responsibilities while taking praise for their good will.  
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As a response to the previous argument, Ambrosetti (2008, 440) recognizes that Chandler’s 
reasons seem credible and must be noted since they call for need of critical distance, nevertheless 
he counts that an entirely ‘empiricist’ approach cannot be validated without further investigation. 
Also, Owen (2008, 446) reacts by acknowledging Chandler error of considering that there is a 
single Human Security project.  
Additionally, according to Shanni (2007, 7), the Human Security concept complements and 
actually reinforces the paradigm of national security. In this view, charging states with the additional 
task of ‘responsibility to protect’ its citizen underlines its effective power and empowers its position 
within the international system as a security provider. This comment is also supported by Christie 
(2010, 185) who considers that such approach place the state as the center of attentions by 
literally extending and justifying its governance but also by Floyd (2007, 42) who considers that 
the reason for such focus on the state means that “most securitizations are still performed by state 
actors”. In fact, MacFarlane and Kong (2006, 265) have asserted that the HS “is about ensuring 
that states protect their people”. However, once again, this gives rise to a major concern regarding 
the malleability of the concept which may be used to legitimize increased state control over 
individuals under the pretext of ‘protection’ (Shani 2007, 7).Similarly, Black recognizes that HS 
agenda is corrupted in order to focus on traditional security rather than humanitarian action (2006, 
59).  
In Ambrosetti’s (2008,440) view, although such warnings shall be acknowledged, the majority is 
biased by a state centered vision, aiming to restore politics and competition for power as the focus 
of the analysis. In this sense, new approaches such as HS produce real changes and be effective 
without affecting, at least initially, the hierarchy of power among the existing actors. 
Advocates of Human Security have identified crucial blind spots in the conceptualizations of 
national security, making it a relevant normative concept. However, even if one believes that the 
HS idea has achieved significant improvement or had just stalled in recent years, an important 
step to be taken regards a new engagement in self-reflection in order to analyze possible flaws 
within the approach and, if there is, understand on how these could be straighten out (McFarlane 
and Kong 2006, 236). In this sense, it is crucial for advocates of the HS idea to “put their 
conceptual house in order before pressing ahead” (McFarlane and Kong 2006, 236).  
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Human Security: A Vehicle for National Interest? 
 
The Human Security concept was one of the long series attempt to challenge the traditional state-
focused approaches to security, becoming significantly attractive due to discourse adoption by 
states, International Organizations and non-governmental organizations thus resulting in interesting 
foreign policies and security initiatives (Krause 2009, 76). However, noticed by Chandler (2008, 
433), the areas within HS that have gained particular consideration and resources are those who 
echo the ongoing priorities of some member of International Organizations and the international 
community. In fact, Shanni goes further and asserts that: 
Human Security is a double-edged sword: sharp enough to pierce through the thick armour 
of sovereignty with the state protects and insulates itself from the subaltern challenged of its 
citizens, yet blunt enough to be used by states to legitimize their strategic, and often blatantly 
material, interests (Shani 2007, 7). 
Following McDonald’s view, states can “benefit from ‘talking the talk’ of Human Security, without 
‘walking the walk’” (2002, 282), meaning that these actors may perk from positive perceptions on 
HS but also “pick and choose which causes they wish to pursue” (Black 2006, 59, according to 
their national interest of self-preservation, national security but also prestige (MacLean 2006, 64). 
Particularly regarding the “Freedom from Fear” approach, Tzifakis (2011, 361) affirms that this 
perception is closer to traditional security thinking, mostly positioned by states who face budgetary 
constraints, therefore not possessing all the needed resources to put forward a more ambitious 
agenda.  
Several contributors such as McDonald (2002, 282), Chandler (2008, 434), MacLean (2006, 64-
65), Black (2006, 55-57), Christie (2010, 171) or Suhrke (1999, 265-267), have taken the 
Canadian approach to HS as a good example for such assessment, given its role as a leading 
player in many Human Security ‘successes’. For instance, Canada’s position within the 
international community as middle power state, perceived as a ‘good international citizen’ and 
‘honest broker’ (Tzifakis 2011, 364), is consistent with its national interest of being recognized for 
its ability to influence international politics (McDonald 2002, 282). Black (2006, 59), goes further 
by affirming that Canada’s approach corresponds to an attempt of rescuing “Canadian defense 
policy from military irrelevance and strategic sterility”. Additionally, its HS conception is not a 
radical one (McLean 2006, 63), just enough to become “an active participant in global affairs” 
(McLean 2006, 70).  
In sum, according to this source of criticism, many states may find that promoting such a concept 
like HS can reveal to be a useful instrument to advocate their self-interests such as status and 
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influence in the international realm (Suhrke 1999, 267) but also that humanitarian ideals can be 
used to justify self-interested actions and, consequently, to promote an image of credibility (Christie 
2010, 174-175). 
 
1.4. Final Considerations 
 
The State is inserted in a wider context where all actors interact generating a global system of 
networks that affects its action. These two arenas are not necessarily apart, in fact they are under 
continual influence. In this regard State behavior is also moved by its internal conditions and 
pressures, many of them natural but others correspond to an outcome of state formation and 
evolution throughout the years, such as its political system or societal composition. Plural societies, 
for instance, may endorse particular Foreign Policy labels by taking into account their internal 
diversity with the overall goal of forging shared beliefs and opinions among the different societal 
identity groups essentially through soft power tools of influence, attraction and moral legitimacy, 
many times building a state-brand based upon these. However, given the global system of networks 
that affects state behavior, internal or external determinants, their goals may or not be achieved. 
Such acknowledgment takes foreign and domestic politics as entangled parts of an interconnected 
system where external and internal dimensions of state action are mutually supplied by an ongoing 
synergy.  
For the purpose of this essay, national unity is described as a “relationship of cohesiveness and 
cooperation built on the basis of clear and solid foundations that give no room to any 
misinterpretation” (Meftah et al. 2012, 278) among members of one community. Such ambition 
is “justified by the need to be stable and follow the pace of development leading to progress, 
prosperity and stability” (Meftah et al. 2012, 771). Relating National Unity with Foreign Policy 
remotes to the idea that the external construction of discourses through Foreign Policy approaches 
informs domestic politics by targeting domestic audiences. Increasingly attractive to state 
discourses and an interesting component of its Foreign Policy, Human Security became a powerful 
instrument of self-promotion and national interests. A tool of influence in the international sphere 
based on credibility considering the advantage of its humanitarian values which can be 
incorporated in internal discourse for ‘beliefs’ cohesion and inherent state legitimacy. In this 
perspective, integrating HS into the political agenda of states may be regarded as an outcome of 
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both foreign and domestic determinants of states behavior which may serve national purposes, 
namely the need to advocate aggregating values as the means to further develop national unity. 
 
Source: Formulated by the author. 
This chapter has presented the topic of National Unity and its relation with Foreign Policy and, 
ultimately Human Security establishing the conceptual and theory grounds of this thesis. Further 
analysis will be dedicated to governments and respective action plans on Human Security agendas 
and ambition for national unity as a domestic project.  
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Chapter 2. Jean Chrétien’s Government 
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Following the formulation and exposure of the theoretical-conceptual framework that will provide 
further support to this dissertation, it will take place the case study analysis on Jean Chrétien’s 
government between 1995 and 2000, with particular focus on the role played by the department 
of foreign affair under the leadership of Lloyd Axworthy.  
In first place, it will be done a brief contextualization on the international and domestic environment, 
as important determinants to explain the government’s Foreign Policy initiatives, particularly 
regarding its Human Security agenda. This will be followed by an analysis on discourses at both 
national and international stages, performed at government level but also through the ministry of 
foreign affairs as an important soft power tool. Lastly, the government action plan will be exposed 
by considering a set of important initiatives on Human Security.  
 
2.1. International context  
 
By 1990’s, a considerable shift was taking place with new perceptions of the world arising out of 
the peaceful conclusion of the Cold War confrontation while, at the same time, an ongoing 
transformation at the emergence of globalization affected state’s economies, technology but also 
the flow and management of information At the rise of the new decade there was a general global 
hope on a “New World Order” and how the increased liberalization and deregulation of markets 
would solve issues such as poverty however, as this tendency was driving in the opposite direction, 
so was the sense of optimism on wane (Axworthy 2010, 19). 
These unique circumstances begun a period of adjustment where the international community and 
policymakers faced new daring challenges. Also, the recent geopolitical stability provided a new 
perception on the root causes of human vulnerability, making visible a wide range of harms that 
used to be disregarded in the previous superpower clash period (Owen 2010, 39). The result was 
an emergent sense of distrust in the ruling system essentially based on the prominence of states 
who revealed themselves incapable of dealing with the new circumstances and threats to 
individuals who were now regarded as the fundamental object of security (Owen 2010, 39). In this 
new context insecurities “stemmed from a mix of health, environmental and economic 
vulnerabilities as well as new forms of conflict which had become a greater human threat than the 
inter-state war” that had long dominated the idea of insecurity (Owen 2010, 9; Hassan 2015, 87), 
in fact, as acknowledged by Axworthy, “there was a definite vacuum in defining security needs and 
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responses” (2010, 19). Such empowerment of people called upon an emancipatory wave to a 
Human Security agenda (Hassan 2015, 88).  
Even if the old beliefs on state sovereignty and resistance to cooperative actions were at a strong 
hold, a clear demand for a much more effective international network was also fierce, one that 
would pass by organizational structures like the United Nations, G-8, OECD but also other 
international actors many times marginalized such as NGO’s and civil society itself (Axworthy 2010, 
20). Simultaneously, at a time when peace was expected, several international crisis were ongoing 
from Rwanda to Haiti, East Timor or Kosovo, new approaches were needed to emphasize a more 
humanitarian dimension that would provide a humane lens through which to perceive the 
international events.  
In such context, Canada took the opportunity to promote itself as an innovative player and become 
one of the major proponents of Human Security. This was done by developing an approach that 
would work towards new standards of international behavior based on the notion of human rights, 
mainly through soft power strategies of communication and persuasion (Axworthy 2010, 22). As 
Axworthy noted itself, “the idea of Human Security seems a particularly good fit of Canadians (…), 
a honest broker, a mediator, a peacekeeper”, one that would express the inherent characteristics 
of Canadian people as the ones who have “forged a community of interests that express a humane 
set of values” (2010, 23).  
 
2.1.2. The Role Played by the United States 
 
The end of the bipolar balance of power opened a unipolar international system with the United 
States occupying and absolute and indisputable supremacy. After defeating its major rival, by the 
1990’s the United States revealed itself as the most powerful country in the world, measured in 
terms of its military, economy, politics and culture (Beeson 2004, 1). In fact, Ikenberry, names the 
new post-Cold War system as an American-led open-democratic political order where the U.S takes 
the position of a “world order producer” (2005, 133-135).  
By 1996 President Bill Clinton was at the American office, facing a period of redefinition on 
America’s role in the world, only five years later on the collapse of the Soviet Union and dealing 
with the widespread disorder abroad. Throughout this period, Clinton’s presidency relied its 
international action on multilateralism, particularly focused on trade, believing that the new order 
based on America’s hegemony and globalization would promote economic prosperity throughout 
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the world. Among its activity it is possible to highlight the signature of the NAFTA agreement9 along 
with Canada and Mexico, minimization of trade tariffs with China, commitment towards the 
enlargement of NATO into Eastern Europe, but also an active role within NATO in regard to the 
Kosovo War in the Balkans.  
Clinton’s conception on U.S. Foreign Policy aimed to create new approach to international affairs, 
a doctrine based on crucial points such as expanding democracies throughout the world, free trade 
focus, multilateral peacekeeping efforts which included a reinforcement of international alliances 
but also engagement towards crisis situation with the possibility of intervention when practical and 
morally valued (Riley 2009). In fact, the promoted policies were designed to enhance human and 
civil rights, noting that these should not interfere with its national security, neither undermine nor 
overdrive its national resources. 
It would be feasible to assert that there would be a much more cooperative and close partnership 
between the U.S and Canada, regarding the apparent American commitment to the core Canadian 
values based on global peace, human rights, democracy and rule of law. A relation essentially 
based on multilateralism would be a cooperation to manage an effective response to the new post-
Cold War challenges however, such Foreign Policy convergence would only persist as long it did 
not affect American interest, where Canadian international initiatives would not cross American 
borders (Payne 2004, 10-11; Thompson 2003, 5). As Behringer also found in its study on middle 
power leadership regarding the Human Security agenda, the U.S. would be more likely to oppose 
Human Security initiatives if these could challenge the rights of American citizens who were 
protected under its constitution; only campaigns that did not threat the core national interest, the 
security of its territory, institutions and citizens would count with the American support (2005, 331-
332). For instance, Americans went along with the SHIRBRIG10 and APL11 initiatives because neither 
corresponded to a direct or indirect threat to its national interest but made clear its prerogatives 
namely the grant that a standing UN army would not be created ; additionally they absolutely turned 
 
 
9 The NAFTA Agreement was first signed in 1992 by President George Bush (U.S.), President Salinas (Mexico) and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney 
(Canada) in 1992 with the intent of reducing trading costs, increase business investment and increase the overall competitiveness of North America 
in the global market place. It was not until 1994 that the agreement assumed law force, becoming one of Clinton’s major legislative remarks by 
eliminating most trade barriers among the signatory countries and an economic milestone that unites the three North American states (Waxman 
2018).  
10 The SHIRBRIG initiative aimed to create a standby force, a UN peacekeeping brigade that could provide a rapid response to crisis situations 
affecting the security of civilians. The initiative, advanced by the Danish, counted with the leadership of Canada and the Netherlands as well by 
making reports and diplomatic campaigns to increase the UN’s rapid response capability (Behringer 2005, 331).  
11 The U.S. initially declared its support for a comprehensive global ban on use, production, stockpiling and transfer of Anti-Personal Landmines 
given the international campaign in this regard but ended up rejecting the Ottawa Process due to inability to grant exceptions on the American APLs 
in Korea and Cuba (Behringer 2005, 332).  
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down on both the ICC12 and SALW13 campaigns by arguing violation on particular constitutional 
rights of its citizenry (Behringer 2005, 332). Many initiatives were perceived by Washington as 
threats to the American constitutional system which is regarded the ultimate institution of its 
democracy.  
In sum, the U.S. although this period was not an entirely convergent and consensual one between 
the two neighbors on multilateral initiatives, the American view on Canadian approach to 
international issues was relatively calm and stable during the Clinton administration (Thompson 
2003, 6).  
 
2.2. National Context 
 
In 1993 Jean Chrétien won his first federal election as leader of the liberal party, after a practically 
flawless campaign targeting the creation of job positions and releasing a platform book, also known 
as the “Red Book”, that listed the intended changes if the liberals were brought to power (Bothwell 
2015, 5). His first term awarded the liberal party 38% of the popular vote, 19 seats in Québec, 
thus facing and incursion by the Bloc Québécois and 155 elsewhere in the country, conquering 
majority with but taking the nationalist party of Québec as its major opposition (Figure 1). 
The 35th federal election reflected that Canadians were generally dissatisfied as, according to 
Ludec, only 67% of the eligible voters exercised their right of participation, one of the lowest 
percentages in federal elections, reflecting a common resentment and unable to demonstrate 
broad support to any political party or leader (Ludec, 2006). However, the following period would 
not be an easy one to manage given the heavy heritage owned from the previous government and 
a considerable recession: high taxes, high national debt and a distressing deficit (Bothwell 2015, 
5). In such context the new government was compelled to limit a considerable number of federal 
programs, namely subsidies of provinces, making the deficit reduction as a top priority of Chrétien 
government. Additionally, and, perhaps, considerably more dangerous, this government faced the 
turbulent wave of Québec’s separatism, worth noting that by 1994 separatism counted 
 
 
12 The distaste of Washington towards the ICC concerned its unability to guarantee American soldiers their constitutional rights to a jury trial and 
inherent processes (Behringer 2005, 332).  
13 SAWL was promptly rejected by the Clinton administration who asserted that was not willing to take any international treaty that constrained the 
legitimate trade of SALW by U.S. citizens or break their constitutional right to own firearms (Behringer 2005, 327).  
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Figure 6. Result of the 35th Federal Election in October 25th of 1993 
 
Source: Government of Canada [1993c].
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with an average of 40% on support from Canadians (House of Commons Library 2013, 11). In the 
end, the federalist forces came to victory however, it sounded the alarms on national unity and 
cohesion within the federal system of Canada (Bothwell 2015, 5). With a complete disorder within 
parliament after the disintegration of the conservative party of Kim Campbell and the fragmentation 
of the New Democratic Party after the disastrous result in the federal action, the Liberals were left 
in the House of Commons before the two regional forces, Bloc Quebecois and the Reform Party 
(Bothwell 2015, 5). Chrétien was left with no option but to call a federal election in 1997. The 
result gave the Liberal Party 155 seats within parliament and making the Reformist Party its major 
opposition force, followed by the Bloc Québécois who had lost its role as the second power in the 
House of Commons (Elections Canada 2018) comparing to the 1993 election but also by the NDP 
and the Conservative Party who considerably increased representation (Figure 2). 
Although the Liberal Party had achieved the majority this was a narrow one, and, along with the 
Bloc Québécois, had reasoning to be dissatisfied with such results, particularly the former who’s 
vote in Québec declined sharply, from 49% in 1993 to 38% in 1997, just shortly ahead the liberal’s 
36% within the French speaking province (Ludec 2006). The 1997, gave, once again, evidence 
that there were considerable challenges ahead, given the electoral volatility. 
Even though the first term was noticed by its considerable financial constraints and the government 
was able to evidence results by the time of elections: instead of lowering the deficit to 3% of the 
GDP, it was reduced to 1% in 1996, as promised in the elections Red Book, and to 0% the year 
after (Chrétien 2010, 91), a result that might have influenced a second time majority of the Liberal 
Party. 
As Chrétien notes in his book, the 1995 pools evidenced that 40% of Canadians were 
comprehensive on the financial constraints on the 1995-1996 budgets while other 40% perceived 
these as not being sufficient, not punishing his party at the 1997 elections for such policies (2010, 
91-92). Considerable cuts were advance by his government, however, as Chrétien asserted, “all 
ministers struggled hard to keep their priorities consistent with our national values (…) Canadians 
did not want us to eliminate the deficit on the backs of those in need of help (…) they wanted us 
to be both compassionate and clever with our cuts “ (2010, 83). In fact, values came to play an 
essential role throughout all mandates that Chrétien took over office, an essential remark of the 
Liberal Party itself since its foundation, “Canadian values, 
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Source: Elections Canada 2018.
Figure 7. Result of the 36th Federal Election in June 2nd of 1997 
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liberal values, Personal values”, were the guideline “vision” for all challenges ahead (Chrétien 
2010, 57-58).  
Particularly after the Québec Referendum it became clear to Chrétién that the political and 
economic crisis of the 1980’s and 1990’s had impacted the feeling of belonginess within Canadian 
citizenry evidencing the need to re-formulate the attachment to Canadian values and uphold 
national unity (Ozguc 2011, 39). The government promptly engaged increasing efforts in the 
stimulation of national unity and the promotion of Canadian values both at home and abroad. This 
new strategy came through the notion of public diplomacy14 with the intent of enhancing national 
unity through the promotion of values, directly employed by the DFAIT15 initiatives who’s action 
aimed to indirectly reach out Canadians, providing a new approach to the national unity debate 
(Huijgh and Byrne 2012, 400; Massie 2009, 401). 
By the time Jean Chrétien became prime minister, he had considerable previous experience in 
various positions within politics and government specifically however, his foreign affairs experience 
was not much far-reaching when compared to other political areas, even though he had briefly 
served as Secretary of State for External Affairs under John Turner’s government in 1984 (Duer 
2013, 4). 
In this regard, eager to invest particular efforts on Foreign Policy taking into account that the country 
was facing a more stable financial context, Lloyd Axworthy, previously in the ministry of 
Employment and immigration, was nominated Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1996, who had played 
a significant role in the battle against deficit but who highly contributed to make Foreign Policy as 
one of the big remarks of Chrétien’s legacy in Canadian politics (Bothwell 2015, 7). 
In charge of the new ministry Axworthy shifted the focus towards human right issues, a natural 
extension of Canadian values and its Pearsonian internationalism16, two characteristics that always 
 
 
14 Public diplomacy is conceived as a soft power tool, an effort of a government to influence foreign public opinion as an attempt to call attention for 
its national ideas and values, institutions, culture as well as moral goals and ongoing policies. Ministries of foreign affairs may undertake similar 
activities directing them towards its own citizens in order for these to portray the outside world according to a national vision framed within its values, 
thus raising awareness on the importance of their own international role (Potter, n.d 3-4) 
15 Since the establishment of Canada’s values and culture as the ‘third pillar’ of Foreign Policy in the 1995 review, Canada has assumed leadership 
in the use of soft power in support of its Foreign Policy, particularly through public diplomacy. The overall efforts to communicate Canada’s 
international role through public diplomacy expresses two major goals: the ambition to take international activities as means to feature the Canadian 
success as a ‘unified nation’ to Canadians as well as the need to evidence DFAIT’s commitment to combine its activities with national priorities 
(Potter n.d. 4). 
16 During the 1950’s and 1960’s, Lester B. Pearson, as Secretary of State for External Affairs and later Prime Minister, turned the Peacekeeping 
cause as a major priority within Canadian Foreign Policy, taking a superior place within the armed forces, above defending territory (Gravelle et al. 
2014, 119). According to his approach, internationalism was reflected on policies of maintaining and strengthening world peace as the essential 
goal of Canadian national policy, meaning that nationalism and internationalism were the two sides of the same coin as such world view was 
consistent with Canada’s own interest (Simpson 199, 81). His Foreign Policy view, founded on liberal internationalism became known as 
“Pearsonian Internationalism” Since then, “internationalism” has become a broad slogan, one used for shaping the public debate, appealing to 
consensus and support (Munton and Keating 2001, 522-524) but essentially part of a continual nation-building project (Ozguc 2011, 41).  
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walk together in Canadian politics but which are also engrained in Canadian’s consciousness (Lee 
2011,1; Gravelle et al 2014, 118; Ozguc 2011, 38). The main objective of the new foreign affairs 
minister aimed to deliver foreign policies grounded on widely shared concerns and values among 
Canadians (Massie 2009, 401), taking the historical Foreign Policy approach grounded on the 
image of a ‘good international citizen’ which plays a central role in the “imagined community of 
Canadians” (Ozguc 2011, 40).  
 
2.2.1. Quebec’s Quest for Sovereignty 
 
Nationalism in Quebec has been a constant in Canada’s history (Rocher 2002, 1-2). Quebec is the 
largest province of Canada and second in terms of population where almost half have its roots on 
the original French settlers, (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2013, 18-21) noting that since 
the very beginning of Canadian federal system, Quebec has used its status as a provincial state to 
strength its political and economic power within the federation (Roche 2002, 1).  
The divergence between Canada and Québec dates back to the 1700’s by the time of North 
America settlement (Smith 2010, 3). Following a military campaign, the French surrendered New 
France17 to the British, officialized in 1763 by the Treaty of Paris, and, in that same year, its borders 
were redrawn, attaching this region to the other English-speaking provinces (House of Commons 
Library 2013, 2). Even though the 1774 Act of Parliament granted freedom of religion for Catholics 
and permission to take public office, the catholic Church encouraged the French-speaking 
population to remain apart from English-Canada in order to preserve its own culture and religion 
(House of Commons Library 2013, 2), resulting in a clear gap between the marginalized French 
and Anglo Canadians who clearly had economic advantage (Smith 2010, 1). Successive rebellions 
followed and even after the unification of upper and lower Canada into the United Province of 
Canada, the idea of separatism remained in Québec, impulse by the permanent campaigns of 
assimilation by English Canadians which also caused the abandonment of French speaking 
minorities in the English speaking provinces on to majority French Québec (House of Commons 
Library 2013, 2). Since then, the people of Québec could choose between appeals to independence 
 
 
17 New France corresponds to the area occupied by France in North America to which Quebec belonged, ending with its concession to Britain 1763. 
As time passed, New France immersed in the U.S and Canadian regions, with the exception of Quebec where the strong Francophone identity 
remains an enduring legacy of the French presence in North America.  
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or demand the federal government to intercede on behalf of the French-speaking throughout the 
other Canadian provinces, which they ended up choosing.  
The clash between Québec and the other provinces become more quiet in the establishment of 
the recent federal political structure by 1867 due to the promising autonomy of the French province 
and opportunity to cultivate its own culture, only re-emerging in the late 1960’s with Québec 
nationalism as a political force, originating the Parti Québécois in 1968 who advocated a policy of 
independence (Hudon 2017, 2). This movement culminated with the 1980 Referendum, after the 
PQ had taken power in the National Assembly of Québec however, voters choose for unity with a 
result of 60% over 40% who had voted for sovereignty (Smith 2010, 2; Hudon 2017, 5).  
By the 1990’s Jacques Parizeau, elected as Premier of Quebec 1994, had earlier advocated 
independence and a referendum on sovereignty within a year, which inevitably came to happen on 
October of 1995 (Mahler 2009, 459). A new referendum on Quebec’s sovereignty was now facing 
Canada’s unity, under the federal leadership of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, who took the lead 
on the “No” movement against the “No” campaign (House of Commons Library 2013, 13). As a 
French Quebecer, Chrétien was at a tough position if the “Yes” came to reality, meaning that he 
would no longer be a representative of English-Canadians, however, major forces were put forward 
by the prime minister by making two essential promises: recognize Quebec as a distinct society, 
and affirming its veto power on constitutional changes (Chrétien 2010, 160). His promises were 
many times accompanied by emotional speeches were Canadian values and unity were the central 
theme, appealing to “a country whose values of tolerance, understanding and generosity” built a 
unique country and a distinctive one in the world as he noted “other countries invest I weapons we 
invest in the well-being of our citizens (…) other countries resort to violence to settle differences; 
we work out our problems through compromise and mutual respect” (Chrétien 2010, 162). 
Simultaneously the “No” campaign was confident on its victory (Chrétien 2010, 161) given polls 
close to referendum date ( House of Commons Library 2013, 19) asserting that the federal system 
was unfair and inflexible to Quebec, promising that sovereignty would bring advantages by 
appealing to the feeling of solidarity among Quebecers (House of Commons Library 2013, 13).  
Approximately 94% of Quebecer’s chose to vote: 50.58% of them chose to remain a united Canada 
whereas 49.42% would have been satisfied with detachment (Chrétien 2010, 164). The economic 
offers the proposed partnership with the rest of Canada came to play a decisive role for the outcome 
result given that Quebecer’s worried about a possible economic disruption but also political 
isolation (House of Commons Library 2013, 22).  
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In the immediate aftermath of the referendum, constitutional amendments were proposed by 
Chrétien regarding the promised points on recognizing Quebec as a distinct society and providing 
them veto on future amendments (Chrétien 2010, 165) however, small constitutional changes took 
place, in fact (House of Commons Library 2013, 22), instead, special efforts were put forward to 
reinforce Canadian unity, for instance (Chrétien 2010, 167). Two national unity strategies were put 
forward, reflecting two different action plans, Plan A and Plan B (Roche 2002, 15-16). While plan 
B regarded a legal frame to unable a possible a possible secession in Quebec (Roche 2002, 15), 
Plan A intended to rebrand the idea of unity within Canada through a new marketing strategy just 
like Pierre Trudeau did in the 1980’s in order to influence Quebecer’s to view the positiveness of 
being a Canadian (McRoberts 1997, 239), seeking policies that would inspire and unite Canadians 
(Donaghy 2003, 41).  
 
2.3. Building a Discourse 
 
Building an effective discourse is an essential part for achieving the government’s aimed results, 
particularly in the Canadian case where the construction of a discursive narrative plays a central 
role by providing legitimacy through a common national purpose (Ozguc 2011, 40; Thomson and 
Hynek 2006, 847).  
As the Report on Citizen’s Forum18 already previewed in 1991, “Canada is grappling with twin 
crises -one of structure, the other, more profound and delicate, of the spirit.”, whereas the spirit 
refers to “shared ideas, ideals, dreams and confidence”, running the risk to overwhelm the 
structure in the long run (CFCF 1991, 8). The Report on Citizen’s Forum was indeed the first 
document to launch the broader theme of a national unity crisis into the political agenda, 
recognizing seven major issues affecting Canada: “a) Canadian Identity and Values; b) Quebec and 
Canadian Unity; c) Official Languages; d) Aboriginal Issues; e) Cultural Diversity; f) The Canadian 
Economy; g) Responsible Leadership and Participatory Democracy”. However, the document 
denotes particular attention on the role of values and how the involved citizens highlighted what it 
means to be a Canadian considering specific values that defined them as a society: 1. Belief in 
 
 
18 The Citizen’s Forum on Canada’s Future was an initiative launched by the federal government, an independent body sent on the mission to find 
what type of country Canadians ambitioned for themselves and its descendants by listening directly to them. The overall goal of this forum was to 
launch a national dialogue and lower the level of distrust, thus generating a consensus about Canada and its future (CFCF 1991, 15).  
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Equality and Fairness in a Democratic Society; 2. Belief in Consultation and Dialogue; 3. 
Importance of Accommodation and Tolerance; 4. Support for Diversity; 5. Compassion and 
Generosity; 6. Attachment to Canada's Natural Beauty; 7. Our World Image : Commitment to 
Freedom, Peace and Non-Violent Change (CFCF 1991, 35-44). Notably, the 1991 report 
recognized that Canada faced a spirit deadlock, mainly expressed as a crisis of values however, it 
also figured that most participants shared a basic values regardless of its region, language or 
ancestry, highlighting a point from which Canada could be revitalized (CGCG 1991, 116).  
In the same year of the Quebec Referendum, Chrétien’s government launched the 1995 Foreign 
Policy Review, “Canada in the World”, establishing three essential pillars which were drawn upon 
the previous consultations among Canadians: 1. The promotion of prosperity and employment; 2. 
The projection of our security, within a stable global framework; 3. The projection of Canadian 
values and culture (Government of Canada 1995). With the first goal being related with the life 
quality of Canadians, the country’s prosperity and the economic system, the second is noted as a 
prerequisite for the latter, while the promotion of domestic values are assumed as an important 
approach to advance Canada’s interests at the international stage, here recognizing Canadian 
political values as a mean to successful accomplish the national interests. 
Application of values (…) will be critical to the struggle for international security in the face of 
new threats to stability. Their adoption internationally will also be essential to ensuring that 
they are viable in our own country. Canada is not an island able to resist a world community 
that devalued beliefs central to our identity. Vitality of our culture is also essential to our 
economic success. In the new knowledge-based world economy, the skills of people, their 
education, ingenuity and social adaptability, will become key elements of international 
advantage. Our educational system, cultural diversity and continued dynamic growth in 
exports of cultural products and services will contribute significantly to our achievement 
internationally (Government of Canada 1995).  
Although defined in isolated terms, all three were built on the ground of a common framework of 
interdependence and mutual reinforcement, including programs of international trade, assistance 
and diplomacy (Government of Canada 1995).  
Additionally, the 1995 review evidenced the idea of unity among Canadians, one that springs from 
the uniqueness of Canadian values, therefore a source of pride: 
In countries like Canada, unity springs from pride in the civic nationality – based on shared 
values and tolerance, respect for rule of law and thoughtful compromise - that its citizens 
share. Unity around these values permits the identification of a new compass for the 
development of foreign policy in a world where sweeping certainties have been replaced by 
doubts about what is ahead and where the surest path lies. (Government of Canada 1995) 
Such approach rapidly became an active asset in the government’s public discourses, particularly 
emphasizing the role of values and on how Canada had something to offer the world. Also, it 
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outlined how these should be considered a major asset in the face of the recent security 
reconfiguration. Such narrative became a recurrent idea in the Prime Minister’s statement:  
The United Nations stands for the rule of law, for social and political justice and for the 
peaceful settlement of disputes. These are important principles for Canadians. They are at 
the heart of our identity. For although Canadians sometimes forget it, the highest hope of the 
global community is to achieve what we in Canada have achieved for ourselves: a means of 
living together in peace and understanding (United Nations 1995) 
Also noted later in September of 2000 during the General Assembly plenary meeting: 
Canada’s embrace of the United Nations reflects our common values and shared experiences. 
An incredibly diverse nation, we are deeply committed to freedom, tolerance, justice and 
equality. We know the sense of community that comes from sharing prosperity and 
opportunity. (…)The United Nations is our best hope to marshal the common sense of purpose 
needed to realize this vision. But it must meet the challenge of change (United Nations 2000b) 
Being actively supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, particularly Lloyd Axworthy from 1996 
onwards, their discourses mutually enhanced the established goals through active diplomacy 
efforts: 
Canadians take special pride in peacekeeping because the concept was developed in part by 
their Foreign Minister, Lester B. Pearson (…) In a new and changing global environment 
internationalism is ever more important for all nations, large or small, weak or powerful. 
Changing times have set for us a new broad agenda, which includes focusing on the security 
needs of individuals. (…) In Canada, we are currently focusing our approach to these issues. 
We have started reworking our own international tool kit to improve our ability to initiate and 
support peace-building operations in areas such as mediation, dialogue, human-rights 
monitoring, judicial reform, police training and demobilization of military forces (United 
Nations 1996).  
Later in 2000 the discourse cohesiveness was maintained and actually reinforced by the work done 
during the past years where Canada established the example and the lead of international issues, 
particularly after assuming the human security discourse: 
It is a vision that serves the world’s people, and one that resonates with them (…) This is not 
a new agenda for Canada. Indeed, over the past five years, promoting human security has 
been the focus of our own approach to our changing world (United Nations 2000a). 
While Jean Chrétien highlighted what Canada had to offer the international community, 
reassembling the singularity of Canadians, its values, practices, thus building a bridge between the 
‘reality at home’ and the international challenges, Axworthy featured Canadian agency and the 
action properly said, inviting its international partners to follow the example.  
Already in the 1995 Foreign Policy Review, the government had revealed its appeal for the human 
security agenda, identifying for the first time a set of non-traditional threats such as mass migration, 
underdevelopment, overpopulation, environmental degradation and humanitarian tragedies with 
peace and security consequences at both national and global level, recognizing the urgency of 
refocusing security on the needs of the individual (Government of Canada 1995).However, it was 
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not until 1999 with the launch of the DFAIT concept paper “Human Security: Safety for the People 
in a Changing World”, that Canada presented its official formulation on Human Security, one based 
upon the freedom from fear, a narrow conception closer to the traditional security reasoning, 
meaning freedom from pervasive threats to peoples safety or lives” (Owen 2004, 43). Such paper 
outlined the two essential strategies through which human security should be strengthened: legal 
norms and institutional capacity, noting that “little point in defining new norms and rights, however, 
if societies have no capacity to enforce existing norms or to protect already recognized rights” 
(DFAIT 1999). 
Established Canada’s position at the international sphere (role formulation), effective performance 
was endorsed by taking part and actually leading a set of initiatives that configured Canada as an 
effective international player and visible among others (role perceived) which will further by 
analyzed under the topic of “Action Plan”.  
The way Axworthy conceived Human Security became narrower throughout the years and 
increasingly related with Canadian Foreign Policy heritage, thereby reformulating the Canadian 
‘myth’ by linking the country’s present behavior in the international context with its action in the 
past given the perfect fit of Human Security concerns within the traditional Foreign Policy discourse. 
In his article “Canada and Human Security: the need for leadership”, Axworthy was able to 
establish that same link:  
Canada has both the capacity and he credibility to play a leadership role in support of Human 
Security (…) Lester B. Pearson, Canada’s secretary of state for external affairs, summed up 
this policy in 1948 when he stated that Canada could not escape the results and obligations 
that flow from the interdependence of nations. But this internationalist vocation also provided 
Canadians with something enormously valuable: it contributed to a uniquely Canadian identity 
and a sense of Canada’s place in the world. The question for the future is how to build on 
Canadian Foreign Policy traditions so as to adapt Canada’s international contribution to this 
changing world. (Axworthy 1997, 184). 
Canadian agenda was firstly conceived as a broad and costly security approach by recognizing a 
wide set of security threats in line with the UNDP (1995 Foreign Policy Review), but later turned 
into more budget friendly initiatives through campaigns on international humanitarian law treaties 
such as the Ottawa treaty and the Rome Statute, always in relation with Canada’s traditional 
Foreign Policy conception thus (re)building Canadian sense of unity (Bosold n.d, 14). 
The discursive construction assumed a new approach by building it along with civil society and 
providing them an active role through an effective public diplomacy strategy. A new policy approach 
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based on public participation and partnerships counted with a close collaboration with NGO’s19 and 
Canadians; worth noting the annual National Forum on FP in eleven cities across the country or 
dozens of roundtables, such as the CCFPF20, counting with the participations of all Canadians, from 
youth to Indigenous Peoples, business, churches, academics or parliamentarians addressing a 
wide set of critical Foreign Policy issues such as Kosovo, Timor, humanitarian interventions, 
nuclear weapons small arms, among many others or the total reorganization of practices within 
the DFAIT21 itself (Lee 2000, 2-3). Such practice would be seen as a ‘best practice’ of the Canadian 
political system, an image of ‘Canadianess’, one that conceals the idea of homogeneity within 
difference (Ozguc 2011, 46) 
Canada’s new discourse derived from the golden age ‘myth’ of peace, order and good government 
enhancing Foreign Policy as more than a policy agenda but rather a clear expression of how the 
world should take into account the Canadian civic model based upon good governance of liberal 
democracy with democratic institutions, pluralism, free markets and human rights, therefore 
creating an attractive effect in other societies (Ozguc 2011, 46). In this regard, Foreign Policy came 
to play a central role in what values were concerned, the perfect vehicle to convey and establish 
shared ideals internally (Thomson and Hynek 2006, 852). 
 
2.4. Action Plan 
 
Within the goal of national unity, the Human Security agenda was adopted as a new approach to 
Foreign Policy, framed within the traditional Canadian internationalism thus reflecting essential 
values of ‘Canadianness’ (Ozguc 2011, 43). In this regard, Axworthy noted that it would be a 
 
 
19 NGO’s played a central role in Axworthy’s campaigns, endorsing close partnerships of knowledge exchange which became visible with NGOs like 
the Red Cross, key to the success of the landmines treaty but also in the establishment of the International Criminal Court. Also worth noting 
Axworthy’s efforts on pushing for the participation of NGO’s in the UNSC discussions therefore, increasing the transparency of the council’s business 
(Lee 2000, 3).  
20In 1997 the CCFPD recommended public policy discussion on a couple of issues including women, sustainable development, human rights, free 
media, participation of aboriginal peoples and youth. A set of roundtables were designed to generate ideas and if possible policy options resulting 
in the following outcome reports: Human Rights and Business and Code of Conduct issues (Calgary), Women and Economic Development in Asia 
(Fredericton), Free Media (Vancouver), Indigenous Heritage Rights and APEC (Saskatoon). Other Roundtables included a survey discussion of 
Sustainable Development interests (Vancouver), Participation of Aboriginal Peoples (Victoria), Central Asian Security (Ottawa). (Lee 2000, 3). 
21 A completely different flow of information was adopted within DFAIT, both in and out. Under Axworthy’s command, the department now counted 
with annual peacebuilding, arms control and disarmament and human rights consultations; the establishment of CPI; public tours, youth interns 
and a quarterly information magazine; not disregarding Department’s web site that turned to be a considerable resource of information on foreign 
policy. Additionally, bi-annual “Diplomatic Forum” was established for foreign ambassadors based in Ottawa, to meet in different Canadian cities, 
every two years thus, broadening world understanding; as well as Canadian Ambassadors and other diplomats were encouraged to tour Canada 
explaining their work and Canada’s interests abroad (Lee 2000, 3). 
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natural role for Canada to assume leadership in an international Human Security agenda, taking 
advantage of this being a clear reflection of Canadian society (Axworthy 1998, 185).  
The Human Security Agenda necessarily implied a new vision and a broad new scope for policies 
evaluation as a way of going beyond humanitarian action and addressing the root causes people’s 
insecurity. In this sense, two essential strategies were set in order to reinforce Human Security in 
the global order: the strengthening of the international legal norms and enhancing capacities to 
enforce these. As Axworthy noted in 1999, “it would make no sense in defining new norms if there 
is no capacity to enforce the existing norms but also building institutional capacity without 
reinforcing respect for norms would subvert a human centered approach to security. Both are 
fundamental strategies” (Axworthy 1999, 5). 
 
 2.4.1. Building Effective Legal Norms 
 
The notion of International legal norms incorporates a sense of appropriate behavior but mainly 
standards of shared morality which imply an approval for action. Noted by Suhrke, norms influence 
the interests of states by through two ways: by influencing the definition of interests and by 
influencing the order of priority (1999, 268). Therefore, reinforcing the existing international legal 
norms and the establishment of new ones in order to safeguard the defenseless was easily 
perceived by Canada as an influential approach to frame its commitment towards the Human 
Security assumption. 
The distinguished character of the 1990s international relations structure led to grater articulation 
of norms for securing human rights and gave space for the institutionalization of these new ideas 
(Suhrke 1999, 268). Through international platforms with the adequate international projection, 
such as the United Nations but also nongovernmental organizations and internal state agencies, 
new codes of conduct were shaped through the use of a wide range of strategies to persuade civil 
society and mainly states of what is an incorrect of correct code of conduct. International norms 
that have attained a considerable consensus undertake a normative pressure over the international 
system which produces a general but not unanimous adoption of a norm that through international 
connections may be taken as granted and embodied by states.  
Mainly backed up by soft power resources, Canada’s role in this context was to strength security 
of civil society through the development of a set of norms that would restrict the state’s behavior, 
thus further strengthening the international humanitarian regime to protect victims of conflict. 
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These include forbidding a breed of indiscriminate weapons; provide bigger oversight of small arms 
and light weapons; the protection of children and civilians in armed conflicts and the attachment 
of responsibility to the untouchable notion of sovereignty.  
 
The Ottawa Process 
The ban anti-personal landmines project, well known as the ‘Ottawa Process’, may well be 
Canada’s most acclaimed policy initiative regarding its Human Security agenda. Mainly sought to 
restrict or eliminate landmines and similar war instruments that put civilians at risk (Chapnik 2003, 
283), the Ottawa Process, made clear Canada’s ability to overcome traditional diplomatic 
mechanisms, assuming a clear leadership position through Lloyd Axworthy’s entrepreneur efforts 
and new sources of diplomatic influence.  
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their 
Destruction, made its way into Canadian policy priorities during the last days of Oulett as Minister 
of Foreign Affairs but it only gained significant visibility and became a departmental priority when 
Lloyd Axworthy took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who was in search of an issue to make his 
own (Donaghy 2011, 44).  
Even though there was support from several states such as Canada, France and Norway or 
Sweden, advocates endorsing an end to landmines inside and outside of Canadian and other 
government circles had given up on the UN process since the United Nations Conference on 
Disarmament (UNCD) demonstrated unwillingness of overcoming a heavy opposition to a total ban 
(Chapnik 2003, 284)22. As Axwothy made clear in “Navegating a New World”: 
The UN system of disarmament negotiation, based on achieving full consensus, was, as so 
often, held hostage to the position of the most recalcitrant members. There was a clear 
blockage by a number of states such as India, China, Cuba and the permanent five members 
of the Security Council, who wanted discussions confined to a forum they controlled. 
Disappointment was high, and so was the level of frustration. (Axworthy 2010, 146).  
Partnering itself with the International Coalition to Ban Landmines (ICBL), Canada took the needed 
steps to move this project forward towards a comprehensive ban in order to break the clear dead-
lock typical of tradition diplomatic channels by building a massive mobilization of national and 
 
 
22 Traditional diplomatic channels within the United Nations were considered a deadlock for negotiations given its consensus-based decision-making, 
highlighting the need to reconcile the perspectives among a wide set of states, particular big powers who were unwilling to cede. By opting for a 
majority-consensus, initiatives would be accepted by the majority of states, easily implemented and, once was launched, it was hoped that holdout 
states would become persuaded to participate by the existence of new international norms and institutions (Behringer 2003, 27). 
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international civil society organizations. The result was the leadership of Canada on the landmine 
issue by co-hosting, along with other NGOs that found reasons to support the campaign within their 
own mandates, a conference entitled as ‘Towards a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines’ on 
October 1996 (Behringer 2005, 317). This conference brought together fifty states that showed 
support for a draft Ottawa Declaration, twenty-four observer countries, as dozens of NGOs as well 
as representatives from the UN. The most surprising factor occurred on the last day when Axworthy 
closed the conference by inviting participants to work with Canada in favor of a APL ban treaty that 
would be signed by December 199723, 14 months after the Ottawa Conference (Behringer 2005, 
318).  
In the months ahead Axworthy actively promoted the landmine treaty through conferences, state 
visits and informal diplomacy jointly with other state leaders, mainly Like Minded States24 but also 
NGO’s and the ICBL. Apace with the promotion of the norm and the implicit negotiations, the treaty 
was being drafted through several regional reunion sessions which culminated with the Oslo 
Landmine Treaty on September 1997, when the drafting sessions were concluded. Negotiations 
were also outlined by the US’ hesitation and systematical requests for reservations. Despite the 
close negotiations between Axworthy, President Bill Clinton and Madeline Albright, who was 
Secretary of State by that time, and their personal support, domestic opposition could not be 
overthrown, which lead to the non-signature of this treaty.  
By December 1997, 122 states had signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, also known 
as Landmine Treaty25, approved on the UNGA during the 67th plenary meeting through resolution 
A/RES/52/38 (United Nations 1998). The first step was taken, a framework to enforce state 
compliance and cooperation, the next one would be enriching its substance and ensure that the 
flow and use of these mines would come to an end however, as Axworthy concludes in his book, 
 
 
23 Axworthy’s proposal to rejoin in one year to sign a treaty was an astute move not planned but that clearly surprised participants. In fact, this 
strategy was the subject of serious criticism as Ottawa was castigated for violating diplomatic etiquette and consultation protocols. Additionally, 
Belgium, who was a strong advocate of a comprehensive ban, felt that Canada had hijacked the landmines campaign, overshadowing the upcoming 
Brussels International Conference on Landmines. 
24 The origin of the Like-Minded States dates back to the 1990’s, corresponding to a homogenous group of five western democracies who emphasize 
multilateral cooperation as means to make their voice heard on a wide set of shared values, being known for being peace promoters, consensus 
builders and facilitators within International Organizations such as the United nations (Kothbauer-Liechtenstein and Kongshem).  
25 By 1998 the Treaty reached its 40th ratification followed by its effective entry into force in March of 1999, thus becoming binding International Law. 
According to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention source, over 51 million stockpiled mines have been destroyed, with 161 states parties no 
longer holding stockpiled anti-personnel mines, out of the 164 who have ratified the Convention so far. However, some challenges remain, such as 
the fact that 33 States have not yet ratified or acceded the Convention, namely the U.S, China, Russia, India, the Republic of Korea and Pakistan, 
thus holding millions of stockpiled antipersonnel mines (APMBC n.d) 
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“Human Security as a concept and soft power as a tool kit had produced a treaty that set out global 
norms for the protection of people” (Axworthy 2010, 155).  
However, even though diplomatic engagement may be considered a notorious success and must 
be mentioned, the actual leadership would only become visible when monetary backing was put 
forward. In 1997 the Canadian Landmine Fund (CLF), set a $100 million commitment over five 
years, jointly managed by DFAIT, CIDA, DND and Industry Canada and was renewed for $72 million 
for a further five year period in 2002 (DFAIT 2002, 44-46). These funds were aimed to promote 
initiatives anticipated in the treaty universalization but also to assist states towards ratification and 
compliance measures, such as destroying mine stockpiles and demining affected areas. Exactly 
half of the CLF was allocated for programs which would directly impact the lives of those affected 
by landmines: mine clearance, mine risk education and victim assistance (DFAIT 2002, 44-46). 
Also, Canada helped to conceptualize and provided financial and logistical support through the CLF 
for Landmine Monitor, an unofficial verification system coordinated by ICBL that was launched in 
1998 (DFAIT 2002, 16).  
 
Civilians and Children in Armed Conflicts 
Taking advantage of its rotational position at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Canada 
endorsed all its efforts into promoting its Human Security agenda. At a time where heavy images 
of war-affected civilians were being broadcasted by the media, there were ongoing debates within 
the international community and the United Nations itself by the voice of its secretary General Kofi 
Annan. This was perceived by Canada as an opportunity to focus on civilian protection and children 
during armed conflicts. A clear advocate of the freedom from fear agenda, promoting the security 
of civilians and children in conflict contexts was indeed a dominant priority in Canada’s Human 
Security efforts. Regarding this issue, through the Canadian view, UN responses continued 
inconsistent, the directives of state sovereignty inhibited protection efforts allied to the fact that 
Security Council rarely matched with an effective action (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
2001, 6).  
After pushing the debate forward in its first debates at the UNSC presidency, a report was issued 
by September 1999 creating awareness towards this issue. Within this context a resolution was 
released by the Security Council alarming the need for further conclusions and recommendations. 
As explicit by the 1265 UNSC resolution in 1999: 
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Noting that civilians account for the vast majority of casualties in armed conflicts and are 
increasingly targeted by combatants and armed elements, gravely concerned by the 
hardships borne by civilians during armed conflict, in particular as a result of acts of violence 
directed against them, especially women, children (…) Decides to establish immediately an 
appropriate mechanism to review further the recommendations contained in the report of the 
Secretary-General and to consider appropriate steps by April 2000 in accordance with its 
responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations (S/RES/1265 (1999a) 17 September 
1999) 
By April 2000, Canada’s presidency managed to conduct a new resolution which sought United 
Nations peacekeeping missions to enclose accurate arrangements regarding the protection of 
civilians but also provisions that were mentioned in the 1999 report by UNSG (UNSC resolution 
1296/200). 
Especially concerning children during armed conflicts, the main focus was centered on the 
eradication of child soldiers. In this area, Canadian diplomacy worked towards the disposal of 
recruitment and stationing of children under eighteen instead of the already established fifteen 
years old (Snyder 2001, 152). However, issues such as age of voluntary recruitment, age of 
participation in hostilities or if there should be an exception for military schools and applicability to 
nonstate actors (Snyder 2001, 157) were at a deadlock within the working group the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict, mainly known as the “Optional Protocol”. Once more, and in order to overcome the 
traditional controversies of traditional diplomacy, Axworthy mobilized coalitions within Canadian 
government and between different departments such as the Canadian Department of National 
Defense and the Minister of Defense26 (Snyder 2001, 157), also in the international context along 
other like-minded states and the NGO community but also Prime Minister Jean Chrétien pushed 
towards a compromise by the United Stated during the Canada - U.S. Summit in October 1999 
which was an essential backstage diplomacy without with this agreement could not be achieved 
(Snyder 2001, 157). After all the high-profile efforts by all Canadian diplomatic corps and 
government bodies, a compromise was achieved with the age of recruitment raised to sixteen and 
deployment at eighteen years old, Canada was the first state to sign and ratify the “Optional 
Protocol”. After most, this agenda continued to be followed, in particular with the Conference on 
 
 
26 The Minister of Defense, Art Eggleton, worked along Axworthy in order to achieve a consensual agreement that would both preserve the integrity 
of the Protocol and the recruitment customs of in the Canadian Armed Forces, a reciprocal action that proved to be very effective (Snyder 2001, 
157). 
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War-Affected Children which was a reflection of Canadian new diplomacy by bringing together 
NGO’s and other civil and youth organizations along with 135 states in September of 200027.  
Apace with creating a valid and forceful international legal norm system regarding particular risks 
such as the landmines and SALW, Canada’s agenda sought to play an active position on all flanks 
of the Human Security domain, which included extending the normative bound towards protecting 
civilians and children during armed conflict contexts as a way of filling gaps that were left by the 
Fourth Geneva Convention of 194928.  
 
Responsibility to Protect 
Given the challenges presented to the international community after the difficulties faced in Kosovo, 
allied to the financial breakdown in Albania, alarmed the United Nations Secretary General, Kofi 
Annan, who successively called for states consent regarding a new approach to non-consensual 
military intervention under humanitarian purposes. This context proved a chance for Canada to 
considerably advance the credibility of its concept of Human Security. 
In 1994 the world watched a bloodbath while the Hutu militia murdered more than 800,000 Tutsi 
and Hutu civilians but also Kosovo hardship later on (Collins 2010, 2979). These brought to light 
significant questions regarding the nature of humanitarian interventions and the essence of 
sovereignty. In this sense, it was argued by Axworthy that “in cases of extreme abuse, the concept 
of national sovereignty cannot be absolute” (Axworthy 2010, 204), challenging one of the most 
rigid concepts in the international system and predictably opposed by the powerful forces in the 
system, including the P-5 UNSC members. Once again, Canadian diplomacy took the opportunity 
and the advantage of having Kofi Annan as a strong ally, to put forward its security agenda of 
protecting people. From the DFAIT was born the idea of an international commission to undertake 
ongoing research on the intervention and sovereignty issues, which was officially launched in the 
2000 UN Millennium Assembly as the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty by PM Jean Chrétien with the aim of representing different perspectives through a 
global brainstorming (Axworthy 2010, 205). 
 
 
27 The Option Protocol was adopted by the UNGA under Resolution A/RES/54/263 during the 97th plenary meeting in 2000, assuming international 
law force on the 12th of February of 2002, counting so far with 168 ratifications (United Nations [2019]). 
28 Signed by the end of the II World War, this convention covers all individuals who do not belong to the armed forces, take no part in the hostilities 
and find themselves in the hands of the Enemy or an Occupying Power, establishes rules and guidelines for the protection of civilians during times 
of war and outlines a framework for the general protection of the population.  
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This commission focused its work on crafting a definition of sovereignty which predicted that “if a 
state legitimately protects its citizens, then it is in full right of its sovereign power. If it fails to do so 
or is the perpetrator of a massive attack on the rights of its citizens, then the international 
community must assume the function” (Axworthy 2010, 205). Summing it up in Axworthy words, 
“sovereignty is not a prerogative but a responsibility” (Axworthy 2010, 206). 
By December 17th of 2001, the “Responsibility to Protect” report was handled to the UNSG by the 
research committee, compromising three fundamental assets: prevention, reaction and rebuilding. 
In this sense, Prevention is categorized as being the first resource and preference; when this one 
fails the international community must advance towards a reaction that may include measures 
such as political, economic or military sanctions. Lastly, military intervention should be an option 
where mass loss of lives could be at scale (ICISS report, 2001)29. 
Facing the inherent difficulties of challenging one of the most rooted and ancient concepts of the 
international system, Canada was able to promote a new international norm that would secure and 
shelter people that are victims of atrociousness even though there still remains a long path to run 
in what an effective institutionalization by incorporating it into UN missions and operations, granting 
that what happened in Kosovo or Rwanda does not happen again.  
 
2.4.2. Building Institutional Capacity 
 
Carrying out an effective system against Human Security threats would necessary imply the 
capacity to achieve objectives and react to situations where the already mentioned norms may be 
at stake. Made clear in the DFAIT concept paper by 1999, “strengthening norms without building 
the capacity to protect them only invites disillusionment with the possibility of constraining power 
by the rule of law. Both are essential strategies” (Axworthy 1999). In this sense, it is essential to 
the Human Security agenda for societies to have the capacity of enforcing the exiting norms. 
 
 
29 The subsequent report was issued in 2004 by the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, named as “A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility” (A/59/565) and in 2005 the Secretary-General’s launched the report In Larger Freedom: towards 
development, security and human rights for all (A/59/2005) advocating the principle that State sovereignty should be carried along with the 
obligation of the State to protect its own people, meaning that in cases where State was unwilling or unable to do so, the responsibility should be 
transferred to the international community, thus taking diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect them. During the 2005 high-level UN 
World Summit Member States committed to the R2P Principle, thus being included in the final outcome document, “World Summit Outcome 
Document (A/RES/60/1), paragraphs 138-140 (United Nations, n.d). The Principle was officially adopted by the UNGA on the 14th of September of 
2009 during the105th plenary meeting under Resolution A/RES/63/308 (United Nations 2009). 
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The Capacity building concept30 was born in the 1990s by the Human Development Group as 
process of developing and strengthening the skills, instincts, abilities, processes and resources that 
organizations and communities need to survive, adapt, and thrive in a fast-changing world. The 
essence of the term resides in the fact of providing all types of assistance to a country as means 
of increasing its ability to take on specific tasks and achieve the established goals but it can also 
refer to the states capacity to put forward strategies to react and act in needed situations (Human 
Development Report 1993, 1-8). 
In this context, institutional capacity building would be a main asset if Canadian Human Security 
strategy was to become a successful reality both domestically and internationally. The below 
section aims to frame Canada’s initiatives regarding efforts of capacity building to react and 
constrain Human Security risks. 
 
International Criminal Court 
In the Light of the Ottawa’s Treaty success, Canada approached the negotiations of the Rome 
Treaty as an extension of its natural role of global player in what human rights promotion is 
concerned. The foundation of a “new international institution that would anchor the expanding 
sphere of a global rule of law through the use of a legal instrument as a civilizing tool” (Axworthy 
2010, 214) was strategically integrated into Canadian Foreign Policy by the same means used 
during the Landmines process. This court was aimed to be a permanent institution that would have 
the power to deem individuals accused of crimes against humanity (Behringer 2005, 322), more 
specifically as Prakash notes:  
The proposed ICC will be a permanent court that will investigate and bring to justice 
individuals, not countries, who commit the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community, such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, including 
widespread murder of civilians, torture and mass rape. The ICC will be a global judicial 
institution, an international jurisdiction complementing national legal systems. (Prakash 
2002, 4113) 
Canadian participation in the negotiations for the Rome Conference were clearly shaped by its 
partnership with other supportive states and the subsequent evolution towards the “Like-Minded 
Group” (LMG), strategically lead by Canada, assuming, once again, a visible role in the Human 
Security international agenda. Philippe Kirsch, a senior official of the DFAIT, assumed the role of 
 
 
30 According to the HDR, the Capacity Building refers to a new approach to social and individual change that intends to overcome restrictions to 
human development in order to achieve an effective and sustainable outcomes (UNDP 1993, 7-8) 
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Canada’s negotiator for this Convention and was able to put forward Canada’s soft power capacity 
by taking the country into a strategic position, “especially on the crucial issue of the court only 
taking jurisdiction if national systems were unwilling or unable to do so” (Axworthy 2010, 217). 
Simultaneously, Canada’s delegation work was complemented by Axworthy’s campaigning efforts 
through its own diplomatic net by mobilizing parliamentarians and other foreign affairs corps to 
lobby for international support, informal channels of diplomacy in order to grant a credible but 
most of all, forceful court (Axworthy 2010, 216). Canada’s commitment was notable during all the 
process, but mainly during times of dead lock where controversial issues were at stake such as 
funding or jurisdiction and its means. Despite these times of distress, Kirch and its Committee 
were able to overcome and put forward a package to overcome gaps and gather a broader support. 
Adopted by 120 states in July, 17th of 1998, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
“reflected options in the bureau's previous proposal. In a few areas, the bureau developed solutions 
of its own to bridge gaps and accommodate concerns in such a way as to broaden support for the 
court” (Kirch and Holmes 1999, 10). 
Once adopted, Canada and its diplomatic corps were quickly prompted to take all the needed 
procedures of compliance in order to pass all the domestic legislation conditions and fully pay its 
dues fees. By the time the Rome Statue came into force, by 2002, DFAIT continued its role by 
promoting the universal ratification of the document through encouragement and support but also 
funding of workshops and international campaigns. Additionally, particular effort was put in order 
to bring the United into this project but, just like the Ottawa process this was skewed by domestic 
opposition of both Congress and military (Axworthy 2010, 217).  
Canada’s daring and pledge of commitment was visible during all the negotiating process of the 
International Criminal Court, to a point that its engagement was an essential asset that allowed 
this international institution to effectively become a reality. 
 
The Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative  
Since the establishment of Human Security as a clear asset in Canadian policy agenda, building 
up domestic capacity to enhance it also turned up to be a priority if this was to succeed in a global 
perspective. In this context, one of such steps was the formation of the Canadian Peacebuilding 
Initiative in 1996, also known as CPI, a number of principles and actions intended to better 
coordinate Canadian peacebuilding activities, both government and NGO, and to strengthen 
Canada's contribution to international peacebuilding. 
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This new initiative counted with a close collaboration between two different government structures: 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and CIDA, creating a shred policy-making process as a result of the 
increasing international actions during this period which necessarily originated an overlap of 
domestic and international activities (Axworthy 2010, 74-76). Intended to outreach the involvement 
of civilians, the initiative would also bring together NGO’s and the academic community, bringing 
together the best Canadian experts for rapid deployment either on peacekeeping operations or 
assistant with specific human rights projects (Axworthy 1998, 186). The project was brought into 
action in the monitoring mission in Kosovo for purposes of election surveillance and monitoring but 
also in Guatemala in 1996 supporting the Commission on Historical Clarification’s objective inquiry 
on human rights violations during the thirty-six year civil conflict and, finally, funds were also 
disposed to assist the UN on the Great Lakes region in Africa on attaining a peace deal and Bosnia 
where the establishment of a public information campaign promoting the Hague Court required 
support (Axworthy 2010, 78).  
After supplying a wide range of projects throughout the world, the joint cooperation between the 
CPI and CIDA broke down resulting in a gradual degradation of such initiative (Axworthy 2010, 78).  
 
2.4.3. Support to International Crisis  
 
Being able to assume a proactive attitude through the promotion of measures that would enhance 
legal responsibility and effective accountability on Human Security threats was a significant step 
and well recognized effort to enhance such agenda. However, fairly important is also the ability of 
quick reaction to paramount and urgent risks on Human Security, the type of threats that demand 
an immediate action regarding the safety and well-being of civilians under life-threatening 
circumstances.  
The significant number of conflicts that emerged in the post-cold war era, gave Canada a powerful 
ground to further develop its Human Security agenda in the field of support to international crisis 
however, its enrollment in such scenarios assumed irregular responses. In some of the cases such 
as the Balkans, the answer was a structured one involving a wide range of resources, opposed to 
what happened in Haiti and East-Timor where the approach was limited to peace support through 
peacebuilding initiatives and other UN post conflict contributes.  
The below framework will analyze Canadian support to international crisis which outline its Human 
Security agenda as a plausible argument for enrolment or as mere vehicles for agenda promotion. 
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Even though not all cases will be approached, the selected ones make up a significant sample that 
frames the Canadian approach to Human Security in what international crisis are concerned. In all 
selected events Canada’s engagement underlined different reasons that did not always take 
Human Security as its main object but also implied other considerations such as national security, 
domestic interests and moral values, international coalitions or UN featured missions, among 
others. The below section will consider Haiti, Balkans and East Timor as three international crises 
that risked Human Security in the Canadian perspective. 
 
Haiti 
Haiti has always faced rooted instability, mainly caused by institutional weakness, ineffective 
economic system and political cleavages, among others. Categorized as fragile state, Haiti has 
maintained consistent diplomatic relations with Canada, mainly on the basis of development 
assistance, summing up over CAD $600 million which does not include costs related with military 
and police support (CIDA 2003, 6).  
According to the Canadian Development Agency, Canada’s engagement in Haiti is driven by a set 
causes but also advantages to both foreign and domestic affairs. Applied to this case study both 
domestic and international reasons for its commitment. At the domestic level, is worth noting the 
large Haitian diaspora in Canada, which forms a sense of moral obligation for support but also 
Canadian commitment towards La Francophonie intergovernmental organization of which Haiti is 
member, creating a sense of engagement towards French speaking countries that Quebec 
appreciates; for instance, in what international reasons are concerned, Canada’s non-colonial 
history and perceived neutrality in the Caribbean, increases the country’s middle power status and 
its position as a moderate voice in the international forums (CIDA 2003, 11). 
This was clearly perceived under Jean Chrétien’s government and easily integrated as part of the 
Human Security agenda conducted under its mandate. After a multinational force that put back 
the democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide under UN authorization in 1994, 
Canada came to play a significant role in the post intervention phase with the aim of promoting 
stability and rehabilitation.  
Even though Jean Chrétien refused to enroll Canada in the multinational force led by the United 
States that would restore democratic power in the country, Canadian government participated in 
all UN missions from 1995 until 2000, mainly by taking the needed steps of transition from 
peacekeeping towards peacebuilding, and the establishment of necessary conditions and accurate 
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environment for free elections. After a first stage of emergency assistance and reconstruction until 
1995, from 1996 to 2000, Canadian priority was the strengthening of public institutions through 
institution building, public order and other important public reforms in order to achieve secure and 
stable environment within the Haiti state. The total disbursement of this period was around CAD 
$184 million (CIDA, 2003, 8).  
Thus, significant intentions were achieved, the results were still disappointing mainly due to a 
disconnection between the program sequence phases and the political situation in the country 
under the leadership of René Préval which was facing a political deadlock. In this regard, most of 
Canadian support to Canadian institutions were reduced from the year of 2000 onwards.  
 
Balkans 
During most of the 20th century, the Balkans region was considered a single area known as 
Yugoslavia under communist influence. However, longstanding tensions remained within the 
country, namely religious, ethnic and political, creating a deep mistrust between the populations 
and an increased strain context. Once the authoritative order began to decay, the different factions 
within this society, broke into violence and by 1990 the various regions tried to establish their own 
country lines, to the point of persecuting minorities, entire villages and even attempts of ethnic 
cleansing.  
Canada has a long historic commitment to European security, and it was an extremely active player 
during the 1990s in Yugoslavia. Its involvement in this region began during the Bosnian War, 
making significant contributions towards UNPROFOR and the NATO-led Implementation Force 
(IFOR) until 1995 which ended up with the negotiations of the Dayton Accords. However, Canada’s 
enrolment was mostly visible in the post-conflict phase during the peacebuilding and reconstruction 
of Bosnia and Croatia regarding, elections arrangements, rule of law, human rights awareness and 
infrastructures rehabilitation. Comparing these two phases of participation, presence in 
UNPROFOR and IFOR casts a reaction in defense of Human Security principles. 
After the Balkans break, a new crisis arose, Kosovo, a Serbian province which privileged significant 
autonomy under Yugoslavian power but one that had now been abolished with the new Serbian 
leader after the breakup. In this context, following the Bosnian conflict, Kosovo population formed 
a resistance against Serbians and Yugoslav forces which returned with excessive force such as 
ethnic cleansing and other human rights atrocities. Canadian engagement in this case evidenced 
a slight overturn towards hard power in what the Canadian attitude is concerned. However, this 
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tough posture of Human Security was only taken after all the precaution measures were attempted 
such as formal diplomatic paths. For instance, in 1996 Axworthy engaged the Serbian leader 
Slobodan Milos ̌ević on issues related with human rights abuses against Kosovo’s resistance, but 
also G-8 pressure in 1998 pushing towards economic sanctions on Serbia. Additionally, especial 
effort was put into unblocking the UNSC impasse regarding the Kosovo issue even though the 
outcome resolution 1199 failed to put forward an appropriate response to the degrading 
humanitarian problem.  
In order to overcome the deadlock, Canada’s UNSC presidency of February 1999, used its strategic 
position to put the issue at the center of the international agenda with the goal of reaching an 
intervention authorization, however, since this also failed, a resolution entitled “United for Peace”31 
was under work jointly with the UNGA32. The diplomatic efforts were completely depleted after 
NATO’s failures of negotiation for a settlement agreement, the Rambouillet Accords 33 which were 
rejected by Milos ̌ević in 1999. 
With all soft power tools exhausted, military intervention was now justified under the Human 
Security reasoning, even if it meant overcoming the lack of UN approval. By March of 1999, 
Operation Allied started its three-phase air strike under NATO leadership, to which Canada granted 
18 CF-18 Homet fighter jets, airborne tankers, aircraft surveillance, ground crew and also RCAF 
troops. As response to the NATO intervention, the opposition forces began an anti-West campaign 
in order to damage its mission support but also increased its ethnic cleansing to which the west 
replied with and intensification of power through air strikes.  
At the same time, diplomatic paths were not forgotten, and alternative solutions were under 
investigation. During the G-8 summit on May of 1999, a set of general principles were thought in 
order to overcome the standoff with Russia that would conduct negotiation of a possible peace 
agreement which was reached in June of 1999 after the acceptance of Milos ̌ević. Canadian 
engagement was once more visible on its hard work towards the UNSC negotiation of a 
 
 
31 The “Uniting for Peace” resolution (UNGA Resolution 377) states that when the UNSC fails to exercise its primary responsibility for peace and 
security as a result of impasse, the UNGA may consider the matter and make recommendations for collective action to maintain or restore 
international peace and security (UNGA, 1950).  
32 The initiative, however, was aborted because the urgency of the humanitarian crisis made the price of protracted negotiations in the general 
assembly unacceptably high.  
33 Kosovo would gain significant autonomy, although Yugoslavia would retain sovereignty for three years, after which an international meeting would 
be convened for a final settlement; Yugoslav paramilitary and irregular forces in Kosovo would be withdrawn, although a police force could be 
retained.  
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peacekeeping process that would be acceptable for the Russians. Resolution 1244 was adopted 
on 10 of June of that same year, completing a historical mark for Canadian diplomacy.  
Once the big hostilities were diminished, peacebuilding intentions were put into practice, giving 
Canada an even more proactive role. In the context of post conflict reconstruction KFOR, a NATO 
led Kosovo Force, intervened within the country with the aim of creating a secure environment for 
humanitarian action while avoiding the resurgence of hostile acts, one to which Canada contributed 
with over fourteen hundred soldiers along with many other civilian experts working towards 
infrastructure rehabilitation, institution building and legal order establishment.  
Even though some risky steps were taken by Canada, namely, the lack of authorization from the 
UN regarding the intervention but also criticism given the infringement over the Serbian 
sovereignty, Canadian performance since the beginning provided a sample on how a Human 
Security issue should be approached at different stages. The Balkans crisis, especially Kosovo, was 
a crucial international stage where Canada was able to put forward its Human Security agenda at 
all levels of action, diplomatic, military and humanitarian as means of achieving a sustainable a 
solution, one that would provide a freedom from fear approach for Kosovo and Serbia.  
 
East Timor 
After several years of occupation by Indonesia, a UN promoted referendum gave opportunity to the 
people of East Timor to express their will for independence by 1999 however, this was followed by 
a dangerous climate of violence. Pro Indonesia militias installed complete chaos of violence and 
destruction, triggering a humanitarian crisis. 
Canadian approach to the eruption of serious violence in East Timor can be entitled as a cautious 
one. While a robust intervention force was on the top of the table as the most efficient alternative 
by the international community, Canada showed a hesitant attitude towards joining such coalition 
without a formal UN approval and its strategy remained at the diplomatic realm (Hataley and 
Nosssal, 2004, 11). Taking an opportunity during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
meeting, Axworthy tried to put forward Canadian style diplomacy with a meeting of foreign ministers 
from the Asia Pacific states, the USA, along Britain and the Australia, were pushing towards an 
international peacekeeping force by creating pressure on Indonesia government.  
With Indonesia’s commitment by September of 1999, resolution 1264 was passed in the UNSC, 
authorizing INTERFET, peace enforcement under chapter VII of the UN charter, providing the MNF 
with “all necessary measures” to restore security and support the United Nations Mission in East 
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Timor (UNAMET). At this stage, Chrétien announced the participation of 600 Canadian Forces (CF) 
what caused some tension with the Department of National Defense given the military meltdown 
by that time34 (Hataley and Nosssal, 2004, 12). It’s contribution to INTERFET, consisted, in fact, of 
600 personnel from the three different elements of the CF components: 2 CC-130 Hercules 
transports with 103 elements from the air component, 250 crew members from the supply ship 
HMCS Protecteur on the naval component, and finally a small land force of 175 elements from the 
Royal 22 Regiment, an infantry company (Hataley and Nosssal, 2004,13). By the 25th of October 
of 1999, Resolution 1272 under the UNSC settled UNTAET, the UN Transitional Administration for 
East Timor to which Canadian Forces contributed with a small staff deployment, civilian police 
officers and other experts on political and justice affairs.  
Given this brief summary and exposed numbers, Canadian Human Security approach in East Timor 
was a symbolic one. This may be majorly explained by a wide set of reasons. The first is related 
the fact that Canadian Forces were limited in a time where they had been actively enrolled in 
Balkans. Another major argument is a direct result of Canada’s economic ties with Indonesia which 
had been growing significantly over the 1990s, with a 6 billion Canadian investment that was at 
stake (Hataley and Nosssal, 2004, 15). As a result of these dynamics, there would not be broad 
sanctions imposed to Indonesia, participation in a multinational force for peacekeeping would only 
applied under Indonesian authorization and, at last, Canadian contribution would provide a 
symbolic contribution whatever force was conceived.  
 
2.4.4. International Advocacy 
 
Such a discussion could not be complete without a clear discussion on the promotion of the Human 
Security agenda throughout international official stages. Taking topics to a higher level of discussion 
is a skillful activity of modern statecraft which serves important purposes such as the opportunity 
to take effective leadership on a topic by arguments, discussing policy implication and, many times, 
work towards an agreement between opposed parts.  
Between 1996 and 2000 Canada used the highest level of diplomacy to advocate Human Security 
approach and particularly, the Canadian agenda regarding this topic, making itself a visible actor 
 
 
34 By referring to the deployment of 600 troops, Chrétien left the impression of devoting 600 infantry troops to the mission, boosting the country’s 
international image and giving expression to what the Canadian public wanted and NGO pressure.  
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and an international topic leader. Canadian strategy involved not only institutionalized agencies 
such as the United Nations but also ad hoc groups and summits. The following subtopics will focus 
on high level diplomacy as one essential target of the Canadian Human Security strategy, 
particularly the UNSC and G-7, G-8 from 1997 onwards35. 
 
UNSC Non-Permanent Seat 
So far, it has been demonstrated that the United Nations assumed a central role in Canada’s 
Foreign Policy throughout the analyzed term. Regarding the particular case of the Security Council, 
it confers significant influence and leverage to any member even if this e a non-permanent 
representation. As Axworthy noted in his personal writings, “We must also recognize that the UN 
is vital to Canada, affording us a place in which we can exercise influence, lessen or dependence 
on bilateral relations and help establish policies and practices consonant with our values and 
interests” (Axworthy 2010, 248). 
After an energetic and dynamic campaign based on network effectiveness, led by Axworthy and 
Robert Fowler, ambassador to the UN, the final election outcome was a remarkable one with 131 
received votes out of a possible 171 eligible on the first ballot (Riekhoff 2002, 77). A two-year 
period with a non-permanent seat at the world’s most influential stage would be an exclusive 
chance to push towards Canadian Foreign Policy ambitions, including of putting human security in 
the international agenda. However, this was done not only after the election but throughout the 
whole campaign where its strategy focused a specific election platform that headlined the renewal 
of the Council’s leadership and effectiveness on global security, promotion of a more democratic 
council through transparency, accountability and representativeness36, through the Human Security 
agenda, the third element (Reikhoff 2011, 76).  
Within the Security Council, the main supporters of the Canadian Human Security agenda were 
the Netherlands, United Kingdom37 , Bangladesh and Namibia with China and Russia at the 
opposite side as neglecting this program, mainly due to its domestic politics in Tibet and Chechnya. 
The United States were a particular case, where their support would depend on what issue was at 
 
 
35Worth noting that the G group was initially composed by seven members (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, United 
States), being known as the G-7. In 1998 the group became the G-8 group after the entrance of Russia who then was expelled in 2014 as a cause 
of its annexation of Crimea.  
36 This created a wide support from member states who regarded themselves as excluded from decisions and deliberations of the UNSC (Axworthy 
2010, 252).  
37 Canada and the UK had already worked together in the G-8 context regarding the initiative on children and armed conflict. This cooperation was 
extended to the Security Council concerning other Human Security matters (Riekhoff 2002, 91).  
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stake and their level of involvement. Nonetheless these skepticisms, many debates were organized 
around Human Security issues, especially in regard to the protections of civilians during armed 
conflict. It would be a crucial time and circumstances to be in such a position.  
In the pursue of its three-element platform initially established, the strategy was put forward in a 
synchronized approach. Focused in promoting the matter on the protection of civilians during 
armed conflicts in the context of Human Security, more transparent and accountable procedural 
practices were put into action, following the Canadian diplomacy way, such as the enrolment of 
non-member state, NGO’s, civil society organizations and other non-state actors. By opening this 
door to regular consultations, it would be difficult to exclude them in the future, due to the need of 
maintaining open channels of contact with such representatives. In regard to the Council’s 
credibility, especial attention was given to the effectiveness of the UN’s sanctions scheme. After 
the authorization from the UNSC, a commission of experts was set by Robert Fowler in order to 
oversee the pattern of violations to sanctions and respective causes. The outcome paper underlined 
some conclusions, measures and recommendations that were partially approved by the UNSC 
along with the Canadian suggestions of an instrument to control sanctions violators 38as Resolution 
1295 of April 2000 (Reikhoff 2011, 84-87). Also, worth to note was the fact that by the time 
Canada arrived at the UNSC the Kosovo humanitarian crisis was already at the top of the agenda, 
what Canada took as an opportunity to reassess the rhetoric due and expose the concept. At this 
stage DFAIT presented the concept Paper “Human Security: Safety for the People in a Changing 
World”, building a connection between Human Security and soft power in disregard of hard power 
politics but also between Human Security national security and human development (DFAIT 1999). 
It is common knowledge that as a non-permanent member the capacity to impact outcomes is 
always limited, majorly restricted to procedural influence rather that significant political subjects. 
Canadian strong term at the UNSC between 1999 and 2000 proved significant breakthrough 
particularly by highlighting Human Security matters, turning it into a common terminology within 
the UN sphere, mainly due to its well-sketched action program and concrete targets even if some 
were mainly trend lines with long term ambitions. However, a clear gap was visible in the lack of 
 
 
38 The absence of a clear monitoring ability in the UN Secretariat was noticed as one of the major vulnerabilities in the UN’s sanctions regime, 
which the Canadian proposal was meant to amend (Reikhoff 2011, 88).  
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capacity to actually implement the Human Security discourse rather than simply debate it and 
include it in the resolutions, a necessary condition but nor sufficient (Reikhoff 2011, 99-101).  
 
G-7 39Summitry 
Another crucial stage for Canada’s projection relates to its membership in the exclusive G-7 group, 
an outstanding space among the most influential powers in the world to advocate its Foreign Policy 
agenda. Given this group’s exclusiveness, small sized and relatively like-minded profile of 
members, it is an international source of efficacy essential for breakthroughs in regard to the 
world’s most pressing issues. In the official Foreign Policy statement of 1995, “Canada in the 
World”, Jean Chrétien’s government presented Canada’s position in the world, featuring that 
“Canada occupies a position of leadership among the open, advanced societies which are 
becoming increasingly influential as world power is dispersing (…) Canada can further its global 
interests better than any other country through its active membership in key international 
groupings” (Government of Canada 1995, i), advancing the G-7 group as one of the highest tables 
where the country aims to assert its interests therefore, an essential element for an active Foreign 
Policy approach which Canadians support; additionally the document highlights the upcoming G-7 
Summit in Halifax, as an opportunity for Canada to take leadership on the international agenda 
(Government of Canada 1995, 6- 7). 
Throughout its mandate Chrétien positioned Canada, not as a supporter of American initiatives or 
as a Franco-American mediator, but rather as an advocate of its national interests and its national 
values and principles, which were set as the third pillar of Canadian Foreign Policy (Government of 
Canada 1995, 10), by bringing together ad hoc coalitions of countries in accordance with the 
discussed matter and interests (Kirton 1995, 72). Such strategy conceived a new approach in 
Canadian diplomacy by leaving its historic partners namely the United Kingdom, the United States 
or France and choosing to align with other states notably rising powers or like-minded states like 
Japan or Germany, returning towards the North Atlantic Triangle powers primarily on trade and 
economic issues (Kirton 1995, 72). Through this new fluid coalition diplomacy Canada was able 
to build a global acceptance from all of its partners by consolidating its position within the group, 
thus enhancing the recognition and approval of its initiatives and proposals. 
 
 
39 Since most of analyzed action within the G-group occurred during the period when Russia was not a participant member, this section was labeled 
as G-7 and not G-8. 
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The G-7 annual Summit of 1995 hosted by Canada in Halifax, was focused on economic 
constraints, particularly regarding international institutions, therefore discussing issues such as 
growth and employment; Meeting the 21st century challenges by strengthening the global 
economy, the promotion of sustainable development through poverty reduction, environment 
safeguard, preventing and responding to crisis and the reinforcement on the coherence, 
effectiveness and efficiency of institutions; the need of opportunities through open markets; 
Economies in transition; and also Nuclear safety (University of Toronto 1995). Also, considerable 
attention was dedicated to former Yugoslavia, highlighting the need for a more coordinated 
international action plan (Wilson-Smith, 2014). Apart from discussing the increasing crisis in 
Sarajevo who counted with a final presence of Yeltsin, issues such as the deteriorating relation 
between Japan and the United states regarding trade disputes and France’s announcement that it 
would resume nuclear testing also came into the realm but all participants agreed not to consider 
those topics throughout the meeting (Wilson-Smith, 2014). 
The meeting endorsed the increased currency fluctuations within industrialized nations resulting in 
a common agreement to manage an early warning system in order to prevent an unforeseen 
financial crisis, highlighting the role of international institutions like the International Monetary Fund 
but also the World Bank and how these should improve the processes through which they respond 
to financial shocks in order to provide faster and more effective aid to the countries with most need 
(Wilson-Smith 2014). In this regard, a compromise to double the $80 billion special aid which was 
already operational was agreed upon, being managed by the IMF; additionally, given the increased 
economic importance and economic strength of Asian countries such as Taiwan, these were now 
foreseen to actively contribute to such fund (Wilson-Smith 2014). 
All in all, Canadians alleged and overall success on important issues such as reduction of 
international trade barriers which were perceived as one of Canadian priorities although the final 
meeting communication was rather vague and not as straightforward and effective as it was initially 
established to be. Satisfaction on the relation between Chrétien and Chirac (the French President 
at the time) was also felt by Canadian officials who had to balance France’s distress regarding the 
reopening of the nuclear tests in the eve of the referendum given his past expression to encourage 
Quebec’s independence. However, the French president left the topic for one polite question alone 
during a private bilateral meeting with Chrétien, with the French officials stating that Chirac would 
approach the Quebec sovereignty issue through an approach of “non-interference but non-
indifference” (Wilson-Smith 2014). 
 
 
 97 
2.5. Final Considerations 
 
Jean Chrétien’s government Foreign Policy was essentially shaped by trade and national unity 
(Government of Canada [2016a]). Found in a context of economic uncertainty and unity crisis 
within the federal system, Chrétien became considerably notable for its efforts on enhancing 
national unity through all fronts, including Foreign Policy as polls showed that national unity issues 
at the public level increased its importance from 0.6% in 1988 to 9.1% in 1997 (Butowsky 2011, 
477). In this regard, its government set out a wide set projects and policies intended to advertise 
a positive image of Canada as a reaction to the increasing challenges to internal unity as the means 
to secure national cohesion among Canadians (Ozguc 2011, 44). The humane centric approach 
to Foreign Policy as a natural reflection of Canadian identity, many times countered to break 
nationalist narratives by the Quebecois but also to enhance a moral notability when compared to 
the United States, the most powerful country in the world which geography defined as Canada’s 
unchangeable neighbor. In order to face the recent challenges, the central national unity strategy, 
also known as Plan A, became a central policy of both domestic and international agenda, aiming 
to underline and bolster the feeling of attachment to the idea of ‘Canadianness’ however, this would 
only be achievable through the reflection of Canadian values, serving the national interest. In fact, 
the Commission of Citizen’s Forum had asserted that Canadians were united by a shared belief 
and commitment towards, equality, diversity, tolerance and fairness, but also an international 
image of a country committed to peace and freedom (Government of Canada 1991), which 
Axworthy came to revitalize when adopting the Human Security agenda as part of the Canadian 
discourse on national unity. 
Taking opportunity of the ongoing international debate around the conceptual approach to security, 
Canada become a central player in the international context as a natural repercussion of its 
traditional role of peacekeeper, helpful fixer and good international citizens, Axworthy dedicated its 
term to the promotion of Human Security as a Canadian brand. The post-Cold War period revealed 
to be a particularly prosperous one that enabled the Canadian project to be put forward and to 
actually achieve a considerable degree of international visibility and even though the American 
administration showed some reluctance on many of the Canadian initiatives it did not pose 
significant hinders to the point of disabling Canadian action. Additionally there was a clear demand 
for new approaches, one that would bring answers to the new security challenges, may these be 
in terms of legal, institutional or support gaps, which the Canadian government committed to fulfill 
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through the Canadian model of governance based on talents of fair negotiation and good will to 
overcome differences.  
Besides clearly establishing its position and its objectives through a clear agenda-setting, in order 
to achieve its goals and an effective policy formulation space (instrumental intentions and high 
level of knowledge - table 2), substantial and procedural implementation tools of Information, 
Authority, Treasure and Organization (table 1) were also endorsed. Such tools can be further 
perceived as entrepreneurial and implementation leadership at the external environment in what 
the role performance is concerned. These were visible in the forming of like-minded coalitions, 
arranging agreements and facilitating negotiation processes to carry out solutions (entrepreneurial); 
but also by the ability of setting the example and encouraging others to follow; granting that internal 
legislation is in accordance with international commitments; allocate the needed resources to 
accomplish the former commitments; but also contribute with expertise and essential resources 
towards other states empowering them to achieve their responsibilities (implementation) (Riddell-
Dixon 2005, 1068), among other initiatives on public diplomacy, government oversight through 
commissions and agencies or even funding actions.  
 
Table 4. Chrétien's Substantive and Procedural Implementation Tools 
 
 
Purpose 
Governing Resources 
 Information Authority Treasure Organization 
Substantive 
of tool 
Quarterly FP 
magazine; website 
information, 
Ambassadors public 
communications 
DFAIT cooperation 
with CIDA and DND 
CLF Public activism – 
active public 
diplomacy 
Consultations and 
roundtable reports 
Procedural Like-Minded 
Group; ICBL 
CPI Considerable NGO 
funding 
DFAIT 
reorganization (flow 
of information) 
Commissions and 
oversight units 
Source: Adapted by the author from Howlett 2019, 150-236. 
National unity played a central role during Jean Chrétien’s government, an ultimate goal to be 
achieved through both domestic and external means. The promotion of a renewed international 
agenda based on Canadian values framed within the Human Security agenda assumed a 
considerable role among the overall efforts of the government to enhance national unity and 
weaken internal divisions, exporting ‘Canadianness’ as a universal model to be followed.  
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Figure 8. Chrétien's Government Human Security Agenda-Setting and Policy Implementation 
Source: Elaborated by the author.
1991 Report on the Citizen's Forum
1995 Candian Foreign Policy Review
"Canada in the World"
1999 Concept Paper 
•Agenda-setting
Close cooperation with the United Nations
Ah hoc and informal diplomacy
Like-minded states coalition
Active enrolement of Civil Society - Public diplomacy
Active parternship and funding of NGO's
Fast-track, majority-based decision-making
Implementation leadership and entrepreneurial
leadership
•Policy Implementation
Chapter 3. Justin Trudeau’s Government 
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Following the exposure of Jean Chrétien’s government, taking a framework period of four years, 
between 1996 and 2000, that will serve as the first comparative term, it will now take place the 
analysis on Justin Trudeau’s government, between 2015 and October 2019. The focus will be the 
role played by the department of foreign affair under the leadership of Stephen Dion first, followed 
by Chrystia Freeland.  
In first place, it will be done a brief contextualization on the international and domestic environment, 
essential determinants for government action through Foreign Policy initiatives, particularly 
regarding the liberal internationalism agenda. This will be followed by an analysis on discourse 
narratives at both national and international stages, performed at government level but also through 
the ministry of foreign affairs as an important soft power tool. Lastly, the government action plan 
will be exposed by considering a set of important initiatives. 
 
3.1. International Context  
 
During the 1990’s the world was experiencing a period of hope at a time where the individual was 
at the center of the security debate and the state’s international agendas, one which Canada took 
an active role. In fact, throughout the post-Cold War period as a whole Canada played visible role 
at the international stage as “a helpful fixer honest broker and pioneering peacekeeping (…) from 
the fashioning of post-war multilateral institutions to Suez, from North-South relations to the Earth 
Summit to the Human Security Agenda, Canadian diplomatic activism was palpable” (Copeland 
2018, 245).  
In 2015, however, the talk was at a whole different stage given the clear setback on Human Security 
and an uprising of national security discourses (McFarlane and Kong 2006, 254). This major shift 
was made clear in the eve the 9/11 events, unleashing a U.S. lead coalition to physically eliminate 
the terrorist threat in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also replacing regimes. Internally such dynamic 
was followed by an increasing surveillance to persecute suspects of terrorism, thus reflecting a 
return to traditional realist approaches to security by privileging the state as the essential player 
within the international system (Shanni 2007,1). Although the initial international order established 
by the allies after the second World War was able to guide the world into a new era, framing it upon 
political and economic liberal rules, based on a dense network of International Organizations and 
regulations, it is currently under increasingly pressures and serious challenges (Chatham House 
2015, 1). 
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When Trudeau stepped into office in 2015, the Liberal international order crisis was clearly evident: 
the resurgence of nationalist political movements, advocates of state centrism, fostering 
resentment feelings towards political elites, the rise of non-western states as significant 
international players along with the rise of non-state actors and evident skepticism felt by the 
electoral towards the traditional political options throughout the world, signaling the crisis of the 
current international order, led by the United States. In fact, in 2016 the world would face the UK’s 
decision to European Union project and, later, the election of Donald Trump (Dryhurst 2019, 1) 
with far reaching implications, especially when it concerns the most powerful actor at the global 
stage. In this context, the U.S lead economic and political governance order reached a deadlock 
where the economic trends and state system are slowly reversing the American supremacy 
resulting in new arrangements of multipolarity and geopolitical conflicts (Engler and Klassen 2017, 
59) resulting in a climate of international destabilization as a factor of uncertainty. Some dangers, 
however, were brought up from when questioning the American leadership, given that an open 
space is left for other states to pursue their approach as the correct one. In this regard, special 
consideration is given to the increasing role taken by Russia who annexed Crimea, violating the 
Budapest Memorandum and intervened directly in the Ukrainian conflict, but also to China whose 
international moves seek for global influence (Chatham House 2015, 1). 
In general, the new challenges seem to reflect a global disorder with very little coherence or 
coordination from the opposition, instead the dangers arise from its own weaknesses and 
widespread distaste from those which the system is intended to serve. Among the major flaws, 
legitimacy, equity and self-confidence take considerable outstanding, where the role played the U.S 
after 9/11 raised a long shadow over its legitimacy as the ruler of the current system; the inability 
of the system to advantage the majority, lacking fairness and effectiveness; and the longevity of 
the system that champs a western established order with no regard on how it may be perceived 
as an existential threat for many regimes throughout the world (Chatham House 2015, 1-3). Arising 
from such context, many are the outbreaks throughout the world revealing the urgency for an 
effective adjustment: Regional crisis spillover, migration crisis, geopolitical rising tensions; elections 
with global impact, climate change and nationalist movements. In sum, the current international 
order is based upon contradictions, volatility and an elusive consensus. 
Canadian Foreign Policy, on its end, traditionally supports Washington’s neoliberal strategy and the 
economic interests of Canadian capital however, despite the arise of an international turmoil and 
signs of global disorder the same rational of foreign approach was adopted essentially based on 
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Canadian internationalist of liberal values on openness and inclusion, as promised during the 
electoral campaign (Paris 2017, 17). In the post-Cold War period, Canada was able to navigate the 
new world challenges, finding room for diplomatic maneuver and occasionally lead international 
change however, in today’s controversial context, questions arise whether there is still room for 
Canada to take a proactive role and rise after a long period of restraint (Copeland 2018, 245).  
 
3.1.1. The Role Played by the United States 
 
The international order built by the United States upon the end of WWII essentially based on a 
commitment to multilateralism, human rights and rule of law was turned down by the time Donald 
Trump assumed office in 2016, marking a turnover point not only for the international system but 
to its closest neighbor, Canada. When Justin Trudeau took the Canadian office in 2015, however, 
the political scenario beyond its southern border assumed a completely different shape as 
President Barack Obama shared the same world view and international concerns, creating a stable 
context for Canada’s initial Foreign Policy promises. Caught off guard when Donald Trump was 
elected, Canadian government has devoted considerable efforts to manage the relationship with 
its southern neighbor, even more so when an erratic leader sits in Washington (Himmler and 
Lagassé 2017, 11).  
Clear warm feeling surrounded the relationship between Trudeau and Obama as Trudeau reminded 
the American president and his advisors of a younger Obama, therefore serving the Canadian goal 
on resetting diplomatic relations with the U.S through a joint liberal internationalist approach 
however, as Canada’s south neighbor was just a couple of months away from federal election, 
such commitment could expire soon (Paris 2017, 23). The unexpected election of Donald Trump 
in 2016 was, in fact, the first and major crisis to affect Trudeau’s Foreign Policy plan, so far, 
bringing the government to rethink the overall strategy in response to a a world that had suddenly 
become hostile. The new approach included a reorganization of the ministry of foreign affairs itself 
by removing Stephen Dion and naming Chrystia Freeland as the new minister given her strong ties 
and contacts in Washington (Norton 2019), but also François-Philippe Champagne as the new 
minister of International Trade, Freeland’s former chief of staff (Paris 2017. 25), not to mention 
the creation of a U-S Secretariat within the Prime Minister’s office (Paris 2019). Strong efforts were 
put forward in the immediate aftermath of the new election by taking the necessary measures to 
establish a considerable network of contacts within the White House as Trudeau’s staff members 
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promptly reached the new president’s proximate advisors such as Jared Kushner and Steven 
Bannon, allied to significant advice requested from Canadians with significant experience in the 
Canada-US bilateral, namely, the new minister of Foreign Affairs and the Canadian ambassador to 
the United States (Paris 2017, 25). As the new American President was about to affect every file 
in Canadian Foreign Policy, a clear shift was on course in order to take the United States as a top 
priority within the agenda (MacCharles 2017, 1), with Paris also noting that there was nothing 
more important than granting that the Canada-U.S relation was an effective one given the economic 
dependence on such partnership (Paris 2019). 
 
3.2. National Context 
 
By 2015 the issue of national unity was not a central concern for Canadian politicians (Paris 2019). 
In fact, the national context at the time was remarked by a relatively low nationalism in Quebec 
with very few support for separatism as there was no significant reasons for resentments or anger 
towards the English Canada; additionally, there were no benefits on endorsing such decision, 
particularly among young people (Paris 2019). On the other hand, in what economic numbers 
were concerned, the economy had been performing well even though a slower pace was evident 
during the 2008 recession. Yet, there was a sense insecurity among some branches of society that 
were not benefiting from such growth, particularly the middle class which had become considerably 
vulnerable (Paris 2019). In sum, the average context was calm with no significant challenges to 
manage, noting, however, that Canadians were somehow fatigue with Stephen Harper’s almost 
ten-year government (Paris 2019).  
From 2006 to 2015 Canada was governed by the Conservative Party, counting with a significant 
approval rate in the beginning but suffered a gradual decline during its final years, as Canadians 
started to disapprove its harsh approach to politics, particularly regarding its discourse on the 
dangerous posed by immigrant groups such as Muslims (Paris 2019). Additionally, during its 
governing years, Canada remained largely absent from the international realm. With the exception 
of its controversial foray into maternal, newborn and child health40 and participation in the 
 
 
40 The Maternal and Newborn Child Health initiative, also known as the Muskoka Initiative, was a funding action plan announced during the 36th 
G-8 summit engaging member states to monetarily contribute towards the commitments on the Millennium Development Goals 4 and 5 
concerning the reduction of maternal, infant and child mortality in developing countries. Although Canadians were committed to this cause, they 
"were slow to offer three cheers as the idea was to unHarpish” (Capland 2014). 
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questionable military interventions in Afghanistan and Libya, Canada’s once-pervasive international 
presence became illusory and corroded (Copeland 2018, 247-248), while Canadians considered 
that Canada had lost its way and much of its positive force in the world (Paris 2019).  
Justin Trudeau stepped into the election arena with a completely fresh and promising discourse, 
making passionate statements on the importance of pluralism and diversity but also speaking 
directly to the economic concerns of many Canadians who felt they had been left out of the system 
(Paris 2019). In this last regard, Trudeau announced a raise of taxes on the higher branches of 
society with considerable economic gains while guaranteeing its decrease for lower income families 
through a tax reform allied to other social advantages such as child benefits. However, Paris 
considers that the decisive asset for his victory relies on its sense of renewal with a more open and 
positive approach to politics which inspired many Canadians to vote in higher percentage, 
especially younger generations (Paris 2019).  
The 42nd election results (see Figure 8) gave a significant victory to the Liberal Party, actually 
achieving a majority government, rebounded from third place in the House of Commons with 36 
seats to a government with 184 of the 338 total seats (Elections Canada 2015). Harper’s 
conservatives, on the other hand, were reduced to 99 seats, representing the major opposition 
party, with the New Democratic Party also suffering a major decrease 59 seats, Bloc Québecois 
regaining some votes they had lost in the previous election, increasing 6 more seats and summing 
a total of 10; and the Green Party maintaining its 1 position (CBC 2015).  
As Paris highlights, Trudeau embodied the notion of a values of a fair, inclusive, and democratic 
society that Canadians identified with (Paris 2019), promising a positive future internally but also 
expressing such vision at the international stage. 
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Figure 9. Result of the 42nd Federal Election in October 15th of 2015 
 
Source: Elections Canada 2015. 
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3.3. Building a Discourse 
 
Trudeau’s government was one essentially based on a powerful use of discourses a the means to 
transmit its positivism and idealist messages in a context dominated by Trump’s contentious 
rethoric or the UK’s decision to leave the European block A clear difference in rethoric seemed to 
be under progress with the new liberal government when compared to Harper’s conservative 
approach, one including major shifts in human rights, gender equality, climate change and the 
promise to endorse a feminist foreign policy. Essentially, Trudeaus’s tone and style on its narrative 
discourse to the Canadian public turned to be particularly appelative to voters (Lane 2017, 268).  
Starting in its 2015 election platform, “Real Change: A new Plan for a Strong Middle Class”, the 
not yet elected government listed its policy plans and priorities if the liberals were to arrive in 
Ottawa’s office. Among these are: (1) Growth for the Middle Class ; (2) Fair and Open Government; 
(3) a Clean Environment and a Strong Economy; (4) a Strong Canada; (5) Security and Opportunity; 
(6) Fiscal Plan and Costing (Liberal 2015). Such ranking denoted a clear focus on Canadian 
economy and its respective growth, leaving Foreign policy remarks in fifth place under the security 
label, englobing (a) “Opening the door to prosperity” dedicated to immigration; (b) “A more 
Compassionate Canada” in regard to welcoming refuge seekers from conflict and war contexts ; 
(c) “Expanding Exports and Opportunities for Canadians” highlighting the importance of economic 
success and the need to reinforce trade relations with both the U.S and Mexico; (d) “Renewing 
Canada’s Place in the World and Strengthening our Security”, denoting the need to protect 
domestic sovereignty and support peace operations” (Liberal 2015).  
Promising to renew Canada’s place in the World, Justin Trudeau outlined two worth noting 
intentions in order to achieve such goal: (1) “Restore Canada’s place in the World” by returning to 
its tradition of international leadership through the UN and other multilateral institutions, also 
highlighting the world’s urgency in counting with Canada’s effective diplomacy; (2) “Renew 
Canada’s Commitment to Peacekeeping Operations” by working closely with the UN in violent 
conflicts around the world; complemented by other points on military investment, redefining 
strategic priorities on defence capabilities, end the combat missing in Iraq but also mantain military 
commitment towards central and Eastern Europe (Liberal 2015). In regards to Foreign Policy only 
a general promise was made ““Restore Canada’s place in the World”, linked to other promises on 
peace, security and defence where the government was more specific in its intentions: ending the 
combat mission in Iraq and Syria agains ISIL; raplacing the CF-18 fleet with a new one instead of 
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buying a F-35 stealth fighter-bomber; and remaining commited to the existing military contributions 
to NATO assurance measures in Central and Eastern Europe (Nossal 2017, 35). In sum, although 
the commitment to return Canada to its traditional past, particularly in relation to the United 
Nations, is briefly expressed, it is very softly noted as a mere subtopic among other targets such 
as military capacity and not sufficiently featured to be regarded as an agenda focus, not to mention 
the absence of the traditional appeal to Canadian values. As Nossal notes, although there were 
some general points on “immigration, development assistance, trade promotion, and national 
defence, there was no foreign policy section per se” (Nossal 2017, 34).  
Once in power, Trudeau announced “sunny ways”41 during its victory speech expressing that 
politics can be a positive and powerful force for change and the new goverment, with its optimistic 
and hoperful vision were to bring such change (Macleans 2015). Remarking this same 
change,Trudeau addressed Canada’s international partners by stating a clear message: 
Many of you have worried that Canada has lost its compassionate and constructive voice in 
the world over the past 10 years. Well, I have a simple message for you: on behalf of 35 
million Canadians, we’re back. (Justin Trudeau Prime Minister of Canada 2016b). 
The “Canada is back” frase quickly became the hallmark of the new government’s approach to 
global politics, denoting that the Trudeau government was promising to change course in a number 
of key foreign policy areas: the “end to Canada’s antipathy towards the UN (…) no longer would 
the government in Ottawa conduct foreign policy by insult (…) end to the relentless cynicism in 
foreign policy that was so much a mark of the Harper Conservatives, reflected in the efforts to 
politicize almost every foreign policy issue in an undisguised and unapologetic attempt to maximize 
their electoral support” (Nossal 2017, 35-36). 
Similarly, after ten months in office, during the 71st Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly, Trudeau recognized the world’s challenges, and Canada’s renewed commitment to 
multilaterism, finally asserting that “we’re Canadian. And we’re here to help” (Justin Trudeau Prime 
Minister of Canada 2016b). Additionally, the Prime Minister also remarked Canada’s traditional 
slogan by affirming that “In Canada, we see diversity as a source of strength, not weakness. Our 
country is strong not in spite of our differences, but because of them” (Justin Trudeau Prime 
Minister of Canada 2016b).  
 
 
41 The “Sunny Way” quote remotes to a speech of the former Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier in 1895 delivered in Morrisburg, Ontario, referring to a 
guiding philosophy. This approach uses and illustration from the Aesop’s fable in which the sun and the wind hold a contest to see who can remove 
a traveler’s coat. In the end, the sun’s warm rays prove more effective than the wind’s bluster (Liberal 2016). This metaphore clearly relaed with 
the idea of Soft Power.is  
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In what effective agenda setting is concerned, the government was more ponderous in actually 
demonstrating its plans, particularly in what Foreign Policy is concerned (Paris 2016, 24). Although 
it seems to be inconsistent and “awkward” in Paris’ (2019) words, to emidiately one year after its 
election, the government launched the International Assitance Review (IAR) and a Defence Review 
(DR) without considering a Foreign Policy Review (Paris 2017, 24), Paris (2019) considers two 
reasons for such decision: (1) there was no FP review because there was an expectation that the 
government would come in knowing what it wanted to do in FP and therefore, there was no need 
for a complete review in order to express its plan; (2) the last FP review, concluded in 2005, was 
extremely time consuming, occupying considerable attention and resources from the foreign 
ministry, a too chaotic and costly process when considering the value of the final outcome to justify 
all the attention that had to be turned away from actually “doing FP” to conducting the review 
(Paris 2019). However, Paris considers that Chrystia’s Freeland speech in parliament in 2017 
before the launch of IAR and DR should be regarded as the government’s essential FP lines, the 
major framework within which the IAR and DR were released.  
Chrystia’s Freeland discourse in June 6, 2017 starts by recognizing that “International 
relationships that had seemed immutable for 70 years are being called into question” with “long-
standing pacts that have formed the bedrock of our security and prosperity for generations are 
being tested”, describing the role of Canada would pursue in such context:  
The path we choose must be one that serves the interests of all Canadians and upholds our 
broadly held national values; that preserves and nurtures Canadian prosperity and security; 
and that contributes to our collective goal of a better, safer, more just, more prosperous, and 
sustainable world. (Government of Canada 2017c). 
Additionally, the Minister clearly defines the challenges faced by Canada in such world trubulence: 
Climate change is by definition a shared menace, affecting every single person on this planet. 
Civil war, poverty, drought and natural disasters anywhere in the world threaten us  
as well—not least because these catastrophes spawn globally destabilizing mass migrations. 
The dictatorship in North Korea, crimes against humanity in Syria, the monstrous extremists 
of Daesh, and Russian military adventurism and expansionism also all pose clear strategic 
threats to the liberal democratic world, including Canada. (Government of Canada 2017c). 
Many times making reference to Canada’s past through a nostalgic vision of pride and how its 
active role is still needed to build a more prosperous and peacefull world, Freeland states that 
Canada “must play an active role in the preservation and strengthening of the global order from 
which we have benefited” (Government of Canada [2017c]). A role which “ Canadians can rightly 
be proud of the role we played in building the postwar order, and the unprecedented peace and 
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prosperity that followed”, with a new FP policy approach based on the values of “feminism, and 
the promotion of the rights of women and girls” (Government of Canada 2017c).  
Summarizing Canada’s place in the world Chrystia Freeland stated that 
Canada’s values are informed by our historical duality of French and English; by our 
cooperative brand of federalism; by our multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic 
citizenry; and by our geography—bridging Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic. Our values are informed 
by the traditions and aspirations of the Indigenous people in Canada. And our values include 
an unshakeable commitment to pluralism, human rights and the rule of law. (Government of 
Canada 2017c) 
Also highlighting its three major cornerstones grounder on (1) multilateral forums such as G7, the 
G20, the OAS, APEC, the WTO, the Commonwealth and La Francophonie, the Arctic Council, NATO, 
the UN, CETA and the EU; (2) the Military and the Canadian Armed Forces; (3) Trade (Government 
of Canada 2017c). 
Finally, and remarkebly important, the Minister of Foreign affairs addressed its closest neighbor, 
noting that the “United States has truly been the indispensable nation” and “we will continue to 
seek opportunities for constructive progress” (Government 2017c). The role of the United States 
must assume particular analysis as Paris noted that managing Trump became a top priority in 
Canadian Foreign Policy since its election in 2016.  
In June of 2017 the government launched one of its FP brand, labeling it as Feminist International 
Assistance Policy, one that Chrystia Freeland considered to be framed within Canada’s values: 
“Canadians are safer and more prosperous when more of the world shares our values. Those 
values include feminism and the promotion of the rights of women and girls.”(Government of 
Canada [2017a]). Such approach comprised an engagement with SDG 1, Erradication of Poverty, 
by addressing SDG 5, Gender Equality, with the overall goal of making “sure that women and girls 
are empowered to reach their full potential so they can earn their own livelihoods, which will benefit 
families as well as the economic growth of their communities and countries.” (Government of 
Canada [2017a]). In this respect, policy initiative would essentially fall upon “gender equality and 
the empowerment of women and girls” also considering other integrated areas such as (a) human 
dignity; (b) growth that works for everyone; (c) environment and climate action; (d) inclusive 
governance; (e) peace and security (Government of Canada [2017a]). As seen in other initiatives, 
this commitment counted with a global engagement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the 
Ministry of International Development and La Francophonie (Government of Canada [2017a]).  
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Regarding the Canada-US relation, Stephane Dion was removed from the now Global Affairs42 
Ministry as U.S. President Donald Trump was taking power with an avowedly protectionist trade 
agenda. A clear shift is visible from Dion’s mandate letter in 2015 to Freeland’s in 2017 who 
replaced the former and who set “America first”. If the top priorities in the 2015 mandate letter 
established to “Improve relations with the United States”(Justin Trudeau Prime Minister of Canada 
2015), a shift of narrative was visible in Freeland’s letter that states “maintain constructive relations 
with the United States” (Justin Trudeau Prime Minister of Canada [2017a]). In second place, 
special emphasis was devoted to trade as Trudeau instructs Freeland to 
Strengthen trilateral North American cooperation with the United States and Mexico. This will 
involve working with the relevant Ministers to enhance North America’s global 
competitiveness and facilitate trade and commerce within the continent, including with 
respect to the North American Free Trade Agreement. (Justin Trudeau Prime Minister of 
Canada [2017a]) 
Only after settling the maintenance of Canada-U.S relations and the reinforcement of trade 
agreements such as NAFTA, does Trudeau instruct Freeland to “Expand Canadian diplomacy and 
leadership on global issues and in international institutions” (Justin Trudeau Prime Minister of 
Canada [2017a]). As Paris remarks, Chrystia Freeland became the official Minister for Canada-U.S 
relations (Paris 2019).  
Although considerable diplomatic efforts and resources of Canada’s FP have been spent in 
Washington, Paris notes that if Canada wants to conquer a non-permanent seat at the UNSC, real 
efforts should be endorsed: an actual Foreign Policy Review should be pursued, and an exclusive 
focus on the U.S should be left, with FP strategy being taken in more broad terms given the need 
to look towards, China, Europe or the rise of authoritarianism without disregarding the United States 
(Paris 2019).  
 
3.4. Action Plan 
 
In a context of uncertainty and skepticism, Trudeau promised outstanding and encouraging Foreign 
Policy goals. The Prime Minister highlighted Canada’s energetic and constructive historical role in 
 
 
42 Only one month after being elected, Trudeau accomplished one of its electoral promises to establish Global Affairs Canada as the public designation 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, remarking a new conceptualization of Canada’s linkages to the world as something 
more meaningful but also transformational, than the official department title suggests (Klassen and Engler 2017, 56). 
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international affairs, speaking many times of global action on a range of issues such as climate 
change, gender equality, inclusion and diversity, refugees, human rights, and a rules-based 
international order, thus expressing its will on leading international campaigns to tackle such 
issues. 
Traditionally, Canadian internationalism has sought to take such type of leadership at the 
international realm: St Laurent had a notable role NATO’s foundation; Lester Pearson was essential 
in the development of peacekeeping institutions; Jean Chrétien along with its foreign minister Lloyd 
Axworthy achieved an international treaty to ban anti-personal land mines and took a proactive goal 
in the foundation of the International Criminal Court, all leaving a significant remark on Canadian 
Foreign Policy43. Justin Trudeau was in a confident position to achieve similar results taking 
advantage of its positive international profile and global reputation (Paris 2017, 27). In fact, 
Trudeau’s liberal brand of internationalism and idealism is nothing more than a call to the 
traditional role44 that has worked in the past thus standing to do so in the future given that the 
Canadian public continues to support such Foreign Policy approach. 
 
3.4.1. Building Effective Legal Norms 
 
Since the last noticeable activism between 1996 and 2000, Canada has been significantly absent 
from the global stage mainly due to the controversial approach chosen by the Harper government 
(Copeland 2018, 247-248). In this regard, Trudeau chose to adopt the slogan “Canada is back” 
(Nimijean 2018, 128) on behalf of the Canadian brand he intended to revive which necessarily 
implied pioneering creative policy ideas through international engagement. 
In this regard, the below section will analyze Trudeau’s efforts to reconnect Canada with its 
internationalist past in what international legal norms, particularly within the UN’s sphere therefore 
enhancing its commitment to multilateral institutions but also towards a more peaceful and 
prosperous world (Liberal 2015, 68). In order to put forward his plan, Trudeau’s agenda on legal 
 
 
43 Although they might not assume the same level of visibility, some of the described initiatives may be perceived as a continuation or reinforcement 
of what was already launched and endorsed by the liberal Government of Jean Chrétien from 1995 onwards. Among these are the Vancouver 
Principles and the welcoming of Syrian refugees.  
44 Canada’s traditional Foreign Policy role, mainly related with Canadian state brand remotes to the idea of working along with international 
institutions, serving Canadian interests and values, through an active multilateral diplomacy thus, providing Canada the opportunity for international 
influence. This role is remarked by efforts to strength rules and norms in all areas of international affairs but also promoting reconciliation and 
peaceful settlement of conflicts used which is used as a reflection of Canada’s success as a multicultural society therefor contributing to international 
security. (Paris 2014). 
 
 
 114 
norms consisted on strengthening the standards of shared morality on the use of child soldier, a 
traditional topic in Canadian internationalism but also introduced some topics concerning gender 
equality as part of his feminist Foreign Policy approach aimed to increase the participation of 
women in Peace operations. 
 
The Vancouver Principles 
Promoting the rights of Children in Armed Conflict has always been present in the Canadian 
internationalist approach to Foreign Policy, particularly throughout liberal governments. Justin 
Trudeau’s government was not an exception, launching the Vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping 
and Prevention of the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers45 in partnership with Roméo Dallaire 
Child Soldiers Initiative and the United Nations (Government of Canada [2017b]). 
On the margins of the 2017 United Nations Peacekeeping Defense Ministerial Conference, taking 
place in Vancouver, British Columbia, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland along with 
the Minister of National Defense, the Minister of International Development and La Francophonie 
but also Lieutenant-General (retired) Roméo Dallaire announced the Vancouver Principles (see 
attachment table 1). These principles concern a set of political commitments that underscore the 
capacity of UN peacekeeping operational personnel to “take a more assertive approach to 
preventing child recruitment; Strength the identification of early warning signs; Establish reporting 
on abused and grave violations against children in armed conflict; encourage the inclusion of child 
protection mandates in peacekeeping operations; and provide psychological support for 
peacekeepers who face child soldiers” (Government of Canada [2017b]). 
The Vancouver Principles are a considerable remark of Trudeau’s internationalist agenda as it 
perfectly delivers its traditional message: a honest broker focused on multilateralism as the means 
to achieve a sustainable and longstanding peace based on human rights protection and, most of 
all, fits the slogan “Canada is Back”. Such intent is evident in Trudeau’s official statement on the 
new principles: 
Canada will continue to lead the fight against the recruitment and use of child soldiers. By 
bringing countries together, and putting the Vancouver Principles into action, we can make 
 
 
45 The Vancouver Principles were launched on the 10th anniversary of the Paris Principles and build upon these in order to further articulate guidance 
on peacekeeping contexts, particularly the need to prioritize the prevention on the recruitment and use of child soldiers in areas of peacekeeping 
operations (The Vancouver Principles n.d.).  
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sure children remain children, and build a safer, more just future for all.” (Justin Trudeau, 
Prime Minister of Canada [2019]). 
In support of the Vancouver Principles, the Minister of National Defense, Harjit Sajjan stated in 
June of 2019 that Canadian Armed Forces along with the Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative 
would be founding the Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security, as part of the Canadian 
Defense Academy, counting with an investment of $1.175 million through a five year period 
(Government of Canada 2019j). This initiative was intended to support an effective fulfillment on 
the new principles regarding the prevention of the recruitment and use of child soldiers through 
the conduct of research on the best practices to be applied and lessons learned (Government of 
Canada 2019j); additionally, the minister also took the opportunity to reveal the publication of the 
“Implementation Guidance for the Vancouver Principles”, a practical procedure on how member 
states may advance their own policies on how to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers 
(Government of Canada 2019j).  
The overall project on the Vancouver Principles counted with a joint collaboration of ministries, 
endorsing the prime minister itself but highlighting the role of both the Ministry of National Defense 
and Ministry of Foreign Affairs as two essential channels serving the purpose of Canada’s 
internationalist agenda. All in all, both have featured Canada’s leadership on such international 
concern, particularly in the “Implementation Guidance” launch, asserting its “contribute to 
collective peace and security by serving as a road map for countries” (Government of Canada 
[2019e]), thus serving as a “valuable resource for those who work to protect children from armed 
conflict around the world” (Government of Canada [2019e]). 
Taking a natural place within Canada’s liberal Foreign Policy approach, the overall role of the 
Vancouver Principles is planned to improve the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions in what 
peace and stability is concerned by improving the condition of children in armed contexts, thus 
taking its protection as a central goal within peace operations. 
 
Elsie Initiative on Women in Peace Operations 
Calls for a feminist approach to Foreign Policy in Canada is not new given the long historical of 
women’s rights movements promoting governmental policies, particularly regarding issues of 
peace and security, however, it was not until Justin Trudeau took office that the idea of a feminist 
Foreign Policy assumed highlight thus renewing the context for an effective debate (Tiessen and 
Swan 2017, 187). 
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In the context of the UNSC resolution 224246, the Elsie Initiative on women in Peace Operations 
was launched by Canada during the UN Peacekeeping Defense Ministerial in Vancouver in 2017, 
a multilateral project aimed to test a set of approaches to overcome the barriers of an increasing 
participation of women in Peace operations (Government of Canada 2019a) as the effectiveness 
of peacekeeping is directly related with a greater participation of female uniformed personnel by 
building stronger ties with local communities, ensuring distinct sources of information and increase 
the credibility of UN peacekeeping missions (United Nations 2018). Apart from the initiative, a year 
later the UN and Canada, along with other UN organizations and civil society, established the Elsie 
Initiative Fund intended to provide financial assistance and incentives, to which Canada provided 
a first contribution of $15 million followed by the Netherlands, United Kingdom and Finland who 
announced additional contributions (Government of Canada [2019d]). 
Within the Elsie initiative Canada compromised to develop and test a barrier assessment 
methodology in order to identify both universal and context-specific barriers to women’s 
participation in UN peace operations; provide technical assistance to partner countries’ troops and 
police in order to address barriers; launch a global fund to support the increased deployment of 
women; assistance in the selection of UN mission to improve their support capacity and effective 
benefit from an increase of women participation; research, monitor and evaluate the new 
frameworks to gather evidence on effective approached to increasing women’s participation in 
peace operations; and build a political momentum through a Contact Group of like-minded 
countries by taking advantage of collective expertise and influence (Government of Canada 
[2019d]). Such initiative was included in the broader “Canada’s National Action Plan on Women 
Peace and Security”47 (Justin Trudeau Prime Minister of Canada 2017b) recognizing that achieving 
sustainable peace requires the full involvement of women and girls in the prevention and resolution 
of conflict, which is regarded to be a key component of Canada’s feminist Foreign Policy approach.  
 
 
46 The UNSC resolution 224233 (2015) is the eighth resolution on women, peace and security aiming to increase efforts to address global 
challenges given the link between women’s participation and sustainable peace and security, thus placing such agenda as a priority within the 
UNSC but also a tool for states to further implement such agenda (United Nations 2015). A men represent around 95 of personnel in 
peacekeeping, the new resolution calls for an increase of 4.2% to 8.4%of women in military and peacekeeping roles by 2020 however, since 
2015, the overall rate has only increased from 4.2% to 5.4%, meaning that achieve the established target would take several decades at the 
current pace (Government of Canada [2019d]). In this regard, the Elsie Initiative was intended to accelerate the process and promote the initial 
target.  
47 The second National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security for the time period of 2017-2022, had the overall goal of focusing on gender 
equality, government partnership, and strength cooperation with civil society. Key components of this action plan include the Feminist 
International Assistance Policy and Canada’s Defense Policy: Strong, Secure, Engaged (Justin Trudeau Prime minister of Canada 2017b).  
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Ongoing efforts include the Canadian support to Senegal Armed Forces throughout the 
implementation of its Gender Integration Strategy given its plan to increase the number of women 
in its military and gendarmerie but also peacekeeping missions; a $4.5 million assistance to the 
Department of Peace Operations thus improving its capacity to support and benefit from women’s 
participation in peace operations which is being allocated by the UN to women specialized training, 
increased capacities of gender advisors in peacekeeping but also towards a more welcoming 
environment for women in such contexts; additionally, the Canadian Armed Forces will undergo all 
the barrier assessment with the aim of identifying improvement areas (Government of Canada 
[2019d]). 
As the UNSC resolution 2242 set ambitious goals regarding the participation of women in the UN 
peace operations, Canada took the opportunity to take international leadership and endorse such 
ambition as part of its feminist Foreign Policy agenda by setting a project intended to reinforce not 
only its commitment but the international community as a whole. Worth noting, however, that so 
far, the initiative counts with only 11 countries, among them Argentina, Canada, France, Ghana, 
The Netherlands, Norway, Senegal, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, United Kingdom and 
Uruguay (Government of Canada [2019d]).  
 
3.4.2. Support to International Crisis 
 
By making his symbolic statement at the 71st Session at the UN’s General Assembly “We’re 
Canadian. And we’re here to help”, Justin Trudeau made clear the compromise of his recently 
elected government to take a visible and proactive role in what international support to crisis 
management is concerned (Justin Trudeau [2016b]). In fact, such promise was advocated during 
the election campaign as one of the central themes in the agenda where Trudeau stated that 
Canada would highly commit itself to promptly support peace operations within the UN, lead 
international efforts to improve peace operations, deploy well-trained staff and take an active role 
mediation, conflict prevention and post-conflict efforts (Liberal 2015). 
When Trudeau stepped into office a considerable number of conflicts throughout the world were 
escalating demanding effective international peace operations, namely Syria, Iraq, Mali, Ukraine or 
Sudan, opening a convenient context for Canada to enhance its leadership however, Canadian 
posture was somehow inconsistent with its discourse. The below analysis will evidence that the 
Canadian answer was not always consistent with the narrative that had been put forward 
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throughout the electoral discourse given that in any of the below cases has Canada provided a 
structured answer to international crisis nor did it provide considerable resources to peacekeeping 
initiatives neither within NATO or the UN losing the opportunity to take an active role within the 
later, in fact the general public opinion was disregarded in the case of Syria and Iraq. 
The below section will consider Mali, Eastern Europe and Syria/ Iraq as three international crises 
that risked Human Security, an opportunity to recommit Canadian support to peace operations, 
particularly in the United Nations sphere.  
 
Mali 
In the mid of 2012 an armed conflict between the northern and southern region of Mali arose in 
Africa where a number of insurgence groups contested the Malian government given its quest for 
independence of the northern part of the country called Azawad under the rule of the Tuareg people 
Such a context stemmed from long-standing structural conditions of fragile institutions, ineffective 
governance, lack of social cohesion but also unfair treatment and neglect towards northern 
communities whose resentment feeling were exacerbated by degrading conditions of economic 
shocks, instability, and corruption (UN [2019]). 
Counting with well-equipped combatants from Islamic armed groups, the rebellion took power 
through a military coup, suspending the constitution and dissolving government institutions thus 
accelerating the state collapse (Government of Canada [2014]), which was severely condemned 
by the international community in general. After French and African military operations in the field 
in order to restore Mali’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, security conditions improved 
significantly in the country, include the state control over the majority of the territory however, 
serious challenges remained such as terrorist activities, a few military operations, criminal activities 
and weapons proliferation thus threatening the security of several communities in the North (UN 
[2019]). In this regard, the establishment of a peacekeeping mission in Mali was presented by the 
UN’s Secretary General and later formalized by the UNSC Resolution 2100 on April 2013. 
Once Justin Trudeau had taken power in 2017, it was his aim to put forward one of its major 
promises: Restore Canada’s role in the world as a peacekeeping nation. In fact, his minister of 
national defense, Harjit Sajjan, had travelled to African countries in the previous year in order to 
consider a UN peacekeeping mission that Canada would join (Nossal 2017, 37). Seeking a new 
commanding officer for the MINUSM in Mali, the UN regarded Canada as a preference given its 
expertise in such context, NATO member, allied to its French speaking familiarity however, the 
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Canadian hesitation led the UN and some of its close allies to frustration and disappointment, 
being the place attributed to a Swedish Commander due to the urgency on a decision (Blanchfiel 
and Berthiaume 2017). Canadian hesitancy is pointed to result from the recent election of Donald 
Trump, given the government’s need to consult the American administration of its peacekeeping 
plans as the minister of defense made clear (Blanchfiel and Berthiaume 2017) but also the ongoing 
commitment to Eastern Europe with the deployment of 200 troops to Ukraine in a non-UN mission 
thus diving the government on where to send peacekeepers (Nossal 2017, 37) but missing the 
opportunity to lead its first multinational peacekeeping mission in Africa and enhance Canada’s 
role as peacekeeper. 
Canada ended up taking part in operation PRESENCE, supporting the UN’s stabilization mission, 
which intends to provide MINUSMA with permanent assistance to medically evacuate UN forces 
by air but also transport of troops, equipment and supplies through logistic support (Government 
of Canada [2019h]). Its symbolic contribution counted with three CH-147 Chinook helicopters, five 
CH-146 Griffon helicopters, approximately 250 personnel and 10 CAF members taking part in the 
MINUSMA headquarters staff (Government of Canada [2019h]). The mission is intended to be 
complete by the end of August in 2019. 
 
Eastern Europe 
Following the 2013 protest movements in Ukraine the relationship between NATO members and 
Russia started to regress, culminating when Crimea was incorporated into the Russian Federation 
in February 2014, deteriorating relations even further. Although Ukraine is not a NATO member, 
such events would have a spillover effect on other Central and Eastern Europe countries which 
were member states, unleashing a series of sanctions which included the expelling of Russia from 
the G-8 group and military actions. By 2014 NATO had launched a set of actions in order to provide 
assistance to the alliance members in the region, acting as a stabilizing force but also to de-escalate 
the increasing tensions with Moscow (Nossal 2017, 38). Over this course, between 2014 and 
2015, Canada granted air, naval and land forces, thus taking part in Operation RESSURANCE 
which involved an air task force positioned in the Baltics and Romania; a maritime task force in 
the Mediterranean Sea, Baltic Sea and Eastern Atlantic Ocean; as well as a land task force deployed 
to training throughout Central and Eastern Europe (Government of Canada [2018b]). 
As soon as Justin Trudeau took over office, the electoral promise of “We will remain fully committed 
to Canada’s existing military contributions Central and Eastern Europe” was pursued thus 
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continuing the approach launched by the Conservative party by participating in NATO’s 
RESSURANCE operation and the multinational training mission in UKRAINE, entitled Operation 
UNIFIER (Liberal Party of Canada 2015, 71). In March of 2017 the government announced its 
decision to extend Canadian presence in operation UNIFIER for two more years until 2019 and by 
March of 2019 it was further extended until 2022 (Government of Canada [2018c]); Regarding the 
RESSURANCE mission Trudeau increased the Canadian commitment, announcing in July of 2016 
that Canada would lead a multinational battle group in Latvia; In June of 2017 Canadian-led NATO 
enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup Latvia was stood up, renewed in 2018 until 2023, also 
increasing the number of deployed members from 455 to 540 (Government of Canada [2018b]).  
 
Countering the self-proclaimed ISIL in Iraq and Syria 
When self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), also known as Daesh, first arose in 
the Middle East and the later announcement of a Caliphate, thus declaring religious authority over 
the Muslim people, Canada joined a US-led coalition force along with its closest allies aimed to 
defeat such group ensuring security and stability in the region (Nossal 2017, 39). In this context, 
the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) launched operation IMPACT in October of 2014, arranging two 
CF-188 hornets, a CP-140 Aurora and a CC-150T Pollaris air refueller to Kuwait joining the Global 
Coalition (Government of Canada [2018a]). In March of 2015 Canada’s commitment was renewed 
for one more year by Stephen Harper. (Government of Canada [2018a]). 
Justin Trudeau, by the time leader of the Liberal Party, severely opposed such military approach 
to the Daesh issue, considering that Canada should limit its intervention to humanitarian assistance 
in the region. Although such position became a controversial matter within the Liberal Party itself, 
Trudeau made clear that if he was to be elected prime minister in October of 2015, ending the CF-
18 air strikes would become a major policy priority, thus turning the focus to local forces training 
(Nossal 2017, 39). Throughout the electoral campaign such idea was intensively repeated and a 
core promise of its government program (Liberal Party of Canada 2015, 71), becoming official 
when the now elected Trudeau announced its new policy to address the crisis in Iraq and Syria on 
February of 2016 (Justin Trudeau [2016c]). Despite considerable criticisms from opposition, public 
opinion and even within its party, the government communicated its intention to withdraw the CF-
18s, ceasing airstrikes and reallocating Canadian resources on training, advising and assisting Iraq 
to tackle Daesh forces however, aerial refueling and surveillance activities were maintained as part 
of the Coalition’s military operations (Justin Trudeau [2016c]). In this regard, the number of staff 
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deployed to the training mission was tripled and a commitment towards the NATO training mission 
in Jordan was established (Nossal 2017, 40). According to Trudeau’s view, Canada could best 
contribute to the coalition campaign in Iraq and Syria through an effective and sustainable strategy 
that would enable local forces to carry out their own defense against Daesh instead of deploying 
external personnel to fight on their behalf (Paris 2017, 22).  
Although significant efforts were put forward by the government’s ministers to ensure that its allies 
accepted the new approach, such was not visible when Canada was excluded from a meeting of 
allied defense ministers in Paris to review the ongoing campaign against Daesh (Nossal 2017, 39). 
The chosen timing to announce the new policy was, however, unsuitable not only regarding internal 
public opinion but also external partners as Paris had just gone through a jihadist attack that killed 
130 people in November of 2015 and a Jihadist attack in Ouagadougou and Jakarta in January of 
2016 killed seven Canadians, causing hard judgments on Trudeau’s policies to Daesh (Nossal 
2017, 39).  
  
Welcoming Syrian Refugees48 
With the rise of a civil war in Syria in 2012, following the Arab uprisings and the rise of ISIS, over 
four million refugees had escaped the Syrian border, creating an unprecedented crisis (UNHCR 
[2019]), a topic with a high need of an advocacy and international assistance leader. If the 
conservative government had settled 2300 promised to welcome 25,000 refugees as a major 
campaign commitment as part of its immigration and refugees folder and the Liberal policy to 
encounter the self-proclaimed ISIL (Liberal Party of Canada 2015, 64), focusing on meeting the 
basic needs of those severely affected by the conflicts in the regions of Iraq and Syria (Justin 
Trudeau [2016c]),  
Although the refugee crisis did not initially take a central place in the campaign’s agenda, a 
photograph revealed in September of a lifeless three-year old Syrian child, Alan Kurdi, who was 
eventually trying to reach close family in Canada, British Colombia, along with his parents, not only 
shocked the world but particularly Canadians, thus assuming a deep impact in the remaining 
months of campaign (Nossal 2017, 40). Trudeau had long been a strong advocate of a generous 
policy approach to the welcoming of refugees in what the Syrian crisis was concerned, opposing 
 
 
48 The theme on Syrian Refugees could be perceived as a new topic to perfectly fit the Human Security Agenda as it regards the protection of 
individual from pervasive threats, being considered a hot topic among the international community.  
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to Harper who considered that military action would be the most effective strategy to address the 
root causes of such crisis. In this regard, the sudden emergence of such topic into the campaign 
enabled Trudeau to achieve considerable advantage given its impact on public opinion (Nossal 
2017, 42).  
The electoral promise to welcome 25,000 Syrian refugees in Canada was successfully 
accomplished and actually overcome by February of 2016 (Government of Canada 2016b) 
although considerable difficulties were found along the way in order to achieve such target in the 
quickest way possible (Nossal 2017, 42). Such achievement became a notable remark of 
Trudeau’s government legacy, counting with the joint work of multiple organizations, not only 
Canadian federal departments and agencies but also the UN, the IOM, governments of Lebanon, 
Turkey or Jordan and private sponsors, donations, among others (Government of Canada 2016b). 
In fact, such initiative has brought together Canadians around on single cause by setting up 
collective initiatives, raising money and pressuring the government to do more in a quicker way 
(Government of Canada [2019i]). This process easily reminds the ones on Human Security during 
the 1990’s: a strong civil society commitment with an active enrolment of NGO’s, private sector, 
but essentially effective diplomatic efforts in order to make it progress (Small 2016, 4).  
By January of 2019 Canada had admitted over 40,000 Syrian refugees, significantly beyond the 
initial electoral target to which should added the implementation of an outstanding resettlement 
program with all kinds of available services and support, costing the government $690 million (not 
counting Quebec) in 2017-2018 (Government of Canada [2019i]). Such welcoming became an 
important element of Trudeau’s rebranding mission as the New York Times published a first-page 
article citing that Canada had “embraced Syrian refugees like no other country” (Hillmer and 
Lagassé 2017, 8).  
 
3.4.3. International Advocacy 
 
As announced in its electoral platform, Trudeau promised to “restore Canadian leadership in the 
world” by making a “real and valuable contribution to a more peaceful and prosperous world” 
particularly through multilateral means as the country had done in the past (Liberal 2015, 68). 
High level diplomacy through international forums, may these be institutionalized or not, such as 
the United Nations or the G-7, would be a valuable mean by which Canadian government could 
make itself an active player again at the international realm as there is no higher stage to put 
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forward the its agenda ambitions. Such groups have always kept close ties with Liberal’s Foreign 
Policy approach, particularly those governments who eager to make its internationalist approach 
as a remarkable one both domestically and internationally. In fact, the government recognized that 
organizations such as the United Nations are a cornerstone of Canadian Foreign Policy, advancing 
that it “is Canada’s preeminent international forum for advancing issues that matter to Canadians” 
(Government of Canada [2019c]).  
In this regard, the following subtopics will focus on assessing Trudeau’s efforts towards a possible 
UNSC in 2021 and the attempts to build a transformative agenda within the ad hoc group G-7. 
 
Questing a Seat at the UNSC 
The UNSC is the most important political organ in the world given its especial role and powers on 
the maintenance of collective security, combining judiciary, legislature and executive powers in a 
single body. The liberal’s internationalist Foreign Policy approach take the bid for a UNSC as a 
mandatory commitment in every government as a unique opportunity to country’s enhance its 
international agenda, an essential platform for middle powers like Canada to make themselves 
more relevant in the context of major super powers (Charron 2017, 248). To remark the return of 
an internationalist engagement to Canadian Foreign Policy, Trudeau announced in the United 
Nations’ lobby, New York, on the 16th of March of 2016, “It’s time. It’s time to step up once again” 
(Charron 2017, 247), thus beginning its campaign to become a non-permanent member of the 
UN’s Security Council for a two-year term beginning in 2021 (Justin Trudeau [2016a]).  
Although the UN’s General Assembly will not vote until the fall of 2020, meaning that Trudeau will 
need to win a second federal election to personally return Canada to the UNSC, its achievement, 
or not, will become an important element of Trudeau’s government legacy, breaking, or not, 
Canada’s longest absence from the United Nations council since the organization was conceived, 
as the last two-year term was in 2000 under Jean Chrétien’s liberal government, 21 years ago 
(The Canadian Press 2016), with a defeat of the Harper government to Portugal in 2010, mainly 
due to its derive behavior towards the UN (Nossal 2017, 37). However, questions remain on 
whether Canada has done enough to earn such position in the last couple of years along with the 
fact that external competition will be stark.  
Canada’s direct competitors for the UNSC seat 2021 will be Norway and Ireland which has been 
elected to the post considerable fewer times than Canada, enjoying significant popularity and 
general support as well (Charron 2017, 247). The Irish government has been strongly endorsed in 
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what development aid is concerned, an essential UN priority, clearly surpassing Canada after the 
OECD results evidence that the country was able to achieve the 0.99% contribution in 2017 beating 
the 0.7% target of the total economy, whereas Canada’s 0.26% contribution even declined from 
0.31% in 2012 (Dohan 2018). Ireland, on the other hand, enhances its role as the only country 
which has been continuously present on UN- mandate peace operations, which used to be 
Canada’s trend but has dwindled since the end of the 1990’s and, although the Canadian 
government has allocated 250 personnel in Mali, it’s a symbolic presence when compared to 
Ireland’s ongoing consistency (Drohan 2018). In addition, addressing climate change has turned 
to be a defenseless topic when Canada is compared to its international partners. Although 
Trudeau’s government argues to be compromised to achieve the targets established by Harper of 
bringing the gas emissions 30% below 2005 by 2030 (Dhrohan 2018), in reality, however, a report 
by the provincial auditor general in 2018 revealed that the emissions are expected to be 20% higher 
than the fixed target (Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2018). In sum, Canada discourses 
about ‘punching above its eight’ but his competitors actually do.  
Allied to the fact that Trudeau carries Harper’s heritage within the UN, its government faces a 
harsh financial reality which considerably limits its fully endorsement on the UNSC 2021 project. 
Given the required amount of money and resources to carry out a campaign, grant engaged public 
servants and hold the seat itself, significant spending is also required to endorse its foreign agenda 
projects in order to make the country visible on a substantial number of pressing international 
concerns (Charron 2017, 254). It is worth noting that developing states, particularly in Africa, Asia 
and South America, need to feel that such country cares about their needs and concerns. However, 
perception that Canada is absent in such regions in what development assistance is concerned, 
may be a strong damaging factor on the opportunity to earn a seat given that Canada is not in 
position to promise financial support. As its development funding is currently very limited, 
encompassing very few poor countries in Africa, Trudeau’s approach has followed Harper’s 
development policy (Charron 2017, 254). Additionally, given the migration crisis faced by the EU, 
many states argue for the need to reinforce the voice of such states within the UNSC (Charron 
2017, 254).  
So far, Trudeau’s government has demonstrated to be primarily concentrated on its diplomatic 
relations with the United States along with its trade agreements such as preserving that NAFTA 
deal, revealing no clear efforts to overcome the lack of advantage over its competitors on the UNSC 
seat for 2021. 
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G-749 Summit 
Canada’s place among the seven most powerful countries in the world is a major reflection of its 
middle power status, an important one which Canada is not willing to loose, thus demanding 
considerable efforts to keep up with the world’s most advanced economies. Maintaining this 
traditional status has long been associated with the Canadian internationalist Foreign Policy and 
the LPC itself, since the country’s middle power title flourished through such approach in the 
postwar period under notable figures such as Lester B. Pearson. However, this status has faced 
better times, as UN data evidences that the time when Canada ‘punched above its weight’, 
deserving a middle power position among the world’s great nations, has longer been gone (Black 
and Gattinger 2017, 87). In this regard, and taking into account the overall promises on ‘Canada 
is Back’, the Group of Seven, regarded as a group that influences global trends and tackles 
pervasive issues, may be perceived as an important forum where the government can better 
promote and deliver its commitments, giving them an international projection and make itself 
visible again among the world greatest economies.  
Trudeau’s commitment to the G-7 forum has reflected its Foreign Policy approach, considering 
priorities as gender equality, peace and security, climate change and building a sustainable 
economy (Government of Canada [2019b]). Assuming the forum’s Presidency in 2018 was an 
important moment to put forward its policy ambitions, counting with the engagement from seven 
important groups, varying from Business, Civil Society, Labour, Science, Think Tanks, Women and 
Youth (Government of Canada [2019b]).Throughout its Presidency, Canada hosted the G-7 
Leaders’ Summit in Charlevoix, Quebec which is the calendar’s high point, intended to discuss key 
global issues but also hosted four sets of G-7 ministerial meetings aligned with the Canadian topics; 
additionally, Canada founded the Gender Equality Advisor Council for its presidency with the goal 
of including gender equality analysis in all activities and outcomes, thus building a transformative 
agenda (Government of Canada [2019b]).  
At the Leader’s Summit in Charlevoix, themes concerned economic growth; jobs of the future, 
gender equality and women’s empowerment; climate change, oceans and clean energy; peaceful 
and a secure world, resulting in an overall investment of $3.8 billion from the European Union, 
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the World Bank to support quality education for women 
 
 
49 As previously noted, Russia was expelled in 2014 from the G-group after its annexation of Crimea. Therefore, we shall consider G-7 instead of G-
8.  
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and girls living in crisis and conflict and fragile states, to which Canada contributed with $400 
million (Government of Canada [2019b]). On this same Summit, an outreach session was 
convened to tackle the question on how to work on resilient coasts and communities, sustainable 
oceans and fisheries as well as handling the issue of plastic in the oceans, counting with the 
presence of Argentina, Bangladesh, Haiti, South Africa, Seychelles, among other countries and 
international institutions such as the UN, WB, IMF and OECD with an outcome announcement of 
a $100 million investment to eliminate global marine litter and plastic from the ocean and $162 
million to build a more resilient coasts in climate-vulnerable countries (Government of Canada 
[2019b]).  
As evidenced, Gender Equality assumed a central role throughout the presidency as part of a more 
feminist Foreign Policy approach advanced by Trudeau (Tiessen and Swan 2017, 187), from which 
resulted an increased G-7 commitment to gender equality. For instance, through the report “Make 
Gender Inequality History”50, part of the initially established Advisory Council on this topic, an 
assessment and concrete recommendations for future presidencies was launched (Government of 
Canada 2019b). The 2018 G-7 presidency outcome documents expressed a straightforward 
addressment of gender equality, evidencing 81% of the tackled issues compared to the 46% average 
of the previous five years, corresponding to a significant part of the Canadian legacy in the 2018 
G-7 presidency (Government of Canada [2019b]). 
However, despite Canada’s good policy intentions, the group faces considerable instability since 
the arrival of Donald Trump as president of the United States, making it difficult for the Canadian 
government to take the spotlight. The new American President has brought significant internal 
division mainly caused by its unsteady relationship with several leaders within the group, a forum 
intended to be united due to their common interests therefore, able to effectively tackle global 
issues through collective action (Council on Foreign Relations 2019). One of Trump’s steps when 
he arrived in his first G-7 Summit in 2017 was, for instance, his refusal to recommit the U.S to the 
2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change as well as his intent to withdraw. Such tension was, 
once again, visible ahead of the G-7 Summit of 2018 in Canada when Trump advocated the 
readmission of Russia into the group after its pull out in 2014. Additionally, G-7 meetings have 
 
 
50 The report issued by the Gender Equality Advisory Council called attention for the empowerment of girls and women who should be supported 
with the necessary resources and opportunities; societies in which women are equally represented in decision making; prosperous and equitable 
economies based upon inclusiveness; a sustainable planet and peaceful, just and secure world (Government of Canada [2019b]).  
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been essentially focused on economic affairs, particularly regarding international trade agreements 
and the Trumps insistence on applying trade tariffs, such as the ones applied upon Canadian steel. 
The 2018 G-7 Summit, for instance, was remarked by Trump’s very hard position towards its 
closest allies regarding trade, which was visible in his public statement: “It’s going to stop or we’ll 
stop trading with them. An that’s a very profitable answer if we have to do it”, he noted, earning 
equally detestable replies from its partners such as the United Kingdom, France, or even Canada 
who’s prime minister stated that “As Canadians, we are polite, we’re reasonable, but also we will 
not be pushed around” (Shear and Porter, 2018). 
All in all, considerable efforts were endorsed by Canada to take its internal and external agenda 
objectives into the G-7 realm as an attempt to reconnect Canada’s internationalist approach and 
upgrade the country’s image. However, as exposed, the timing was not a favorable one and 
Canadian, both symbolic and substantive, resolutions were not enough to effectively revive 
Canada’s image, particularly at a time of turmoil when the G-7 is facing a crisis of efficiency and 
deadlock due to the tense relations with the American President, leaving no spotlight room for 
Canada’s initiatives.  
 
3.5. Final Considerations  
 
As Paris notes, pursuing a FP that acts as mirror of Canadians in order to promote national unity 
has always been an overall goal of Canadian governments, although more visible through the 
Liberal approach however, he makes clear that, given the national context between 2015 and 
2019, there was no urgent demand to clearly enhance that objective (Paris 2019). As Trudeau’s 
first term arrived to an end, most Canadian voters remained skeptical on whether Canada is back, 
not disregarding the question on whether they have, or not, made a difference in today’s turbulent 
world. 
Throughout the 2015 election campaign, the Liberal’s drew its political future by defining Canada’s 
place in the world: a middle power highly committed to multilateralism, human-rights and rule of 
law, thus renewing the Canadian brand lost during the Harper years. By understanding the gap 
between the previous Conservative policies and the expectations from the Canadian public, Justin 
Trudeau promised to restore the country’s well-known reputation at the international stage to which 
Canadians were most familiar with, allied to a reengagement with the United Nations and 
peacekeeping missions. Trudeau’s government endorsed a set of initiatives establishing its efforts 
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on women and children in vulnerable contexts, including a refocus of Canada’s development policy 
on gender allied the empowerment of women and girls’ rights, particularly seen during the G-7 
Summit in Charlevoix. In this regard, there was no direct intention of going back to the 1990’s 
agenda and discourse on HS, although many initiatives seem to assume the same framework given 
that they are all globally grounded on the same Canadian values and principles (Paris 2019).  
In what international assistance and peacekeeping is concerned, the Liberal government has 
agreed to participate in peacekeeping and security operations however, its endorsements have 
been done in a reluctantly and haphazardly manner, for instance, despite calls from the UN and 
France, the Trudeau government has announced that by the end of 2019 Canada will exit and 
terminate its mission in Mali therefore, reflecting indifference towards its closest allies. Most of its 
contribution abroad lacks an explanation on how they serve the broad Canadian interests, mostly 
because the government is yet to clarify on what such interests are in the absence of a proper FP 
review. Seemingly, although Trudeau aimed to uphold his Foreign Policy approach and it is 
assumed as considerable remark of its mandate, it is still off the pace of some Nordic countries 
who are also running for the 2021 UNSC non-permanent sear, where effective policies are well 
backed up not only in research but also significant funding.  
Particularly after Chrystia Freeland’s nomination as foreign affairs minister, replacing Stephane 
Dion, Canada Foreign Policy strategy was redesigned and new agenda priorities were set (Paris 
2019), being mainly aligned with American interests and slipstreaming its course. While a relatively 
permissive international environment during Trudeau’s first year in office had allowed for the 
gradual endorsement of international initiatives, red lights flashed in Ottawa and across the country 
when Donald Trump was elected as the new American President, being remarked as the first 
Foreign Policy crisis to affect the government and which demanded effective measures (Paris 2017, 
24), by taking the Canada-U.S. relations to the emergency level (Paris 2019).  
Trudeau’s agenda setting process was somehow inconsistent by not making sufficiently clear is 
Foreign Policy ground, also based on a poor policy formulation space (less instrumental intentions 
and low level of knowledge - table 2). In what implementation is concerned, substantial and 
procedural implementation tools (Information, Authority, Treasure, Organization- Table 1) were not 
considerably endorsed although some cooperation with the United Nations was seen (Vancouver 
Principles) as well as the enrollment of civil society on the welcoming of Syrian refugees and the 
Charlevoix Summit initiatives. Additionally, the absence of implementation or entrepreneurial 
leadership as the one perceived during Chrétien’s approach was made clear. As Trudeau’s former 
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advisor noted, Roland Paris, there was a formal agenda-setting before Trump and an informal 
agenda-setting after the election of Donald Trump, by reordering priorities (Paris 2019). 
 
Table 5. Trudeau's Substantive and Procedural Implementation Tools 
 
 
Purpose 
Governing Resources 
 Information Authority Treasure Organization 
Substantive 
of tool 
 Cooperation of 
Foreign Affairs, dnd 
and Ministry of 
iInternational 
Development and La 
Francophonie  
 
 Public Consultations 
on IAR and DR; 
Civil society 
consultation on G-
7report “Make Gender 
Inequality History” 
Procedural  G-7 presidency 
advisory Council on 
gender equality 
No significant NGO 
funding 
Establishment of 
Global Affairs Canada 
(Department of 
Foreign Affairs, Trade 
and Development) 
Source: Adapted by the author from Howlett 2019, 150-236. 
Although a different breeze was felt with the new government, it was indeed not sufficient to 
knockout President Trump’s protectionist approach and trade agenda, towards which the Liberals 
allocated most of its resources, particularly in what the NAFTA deal is concerned as a major 
economic asset for Canada, leaving behind a long list of empty promises. 
Rebranding as a marketing ploy was used as powerful tool to reinforce Trudeau’s domestic base 
but carry the real change that the its government promised mainly because the balance between 
actions and rhetoric demonstrated to be inconsistent and sometimes times contradictory. Canada’s 
approach was mostly focused on messaging and advancing the Liberal brand, with a considerable 
amount of resources allocated to Washington leaving behind the project of adopting its FP project. 
 
Figure 10. Trudeau’s Government Agenda-Setting and Policy Implementation 
 
  
International Assistance Review
Defense Review
Feminist Foreign Policy
•Agenda-setting
United Nations Cooperation (Elsie Initiative on Women
in Peace Operations);
Close cooperation between Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
National Defense and Ministry of iInternational
Development and La Francophonie (Vancouver
Principles);
Involvement of Civil Society, Private Sector and NGO's in
international causes (Syrian Refugees) and public
consultations (IAR)
•Policy Implementation
Conclusion 
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The present research work began by asserting that it emerged from the ambition of reconciling the 
study of Political Science with international dynamics. To analyze such interaction, Canada was 
the chosen case study in the context of its domestic search for national unity within diversity and 
its liberal internationalist Foreign Policy, particularly in the periods between 1995-2000 and 2015-
October 2019, highlighting its Human Security agenda in the early 1990s and the liberal project 
fifteen years later. As an attempt to provide an interpretative approach on how Canada has 
instrumentalized the ongoing dynamics between internal and external environments to promote its 
national interests, this dissertation raised the following question: Why has Human Security, framed 
within the liberal internationalist approach, has been instrumentalized to foster national unity in 
Canada during the governments of Jean Chrétien (1995-2000) and Justin Trudeau (2015-2019)? 
The chosen approach to address this question involved a justification in light of the agenda-setting 
and policy implementation processes, also considering the international and domestic context at 
the time of each government. However, in broader terms, outlining the background on the 
theoretical and conceptual framework revealed to be an essential tool for this dissertation. In this 
regard, the concepts of National Unity, Foreign Policy, Human Security were individually analyzed 
with focus on how all three may be articulated in the case study context: Human Security discourse 
and agenda, with its peak during the 1990’s, may be conceived as Foreign Policy tool motivated 
by domestics politics based on the selfish purpose of promoting national unity within its borders 
through the power of values. 
Such analysis was grounded on the idea that the external construction of discourses through 
Foreign Policy approaches informs domestic politics by targeting domestic and external audiences, 
depending on the final purpose, considering the national driven essence of a state’s action. Such 
conceptual linkage not also answers the ‘why’ for this case study by underlying the need for national 
unity which induces the state in a search of the means to achieve its ends, but it also inaugurates 
the ‘how’ present in the research question by noticing the performance of Foreign Policy, framed 
under the Human Security discourse, as the mean through which national unity may be achieved.  
This analysis, however, would not be complete without highlighting role played by soft power, state-
branding and values as complementary concepts which bind together the major premises of this 
thesis. Soft power is conceived as a Foreign Policy tool that confers states with the capacity to 
influence others and obtain the desired outcomes, providing them with the ability to highly influence 
the international agenda. Such ability can be related with the power of its political values which are 
considered to be a source of moral authority and legitimacy, whereas these same values are 
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translated into a differentiation point that remark an image and reputation, also recognized as state 
brand that may nourish domestic pride.  
In what the case study is concerned, two major conclusions where recognized regarding the 
hypothesis firstly formulated:  
 
H. Jean Chrétien’s government has adopted the Human Security discourse and agenda by 
endorsing a solid agenda setting and policy implementation process, complemented by a favorable 
normative and empirical international context as the means to foster internal sense of national 
unity. Justin Trudeau’s government, on the other hand, lacked a coherent agenda setting and policy 
implementation process, facing an hostile and unstable external environment in the pursue of a 
Foreign Policy discourse and agenda to foster national unity. 
 
C1. There was a significant internal necessity to foment national unity during the government of 
Jean Chrétien (1995-2000) who endorsed a clear agenda-setting and a powerful policy 
implementation strategy in the promotion of Human Security as a Foreign Policy approach, taking 
advantage of a favorable international context in order to successfully foster national unity. 
Being internally motivated to promote national unity in a domestic context of crisis regarding the 
Quebec referendum and economic restraints, Chrétien sought to adopt a FP that would bring 
Canadians together. A clear agenda-setting was pursued by the launch of a Foreign Policy Review 
in 1995 which established the three pillars of Canada’s FP approach, highlighting the essential 
role values and culture (Government of Canada 1995) being later complemented by the 1999 
Concept Papers which established Canada’s position on Human Security, meeting the points 
initially conceived in 1995, also complemented by the articulation of discourse between the Prime 
minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Axworthy. An effective and exhausting policy 
implementation was also pursued, through substantial and procedural implementation tools 
(Information, Authority, Treasure, Organization- Table 4) also expressed on its entrepreneurial and 
implementation leadership through essential ad-hoc skills, allocation of resources and other 
strategies to overcome the traditional diplomatic deadlock, setting the example and providing the 
necessary support but also backed by an active public diplomacy program. This not only allowed 
an effective international performance through compelling action and outcomes but also a highly 
successful perception by the other international actors therefore, increasing the chances of a very 
likely internal legitimization. 
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Also worth noting, Human Security was the chosen approach at a time when the concept was 
under the international spotlight not only in the academy but also in the real world context where 
new answers were demanded to tackle new political and security dynamics (Kaldor 2013, 2-3). 
Adopting the overall Canadian state brand, Chrétien’s HS approach essentially focused on children 
and civilians by launching initiatives that would fall upon these as security objects. The ongoing 
context, not only favored Canada to actively contribute towards the definition of the concept through 
its added value on the freedom from fear approach, for instance, but by actually having the 
opportunity to apply its vision to real cases, sometimes providing the needed responses to urgent 
international causes (e.g. Landmines Treaty), many times taking advantage of its already known 
reputation as peacekeeper.  
 
C2. There was no major necessity of fomenting national unity during the government of Justin 
Trudeau neither the intention of restoring Human Security. However, there was a promise of 
returning Canada’s traditional Foreign Policy through a new approach but whose efforts became 
constrained by an adverse external environment, also failing to endorse an effective agenda-setting 
and policy implementation processes  
Elected in a relatively calm context within Canadian society, with no considerable crisis to be 
managed, Justin Trudeau was elected in 2015 representing optimism and fresh air into Canadian 
politics that many desired after ten years of conservative government but with no substantial 
intention of fomenting national unity as a priority. His personal style and idealistic messages hinted 
a return to Canada’s traditional role in external affairs that many Canadians identified with, as 
pronouncements on a new agenda focused on environment, diversity and gender, a turning point 
in Canadian politics (Nimijean 2018, 128). Although these topics could be perfectly grounded on 
Human Security as they are very consistent with its approach given its common base of Canadian 
values and liberal internationalism, there was no outlined intention of going back to the 1990’s. 
Instead the new government sought to place emphasis on women and children in vulnerable 
contexts (Paris 2019).  
Considering Trudeau’s agenda-setting an policy- implementation processes, the first was somehow 
underperformed and inconsistence in the absence of a Foreign Policy Review to outline the turning 
point, but formulating an International Assistance and Defense Review with no consistent FP 
ground. However, as Roland Paris made clear, there was a formal agenda-setting before Trump 
and an informal agenda-setting after the American election, resulting in a reorder of priorities (Paris 
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2019). In what policy implementation was concerned, there were no effective substantial and 
procedural implementation tools (Information, Authority, Treasure, Organization- Table 1) neither 
implementation or entrepreneurial leadership as the one perceived during Chrétien’s approach, 
although some cooperation with the United Nations was seen (Vancouver Principles) as well as the 
enrollment of civil society on the welcoming of Syrian refugees and the Charlevoix Summit 
initiatives. Paris highlighted that most of Canada’s FP resources were allocated to Washington 
(Paris 2019) managing the Canada-U.S relations, not disregarding the opportunity to elect a 
Canadian commanding officer for the MINUSM mission in Mali which was rejected by Canada, 
thus disappointing the expectations of its international partners and the UN itself.  
By the time Donald Trump was elected in the United States, a “four alarm fire” turned on in Ottawa 
(Paris 2019), generating an adverse external environment to pursue the established agenda and 
demanding a complete reorganization of priorities.  
 
Table 6. Hypothesis and conclusions 
 Jean Chrétien’s Government 
(Hypothesis confirmed?) 
Justin Trudeau’s Government 
(Hypothesis confirmed?) 
Strong internal environment determinants ü  x 
National Unity Purpose ü  x 
Human Security Agenda ü  x 
Effective Agenda-Setting / Policy Implementation ü  x 
Favorable external environment determinants ü  x 
Canadian State Brand and Domestic Values (Soft Power) 
- Liberal Internationalist approach 
ü  ü  
Source: Formulated by the author. 
Taking the two governments and considering the comparative approach through the method of 
difference, both liberal governments were driven by a liberal internationalist approach to Foreign 
Policy based on traditional Canadian values of diversity, equality, dialogue, fairness and peace, 
essentially grounded on the Canadian state brand of diversity as strength and source of peace 
therefore having something to offer the world. However, they differ considerably on the purposes 
of the intention of their policies, on the domestic and external context as well as the efficiency of 
their agenda setting and policy implementation strategies.  
Chrétien’s government was highly influenced by domestic determinants (national unity crisis- 
internal environment) to pursue a FP approach that would act as a mirror of Canadian society, one 
that would bind Canadians together, adopting HS which was reflected its values and brand but was 
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also the mainstream discourse at the international stage with no significant constraints (external 
environment). Such discourse could count with a considerable Canadian contribution, one which 
effectively did considering the effective agenda-setting (internal environment) and policy 
implementation (external environment) processes endorsed by the Canadian government, 
therefore increasing the probability of fomenting internal legitimacy and moral authority in the form 
of national unity (Internal environment).  
Although there is a general consent that all governments should take national unity as a priority, 
particularly liberal governments, opting for a FP that brings Canadians together (Paris 2019), in 
2015 Justin Trudeau had no significant domestic determinants (internal environment) that 
demanded taking national unity to the emergency level. Although some FP initiatives seemed to 
reflect a HS discourse, there was no intention of returning such discourse, being essentially 
explained by their common ground on Canadian values and Canada’s traditional state brand. 
Similarly, in what agenda-setting and policy implementation is concerned in the endorsement of a 
new FP discourse, there was not an effective performance when compared to Chrétien’s 
government, essentially explained by the need to reformulate priorities in the face of a perverse 
and unstable international environment. 
Considering The Process of Rolemanship Model (Thomsen and Hyken 2006, 257) initially 
presented in this thesis: Chrétien’s government clearly assumed its role (internal environment) 
through an effective agenda-setting process, complemented by and active and outstanding role 
performance in what policy implementation is concerned (external environment), therefore being 
positively perceived by its international partners and increasing the chances of role internalization. 
Justin Trudeau, on the other hand, did not clearly define its role, at least in formal terms through 
an explicit agenda-setting, neither did effectively perform its role by endorsing an effective policy 
implementation process, mainly influenced by the external environment, also missing the 
opportunity to be perceived by its international partners and increase the chances of the role being 
internalized. 
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Source: Adapted by the author from Thomsen and Hyken 2006, 257. 
 
Research contribution 
 
The main research contribution of this research work relies on its interdisciplinary approach, 
argument originality and puzzle definition in what concepts are concerned.  
Through this approach it was evidenced how internal and external environment of state action are 
in permanent interaction and mutually constructed given the influence of both domestic and 
international determinants over state behavior through policy outputs and polity inputs (Figure 3) 
which were present in the chosen case study.  
By taking into consideration the selfish purpose of state behavior at the international stage, this 
work privileges domestic reasons for such approach to be endorsed, particularly the domestic 
search for alternative strategies of aggregation, using international dynamics to achieve internal 
purposes. Although the focus remains on domestic intentions, external determinants are also 
considered important variables that may, or not, uphold the achievement of the established goals. 
Shading light upon the importance played by effective agenda-setting and policy implementation 
processes from a Foreign Policy perspective, providing one valuable explanation for the successful, 
or not, achievement of the established goals. 
The last contribution is related with the chosen case studies. Although there is significant research 
on Jean Chrétien’s Foreign Policy approach, particularly under the Human Security Agenda, there 
is no considerable explanation on how the purpose of national unity was fomented, especially taking 
into account the effective agenda setting and policy implementation processes therefore, 
enhancing how the role was assumed, performed and perceived, with very likeability of being 
internally legitimized by Canadian society. In what Justin Trudeau’s government is concerned, very 
few research has been completed on his first term, particularly domestic determinants and Foreign 
Figure 12 Chrétien's Rolemanship Model Process Figure 11 Trudeau's Rolemanship Model Process 
 
 
 138 
Policy options. In this regard, taking into account his known nostalgic messages on Canada’s past 
approaches, an assessment on its internal motivations as well as overall performance on agenda 
setting and policy implementation are considered to be valuable topics of research, particularly by 
taking into comparison a successful case study from the past. 
 
Future Research Venues 
 
A possible future research venue shall consider state behavior within internal and external 
environment taking domestic determinants as the starting point. Analyzing such behavior from a 
Foreign Policy making process could be enriched with a deeper research into the complete policy 
cycle course by taking into account agenda setting along with policy formulation, decision- making, 
policy implementation but also policy evaluation phases in order to capture an overall picture of 
the process. Such approach not only would be more complete in what policy analysis is concerned, 
but would also provide additional explanations for state behavior such as institutional conflicts 
between departments (FP and DND) or competition on funds allocation, for instance. Additional it 
would be of valuable interest taking into deeper consideration the role played by pressure and 
advocacy groups in the policy process, particularly in more humanitarian Foreign Policy 
approaches.  
In what the case study is concerned, Justin Trudeau’s first term has a wide set of possible research 
lines given its recent performance and outcomes yet to be perceived in the long term run, such as 
the results of its agenda setting and policy implementation processes. Additionally, given the recent 
election of Justin Trudeau for a second term in Ottawa, new determinants emerged within the 
domestic context and new agenda setting topics were revealed in the Liberal campaign. Although 
this research concluded that the there was no emergency need to promote national unity during 
the first term, the 2019 election results announced considerable losses for the liberal government 
with considerable gains for Bloc Québécois. Quebec’s nationalist party, who added more 22 seats 
in parliament to the 10 conquered in 2015, counting with a total representation of 32 deputies 
and passing from the forth (2015) to the third political force in power (CBC 2019). In this regard, 
concerns of national unity should take further reflection within the government’s second term.  
Also, the Liberal 2019 election platform has revealed interesting topics in what Foreign Policy 
agenda is concerned, noting the promise to “lead an international campaign to ensure that all 
children living in refugee or displacement camps can get the good education they need and 
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deserve” (Liberal 2019), expressing a substantial FP project, one that should require effective 
agenda setting and policy implementation processes. As highlighted by Paris, expecting that 
Canada-U.S relations are now stabilized with a new NAFTA agreement signed and the removal of 
U.S tariffs over Canadian steel and aluminum, a new endorsement over foreign affairs beyond its 
southern neighbor is expected to happen as well as a Foreign Policy review (Paris 2019), 
particularly if the ambition of reaching a UNSC non-permanent seat in 2021 still endures. 
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Appendix 1 Concluding Summary Table 1 
 
 Government of Jean Chrétien 
1995-2000 
Government of Justin Trudeau 
2016-2019 
International context 
Post-Cold War Period – Normative and political 
reconfiguration of security context promotes the 
emergence of international initiatives where the individual 
is the main subject of security – Human Security. 
Post 9/11 period – Re-emergence of national security 
discourses advocating state-centrism allied to widespread 
resentment feelings from the electoral allied to the rise of 
non-western powers and non-state actors. 
Domestic Context 
Political and economic crisis – The late 1980’s, early 
1990’s, were a period of clear economic recession with 
direct impact on Canadian’s daily lives; uprising of 
separatist discourses within Quebec lead to a 
Referendum; Political instability in Parliament during the 
1st mandate demanded call of new elections. 
Ten years of conservative government, economic 
concerns, low Quebec nationalism – Trudeau’s four year 
term was marked by very few support for Quebec’s 
separatism and no considerable economic issues 
although there was a sense of economic insecurity 
among lower branches of society. After a decade of 
conservative government Canadians demanded a new 
political approach.  
Di
sc
ou
rs
e 
Ag
en
da
 - 
Se
tti
ng
 
Official documents 
ü 1995 Canadian Foreign Policy Review: "Canada in 
the World" 
ü 1999 Concept Paper: “Human Security: Safety for 
the People in a Changing World” 
 
ü International Assistance Review 
ü Feminist International Assistance Policy 
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Source: Elaborated by the author.  
  
Ac
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n 
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- 
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n 
Policy initiatives 
ü Ottawa Process 
ü Civilians and Children in Armed Conflict 
ü Responsibility to Protect 
 
ü The Vancouver Principles 
ü Elsie Initiative on Women in Peace Operations 
 
Institutional Capacity ü International Criminal Court 
ü Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative No initiatives released 
International assistance 
ü Haiti 
ü Balkans 
ü East Timor 
 
ü Mali (controversial performance) 
ü Eastern Europe 
ü Countering self-proclaimed ISIL IN Iraq 
ü Large welcome of Syrian refugees 
 
International Advocacy 
ü UNSC 1996 seat achievement with considerable 
voting consensus 
ü Significant endorsement of diplomatic resources 
towards the UN on a wide set of initiatives 
ü Contribution to UNSC Resolution 1295 (2000) 
ü G-7 Summit in Halifax 
ü Poor campaign for 2021 UNSC non- permanent 
seat 
ü Poor allocation of diplomatic resources towards the 
United Nations 
ü G-7 Leaders’ Summit in Charlevoix 
ü Report “Make Gender Inequality History” 
ü Gender Equality Advisory Council G-7 Presidency 
Results 
ü International agenda setting capacity 
ü International visibility 
ü UNSC non-permanent seat election 
ü Increased influence within the UN 
ü Reinforced Middle Power position 
ü Strengthen multilateralism 
ü HS efforts as a source of pride among Canadians 
Future Investigation Topic 
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Appendix 2 Concluding Summary Table 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
  
 Government of Jean Chrétien 
1995-2000 
Government of Justin Trudeau 
2016-2019 
Li
be
ra
l i
nt
er
na
tio
na
lis
m
 F
or
ei
gn
 P
ol
ic
y  
ap
pr
oa
ch
 National Unity 
ü Consideration of the 1991 Report on Citizen’s 
Forum 
ü 1995 Canadian Foreign Policy Review 
Not Evidenced 
Values 
ü 1995 Canadian Foreign Policy Review: "Canada in 
the World" 
ü 1999 Concept Paper: “Human Security: Safety for 
the People in a Changing World” 
ü Reflection of Canadian State Brand 
(Democratic accessibility antidote to populism of Brexit, 
the Donald, Trump Presidency, anti-immigration 
sentiments and right-wing rhetoric); 
ü International Assistance Review 
ü Feminist International Assistance Policy 
Human Security 
ü Ottawa Process 
ü Civilians and Children in Armed Conflict 
ü Responsibility to Protect 
ü International Criminal Court 
ü Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative 
ü The Vancouver Principles 
ü Elsie Initiative on Women in Peace Operations 
ü Large welcome of Syrian refugees 
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Source: Elaborated by the author. 
  
•Multin-nation state 
•Quebec nationalism
•Multicultural society
•Lack of collective memory and 
narratives
Domestic 
Sources
•Liberal internationalism ✓
•Human Security Agenda
•Children / Civilians
•Feminist FP
•Women /Girls
•Refugees assistance
Foreign Policy •Internationalism
•Promotion of Canadian values and 
principles
•Middle Power status
•Like-Minded States
•Mutual construction of external and 
internal identity
•Building a state identity through Soft 
Power tools
Canadian 
Brand
•State behavior reflects state 
identity (shapes collective 
meanings, purpose and 
expectations)
•FP as a domestic mirror
•National destinctiveness
•Language of Universalism
•Soft Power Narrative on internal 
political values
National Unity
Appendix 3 Concluding Summary Figure 
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Appendix 4 Interview Information 
 
Name Institution Area Interview 
Form 
Date-Time Guide 
Roland Paris University of 
Ottawa 
Academic and Former 
Global Affairs / 
National Defense 
Advisor 
Video 
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Appendix 5 Interview Guide - A 
 
1. The promotion of National Unity through the advocacy of values as a source of moral legitimacy 
has always been present in the Liberal’s Foreign Policy strategy. Did Justin Trudeau ambition to 
foment such feeling among Canadians when adopting a nostalgic discourse on Canada’s past 
legacy by promising a similar future? 
2. In terms of national unity, Quebec nationalism, economic constraints and social movements, 
how would you describe the national context by the Time Justin Trudeau was elected in 2015 and 
throughout his government? 
2.1. What did Trudeau’s message have to address such context with Canadians awarding 
him a significant majority at the polls? 
3. Trudeau’s 2015 election campaign and some initiatives during its government have endorsed a 
number of topics that could frame a new or updated human security agenda. These included the 
increasing global migration and the Syrian refugees, gender equality or even climate change as a 
direct threat to the security of individuals. Do you consider there was an initial ambition to 
(re)pursue such approach? 
4. In your contribution to the “Canada Among Nations 2017 – Justin Trudeau and Canadian Foreign 
Policy” publication, you noted that the government was less effective at explaining its actual Foreign 
Policy to Canadians. While there was a development assistance review and a defense review in 
2016, why was there no Foreign Policy official statement or review? 
5. Considering that there has been a discourse- reality gap in Trudeau’s overall performance, 
particularly after its first year in office, which key factors do you consider to have most influenced 
this final outcome and why? 
6. Would you say that there have been two agenda setting processes? One before the election of 
Donald Trump, which you were part of as a policy advisor, and a new one after.  
6.1. What do you consider to have failed at the policy implementation stage? 
 
Annex 
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Annex 1. The Vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and Preventing the Recruitment and Use of Child 
Soldiers 
The Vancouver Principles 
1. Mandates All UN peace mandates shall include child protection provisions; 
2. Planning Prioritize prevention on recruitment and use of child soldiers in all peace operation planning; 
3. Early Warning 
Support to UN efforts on monitoring, reporting, 
identification and address of early warning signs 
of recruitment and use of child soldiers; 
4. Child protection focal points 
Account child protection focal points throughout 
mission command structures both military and 
policy, developing an international standard 
among participating nations; enable active 
coordination, and cooperation between such focal 
points and civilian Child Protection Advisors; 
5. Training 
All peacekeepers shall receive training on child 
protection as well as guidance on interaction with 
children being used by armed groups through a 
United Nations standard; 
6. Monitoring and Reporting 
Grave Violations against children in armed 
conflicts shall be reported by peacekeepers 
through the appropriate channels, ensuring 
monitoring and accountability measures; 
7. Protection and care of children 
All children, including the ones involved with 
armed groups, that contact with peacekeepers 
shall be treated in accordance and protected 
against violations of international humanitarian 
law and international human rights law; 
8. Prevention 
Protection to children at risk of recruitment or 
used as child soldier should be put forward based 
on credible information in accordance with the 
engagement rules of the mandate; 
9. Detention 
Used as a last resort, detained children shall be 
treated in consistency with international norms 
and children’s rights; they should be handed to 
civilian protection authorities in shortest term 
possible in accordance with the defined policies 
and guidance; 
10. Conduct and discipline 
Peacekeeping personnel should follow the highest 
standard of conduct but also investigate and 
prosecute, in accordance with national law, any 
incidents of possible abuse against children by 
UN peacekeepers; 
11. Contribution of women Contribution of women to peacekeeping 
operational effectiveness shall be recognized; 
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Source : Elaborated by the author from Government of Canada [2019e]. 
 
12. Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration (DDR) 
Child soldiers shall be set as a priority in all UN’s 
supported disarmament, demobilization, 
reintegration and repatriation (if the case) efforts, 
preventing future re-recruitment and promote the 
transition to normal life; 
13. Mental health 
Promote research on trauma experienced by 
peacekeepers dealing with child soldiers; 
providing both pre and post deployment support; 
14. Peace Processes 
Child protection provisions should be included 
within the terms of peace processes, agreements 
and post-conflict efforts considering their 
vulnerability and the importance of an effective 
reintegration: 
15. Sanctions Support of child recruitment and use as a UN 
sanctions regimes criteria; 
16. Best practices 
Share with Member States and the UN best 
practices and learned lessons in peacekeeping 
contexts regarding recruitment and use of child 
soldiers; 
17. Further guidance 
Development of operational guidance for the 
implementation of the above principles in 
consultation with member states and the UN. 
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